Exploring the governance of private finance for the electricity sector in sub-Saharan Africa by Gregory, Julian Andrew
   
 
A University of Sussex PhD thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
EXPLORING THE GOVERNANCE 
OF PRIVATE FINANCE FOR THE 
ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
  
Julian Andrew Gregory 
Thesis submitted for a Doctor of Philosophy  
  
 Science and Technology Policy Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), 
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK 
January 2020 
  
   
    
                          
Page 2 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration 
  
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been, and will not be, submitted in 
whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.  
  
 
Signature: …………………………………………………………  
Julian Gregory 
 
  
Page 3 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Executive Summary 
My dissertation is a paper style thesis, which contains the following chapters: an introduction; a 
research design; three chapters, each derived from a different successful peer reviewed policy paper 
(there were corrections applied to each of the original papers); and a discussion and conclusions 
section. My thesis aims to answer the following research question: ‘What aspects of governance 
deter private investors from financing large-scale electricity network infrastructure in sub-Saharan 
Africa?’ My methodology utilises a Hypothetico-deductive approach: which focuses on the impact 
of risk surrounding the private financing process, when applied to electricity infrastructure 
development in the sub-Saharan region. My sources for evidence are mixed and multidisciplinary; 
and my analysis principally applies a governance lens.  
This is an important topic, as it is over 20 years since the multilateral development 
community re-focused its policy surrounding the improvement of electricity access in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), to one that places private sector financing at the centre of its 
strategy (which transpired during the leadership of the World Bank by James Wolfensohn 
in the 1990s). Yet according to a recently published report by the IEA: ‘despite being 
home to 17% of the world’s population, Africa currently accounts for just 4% of global 
power supply investment’ – suggesting a significant policy failure for over twenty years.  
With SSA’s population forecast to double by the UN by 2050, it is imperative that the 
development community understands why such a policy is gaining so little traction. 
Affordable and reliable energy access is crucial for the economic growth that such a rapid 
population increase will require. If it is not delivered, excessive environmental damage 
will otherwise occur, as the enlarging population will have to continue to rely on 
unsustainably biofuel sources for its energy needs (mostly wood – causing deforestation); 
and ever increasing social problems will ensue, due to accelerating competition for scarce 
resources by this ever-growing population. 
My first paper has two functions: firstly, to reformulate the relevance of risk within 
the academic research community as an obstruction to the private financing of new SSA 
electricity infrastructure development. Secondly, to confirm and classify those risks that 
can be found in the greater interdisciplinary literature, which would negatively influence 
a private, financier’s willingness to invest in this type of infrastructure. To do this, I firstly 
analysed a manageable five-year sample of literature surrounding three African countries 
with a notable body of academic literature: Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania. To create 
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my sample, I systematically interrogated the two principle academic libraries of Scopus 
and the Web of Science, using key terms. My secondary analysis then digs deeper, by 
including further interdisciplinary literature not specific to the first sample, drawing from 
the Project Management, Finance, and Innovation academic disciplines – to identify and 
classify all relevant and likely risks.  
My second paper is theoretical and utilises three separate perspectives to deliver a 
holistic and inclusive governance picture, to answer the following research question: 
‘What aspects of governance deter private investors from financing large-scale electricity 
network infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ These perspectives comprise: 1) Financial 
Investment Governance, the private sector investor’s perspective, which focuses on the 
rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly influence the financial investment 
environment in SSA. 2) Political Governance, the political economy perspective, which 
relate to the negative, indirect investment consequences resulting from the way that SSA 
governments govern; and 3) Technical System Governance, a ‘systems’ perspective, 
which encompasses how the standard structure and organisation of the wider electricity 
delivery system in each country in SSA, negatively impacts such investment.  
My third paper focuses on the impact of governance surrounding large-scale 
electricity infrastructure development (megaprojects), by empirically analysing six case 
studies located in South Africa. My guide for my fieldwork was the following research 
question: ‘What aspects of project governance are important, to prevent time delays and 
cost overruns, when building large scale electricity infrastructure in South Africa?’ This 
research question is relevant to my thesis’ primary interrogation theme, as the adherence 
to schedules and budgets are of central importance to successful private financing of such 
infrastructure.  
My discussion and conclusions section commences with an explanation for why the multilateral 
development community should persevere with their policy of promoting private financing of 
electricity infrastructure development, in SSA. I do this by first explaining why access to affordable 
and reliable electricity services in Africa is crucial for promoting the meaningful economic growth 
in the region. I then discuss why the alternatives to this policy, are less inclusive and more exploitive. 
I then use this positioning to frame my key findings from my research, which I then clarify. Finally, 
I discuss policy implications surrounding my findings and possible policy solutions. 
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Prologue: 
Why I commenced this academic journey 
I first stumbled across the issue of electricity poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, in 2011. 
When I say stumbled, this is not meant to trivialise the issue, or demean its magnitude or 
impact on the region – I just had zero awareness of the problem as it then existed, in any 
capacity; and I certainly wasn’t aware that this subject was about to redefine my life.  
In 2011, I was living in Australia, helping my then 12-year-old son recover from 
intensive medical treatment for leukaemia (he is now a healthy twenty-one-year-old) and 
being introspective about my life. I was at that point, working on the financing of several 
solar PV renewable electricity generation projects in both India and the Philippines 
(unsuccessfully) – which involved my working for the first time, at an authentic 
development/commercial intersection: between a development need and a commercial 
driven financing proposition. I was also becoming acutely aware of the policy problems 
surrounding the private financing of electricity infrastructure, in a development context. 
The realisation had struck, that traditional OECD approaches to the financing of 
infrastructure do not work well, if at all, in a development context ... Then a work-related 
friend asked me, if I had ever considered financing renewable electricity projects in 
Africa. 
I now find myself being able to make a significant contribution to the body of 
knowledge, surrounding such an important policy development intersection – and I 
thank SPRU for giving me this opportunity. 
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Figure 1: Satellite Imagery Showing the Earth at Night, 2015 
 
 
 
Source:  U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Composite map of the world assembled 
from data acquired by the Suomi NPP satellite in April and October 2015. 
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Introduction 
"In Sub-Saharan Africa, three out of five people don’t 
have access to electricity." 
Fatih Birol, IEA Executive Director 
Ministerial Forum of the African Union Commission and the IEA 
 – Addis Ababa, 12 June 20191 
 
My dissertation unpacks the topic of sub-Sahara African (SSA) electricity access: 
specifically focussing on why the development of  much needed new electricity 
infrastructure in the region is not being financed and built. Electricity access is 
problematic for the region from two perspectives. Firstly, there are the issues associated 
with the number of people with zero access to such an important general-purpose 
technology for contemporary societies (see sec.1.2): as 600 million sub-Saharan Africans, 
80% of whom live in rural regions, do not currently have any access to electricity [Blimpo 
& Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; IEA, 2019]. Secondly, there is an affordability and reliability 
issue for those people who do have access [Ibid], which forms a market-breakdown (one 
of a number that surround the topic). Electricity services in Africa are the most expensive 
in the world, and additionally the most unreliable: “yet tariffs are still uneconomic, 
contributing to this reliability challenge” [Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019:4]. Without 
a comparably efficient electricity service to other more affluent regions of the world, 
economic development in the sub-Sahara African region (SSA) will be significantly 
constrained [AfDB, 2018; Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; Briceño-Garmendia et al., 
2008; Halff et al, 2014; IEA, 2019; Moyo, 2013]. 
 
1 https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/600-million-africans-go-without-electricity-iea-chief/1502097 
https://au.int/en/newsevents/20190612/auc-iea-first-ministerial-forum-future-africas-energy 
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This challenge is perhaps the most perplexing of international development problems 
currently facing the multilateral development community, as it surrounds a technology 
that has been well understood and utilised for over a century. It is this difficulty of 
resolution, in combination with the significance of the problem’s many societal impacts, 
which has driven my desire to find a solution. I hope that this desire renders my thesis to 
be a significant contribution to the body of knowledge surrounding this problem. 
 
1. The importance of reliable and affordable electricity 
services for SSA 
1.1 Energy, electricity, and poverty 
Just as there is no clear denotation of the term poverty, there is also ambiguity 
surrounding what its sub-terms energy and electricity poverty convey [Sovacool, 2014]. 
As these concepts have significance to this thesis, I will briefly clarify what I mean by 
these idioms in this dissertation, and why resolving them is important from a poverty 
perspective.  
Poverty is not just a description of a lack of income, but it also incorporates further 
concepts such as calorific intake, life expectancy, housing quality, literacy, access to 
energy, and a variety of other factors’ [United Nations Development Program, 2010]. 
Energy too is multidimensional, and includes many configurations: such as electrical, 
mechanical, or thermal. When prefixed to poverty, it essentially embraces two elements: 
a lack of access to affordable and reliable electricity services – electricity poverty; and 
access to basic and unhealthy (due to pollutants) cooking fuels, such as wood, charcoal 
or dung [IEA et al, 2010; Sovacool, 2014a].  
Electricity services are essential to the poor in many ways, not only directly, but also 
indirectly – as the direct enabling aspects, need little elaboration, I will just summarise 
some of the indirect ones. These include, being able to use labour saving appliances in 
the home, such as for washing or cooking, which empower women; permitting access to 
computers and the internet, to enable knowledge diffusion for better educational 
outcomes for both households and the wider society where those households are located. 
Electricity can also facilitate important income creation tasks, such as those offered by 
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light, which extends the number of usable hours in a day for creating income. 
Alternatively, by improving health outcomes which enhances an individual’s 
productiveness: enabled by water pumps for upgraded sanitation; or refrigeration which 
both permits the storage of vaccines or improved food hygiene. 
1.2 Electricity as an economic growth enabling technology 
Perhaps equally important, are electricity’s enabling characteristics for economic 
growth, due to its function as a general-purpose technology (GPT)2. Through being a 
GPT, electricity has a central influence on both an economies efficiency and the nature in 
which it will grow. This is particularly important, if the sub-Saharan region is to reduce 
its dependence on primary resource extraction to deliver much needed economic growth. 
The sorts of things it enables are as diverse as facilitating foreign direct investment (FDI), 
which is a major constituent for improving the level of capabilities and investment within 
an economy – an essential ingredient for an economies convergence with their wealthier 
peers [Abramovitz, 1986; Ayanwale, 2007; Hobday, 1995; Markusen et al, 1999].  To the 
growth of a politically stabilising middle class, through the enablement and establishment 
of any domestically owned manufacturing industry, which is going to involve any sort of 
mechanisation powered by electricity [de Soysa, 2003]. 
With SSA’s population forecast to double by the UN by 2050 [UN News], access to 
affordable and reliable electricity services will also be crucial for the economic growth 
that such a rapid population increase will require [AfDB, 2018]. Without electricity, 
excessive environmental damage is likely to occur all over the continent, as the expanding 
population will have to continue to rely on unsustainably biofuel sources for its energy 
needs - mostly wood, causing deforestation which can already be evidence by existing 
rapid deforestation within countries such as Kenya [Institute for Economic Affairs, 2015]. 
There will also be ever increasing social problems, followed by likely conflict, due to 
accelerating competition for scarce resources by this ever-growing population.  
 
2 General-purpose technologies (GPT): A technology that acts as a gatekeeper and an enabler of other 
important technologies, which can have a protracted aggregate positive impact, throughout an economy – 
through being a platform for the introduction of other innovative technologies. Such technologies perform 
a generic function and possess a scope for improvement, either in their own capacity or in combination with 
ensuing complimentary technologies [Bresnahan & Trajtenberg, 1995; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2005]. 
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1.3 Electricity’s importance to successful societal development  
Electricity’s GPT characteristics also makes the United Nations (UN) Sustainable 
Development Goal (SDG) 7 – access to affordable and clean energy – unique amongst 
the UNs other SDGs: as it either directly or indirectly enables the likely fulfilment of 
many of the other SDGs. The following SDGs would qualify as being influenced by SDG 
7: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16.  
Figure 2. The United Nations Sustainable Development goals 
(Source: news.un.org) 
  
The rest of this section will now present a short narrative, focusing on four interrelated 
societal challenges for the region, which will urgently require reliable and affordable 
electricity services for permitting any possible aspiration for harmonious societal growth. 
These are of particularly significance, if the United Nations projections for the doubling 
of Africa’s population by 2050, are realised [UN News]. 
Population growth in the sub-Saharan region is currently undergoing a Malthusian 
exponential population growth phase, where the region’s level of population is in danger 
of uncoupling from the region’s ability to support such an increase in that number of 
people. To support such growth without extreme conflict inevitably occurring, the region 
will require a ‘green’ or agricultural revolution to deliver increased food productivity 
using electricity driven irrigation; and consequentially land reform and accompanying 
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electricity supported urbanisation. Equally, such rapid urbanisation will require 
industrialisation and electricity powered economic growth, which will not be possible 
without electricity enabled education, to support the growth in necessary capabilities that 
will be required to help facilitate such growth. Put simply: in order to avoid a Malthusian 
catastrophe, access to affordable and reliable electricity is essential for the sub-Saharan 
region – and if it is not realised, this will not just be problematic for that region, but for 
the rest of the world due to consequential, predictable and unpredictable spillover effects.  
2. Unpacking electricity poverty in SSA 
The academic literature is uniform in recognising that there is a problem of poor access 
surrounding electricity services within SSA. In contrast, as can be observed from the 
results of my systematic literature review (summarised in Chapter 3, sec.4.1), this 
literature falls into two broad camps of causation. On the one side there are the supply-
side orientated explanations, which focus on the failures of the many regional electricity 
service delivery systems (the utilities and surrounding institutions); and on the other, there 
are demand-side orientated explanations, which focus on a lack of demand due to 
widespread household poverty. I argue in this dissertation that both these camps of 
explanation are too limiting in their appreciation of the problem. They do not drill down 
far enough to understand the full structure of causation, behind the problem (Chapter 3). 
2.1 Substandard systems for electricity service delivery 
This supply-side narrative of explanation suggests that electricity poverty in SSA is a 
consequence of an inefficient and dysfunctional utility and associated government 
institutions: such as regulators or relevant and responsible government ministries 
[Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012; Amars et al., 2017]. Every SSA country is vulnerable to 
such a failure, as each one utilises a government-controlled network hub & spoke system, 
to deliver electricity services to their populations. [Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; 
IEA, 2019; UNCTAD, 2017]. This structure comprises a series of large-scale electricity 
generating assets, with supporting transmission and distribution networks; and is a legacy 
of the previous European colonial administrations, that had been in control when the 
technology had become widely adopted during the first half of the twentieth century.  
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For this network delivery system to operate successfully, it requires a utility to have a 
minimal level of both technological skill and dynamic tacit knowledge (capabilities) 
within its management structure [Bell & Pavitt, 1993; Teece et al, 1995]. Furthermore, it 
requires enough working capital to maintain and operate the system efficiently and 
effectively. These requirements are often lacking throughout the region – even to an 
extent in South Africa, as can be observed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Without adequate levels of capability, the likelihood that a utility will recover its cost 
of delivering electricity when it sells it becomes too uncertain, due to both technical and 
non-technical losses. Technical losses entail a significant loss of electricity during 
transmission, through a lack of maintenance of the transmission system – as high as 25% 
in Tanzania for example [Amars et al, 2017]; or an inability to operate effectively a 
demand and supply load management, within the network [UNCTAD, 2017]. Non-
technical losses entail a significant risk that customers will not pay for the electricity they 
use [Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012]: either by not paying their bills, or stealing electricity 
directly from the grid, or bypassing their electricity meter [Bekker et al, 2008].  
Regulatory or ministerial failure generally revolve around the efficiency of 
commercial tariff levels – but as I have just explained, tariffs levels are not the only reason 
for failure of the system. It should also recognise rivalrous government needs, which can 
make the delivery regime ‘off limits’ to efficiency. An example of this might be that the 
government does not wish to lose control of the delivery regime, as their neo-patrimonial 
political system, requires control of it to facilitate a patronage system (Chapter 4, 
sec.5.2.5). 
2.2 Household Poverty 
As an alternative narrative of explanation, electricity demand (kWh) is a function of 
varying contextual factors such as availability of resources, electrical appliance 
ownership, duration of usage, and the affordability of tariffs [Kowalska-Pyzalska, 2018]. 
Moreover, there is often a direct or at least meaningful relationship between household 
economic poverty and energy burdens and energy poverty: the poorer households are, the 
higher their energy burden, yet poorer households tend to access cheaper alternative 
energy options, when electricity tariffs are high – reducing demand [Sovacool, 2012; 
Monyei et al., 2018a, 2018b; Bohlmann and Inglesi-Lotz, 2018].  
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The demand-side camp therefore consists of two principle impediments: firstly, the 
cost of connectivity, not just delivering electricity to the front door of a household, but 
also the purchasing of the necessary electrical appliances to use it, and such extras as 
correctly ‘wiring’ the recipient's home to ensure safe access [Cook, 2011; IEA, 2019; Sen, 
1999]. Secondly, there is the cost of the energy to be consumed – which may be further 
compounded by the unfamiliarity of using it wisely (turning off fans and lights when no 
one is home) [Ibid].  
2.3 Why I reject these explanations as incomplete 
Whilst I of course accept that household-affordability is a very real issue for electricity 
access in the region. I however argue in this thesis that this explanation is too simplistic, 
as a deeper interrogation delivers more nuanced evidence. To help support my 
positioning, I refer to the following evidence.  
A “lack of access to electricity is endemic in Africa regardless of income. The 
region is unique in the world in having the most countries whose level of 
electrification is below what their income level would predict. Africa stands out 
for outliers, such as Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, and Namibia, which should 
have significantly higher levels of electricity access given their per capita 
incomes. Overall, the region’s average level of electricity access in 2016 could 
have been 60 percent, given its per capita income, instead of 43 percent” 
[Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019:12]. 
I also reject the supply side narratives for similar reasons: relevant as they are, they 
require unpacking further. The issues of relationship behind the structure of causation, 
needs to be better appreciated. 
2.4 My thesis’ positioning, hypothesis, and research question. 
My thesis consequentially postulates that there is an alternative explanation for 
electricity poverty in SSA. This explanation covers both the lack of access to electricity 
services, and the unreliable and expensive service that is available when access does exist. 
My explanation also encompasses both the supply-side and demand-side dynamics just 
summarised – but I treat them as part of a larger landscape of independent variables, that 
influence the ability to finance the construction of new electricity infrastructure. This 
makes the ability to finance, a dependent variable. I am arguing that electricity poverty in 
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SSA is as much an issue of causation as it is about the underlying challenges that impact 
access to electricity: what causes what to happen, rather than just a sum of everything. 
My hypothesis is that the cause behind SSA electricity poverty is an inability to 
finance the construction of new electricity infrastructure, because of excessive and 
unmanageable risks – which in turn have created several types of market failures in the 
region (Chapter 6, sec.3). These risks then lead the private sector to reject investment 
opportunities associated with SSA electricity infrastructure projects, perceiving them as 
being both too uncertain financially and reputationally, when compared to alternative 
investment opportunities.  
My thesis seeks to understand why this is – and to make this task more manageable, I 
apply a governance lens by means of asking the following research question: ‘What 
aspects of governance deter private investors from financing large-scale electricity 
network infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ 
3. Supporting evidence for the lack of infrastructure 
The IEA, in their recently released Africa Energy Outlook 2019, makes a case that 
supports my thesis’ positioning, as well as anyone: 
“Infrastructure is an essential building block for economic development and 
quality of life, but Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, lags behind other 
developing economies in virtually all aspects of infrastructure quality. Over the 
past three decades, the level of per capita power generation capacity in sub-
Saharan Africa has remained flat, whereas in India and Southeast Asia (which 
had less generation capacity per capita than sub-Saharan Africa in 1990) it has 
grown fourfold” [IEA, 2019:32]. 
“Making up the deficit of energy infrastructure in Africa will require a massive 
ramp-up in investment, but actual spending trends have been moving in the 
opposite direction. Energy supply investment in sub-Saharan Africa has 
dropped by over 30% since 2012. {….} Power supply investment registered 
strong growth until 2014 but has since stalled. The one bright spot has been 
rising investment in solar photovoltaics (PV), which is set to surpass that in 
hydropower for the first time in 2019, according to early data” [Ibid:33].  
“Africa needs a significant scale-up in electricity sector investment in 
generation and grids, for which it currently ranks among the lowest in the 
world. Despite being home to 17% of the world’s population, Africa currently 
accounts for just 4% of global power supply investment. Achieving reliable 
electricity supply for all would require an almost fourfold increase, to around 
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$120 billion a year through 2040. Around half of that amount would be needed 
for networks” [Ibid: 16]. 
The IEA is not the only multilateral organisation which is highlighting this infrastructure 
deficit: ‘The World Bank’, ‘The African Development Bank’, ‘The Africa Development 
Forum’, ’Africa 50’, ‘The International Finance Corporation’, ‘The Infrastructure 
Consortium for Africa’, ‘The G20’, The Africa Progress Panel’ and The World Economic 
Forum’ join them in this observation, as well as many others. [AfDB, 2018; Africa 
Progress Panel, 2017; Africa50.com; Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; G20, 2017; ICA 
Report, 2017; IFC, 2016; World Bank 1, 2017; World Bank 2, 2017; World Bank 3, 2017; 
weforum.org]. 
4. The failure of the dominant multilateral policy  
Towards the end of the last millennium, there was a redefining of multilateral 
development policy surrounding the electrification of SSA, led by the by World Bank 
under the presidency of James Wolfensohn [Collier, 2014; Eberhard, 2015]. This 
repositioning resolved that the financing for the urgently required electricity 
infrastructure development, had to come from the private sector: as the need for new 
electricity infrastructure in the SSA region represented too great a burden on traditional 
development approaches such as Official Development Assistance (ODA) [ICA Report, 
2017; IEA, 2019; UNCTAD, 2017] . 
“The amount of investment needed for the provision of electricity in sub-
Saharan Africa is substantial and well above the level of the current flows of 
capital into the region’s power sector. Reaching full access by 2030 and 
maintaining it to 2040 would require multiplying current investment levels by 
five. The cumulative investment in this case would reach more than $2 trillion 
between 2019 and 2040” [IEA, 2019:141]. 
Despite this dominant policy’s existence since the 1990s,  
“The majority of the power sector investment in sub-Saharan Africa {continues 
to be} financed by public funds, mainly from domestic governments or state-
owned utilities, development finance institutions (DFIs) and export credit 
agencies (ECAs). Of the new projects with final investment decisions in the 
period 2014-18, two-thirds of the new generation capacity was publicly funded” 
[IEA, 2019:143].  
Yet without significantly increased investment, meaningful economic growth in SSA will 
be impossible. 
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“Poor electricity infrastructure in low-income countries is a major cause of 
unreliability. Under-investment in existing transmission and distribution assets 
and the inability to meet peak load due to installed capacity deficit result in 
frequent service disruptions (unscheduled outages or regular load shedding), 
ranging from a few hours to a few days. Between 2006 and 2018, around 80% 
of sub-Saharan African firms suffered frequent electricity disruptions, typically 
six hours in length, imposing losses of around 8% of annual sales on average. 
Outages tend to be most frequent and prolonged in Nigeria. By contrast, firms 
in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries experience interruptions of around one hour per month on average” 
[IEA, 2019:135, citing World Bank, 2018]. 
The International Financial markets are the only realistic source for this magnitude of 
financial need – hence the importance of my dissertation’s research topic. 
5. Not a revisitation of the Washington consensus 
It has been my experience during my academic journey, that despite learning of the 
importance surrounding identifying, understanding, and avoiding bias – many of my 
academic colleagues often apply their own biases when they review others work. I 
discovered this particularly during my various peer reviews, that my three papers went 
through for approval for publication. I/we were frequently being criticised for not writing 
the paper that the reviewer had thought was (or wanted to be) written, rather the one that 
I/we had written. To protect me from this problem, my co-author (and supervisor) Ben 
Sovacool, taught me the importance of good signposting and the removal of any 
ambiguity. To ensure clarity about my research positioning within the body of knowledge 
therefore, this section confirms the novelty of my research – at least, as assessed against 
the Washington consensus yardstick. 
The reason I am particularly worried about a mispositioning of this nature, is that I 
have often found that when I start to explain my research interest to a development 
focused academic, there is an immediate enquiry about whether I am attempting to revisit 
the Washington consensus. This used to bemuse me, because I fathomed the only reason 
I was being questioned, was that I was advocating a private sector narrative to which they 
were ideologically hostile. I now realise that I too was biased, and perhaps there are more 
nuanced reasons behind their questions.  
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5.1 What is the Washington consensus? 
The term Washington consensus appears to be one of the most ambiguous and 
contentious terms, within the development academic field. It is highly emotive, yet clearly 
undefined. It also appears to be both descriptive and prescriptive, depending on who is 
describing it. John Williamson, the economist who first used the expression in 1989, has 
identified at least three distinct narratives of application [Williamson, 2004A & 2004B]: 
➢ The first narrative encapsulates a descriptive list of ten policies that contribute to 
successful economic development, which John Williamson had identified and 
claimed were widely subscribed to by: The World Bank, International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the US Treasury Department (the Washington located, Bretton Woods 
Institutions), to be desirable in just about all the countries of Latin America in 1989. 
These surrounded Fiscal Discipline; Reordering Public Expenditure Priorities; 
Tax Reform; Liberalizing Interest Rates; Competitive Exchange Rates; Trade 
Liberalisation; Liberalisation of Inward Foreign Direct Investment; 
Privatisation; Deregulation and Property Rights [Ibid]. 
 
➢ The second narrative encapsulates a prescriptive list of economic policies, derived 
from a consensus of thought, within the Washington based Bretton Woods Institutions 
for developing countries in general. These included Williamson’s original list of 10, 
and further additions primarily advanced/identified by Professor Dani Rodrik [2002]. 
These additions included: Legal/Political Reform; Regulatory Institutions; Anti-
corruption; Labour Market Flexibility; WTO Agreements; Financial Codes and 
Standards; Prudent Capital Account Opening; Non-intermediate Exchange-rate 
Regimes; Social Safety Nets and Poverty Reduction [Williamson, 2004A & 
2004B]. 
 
➢ The third narrative is a positional one, designed to facilitate a new development policy 
prescription (or consensus). It does this by grouping flawed neo-liberal or free market 
orientated policies to suggest a developmental policy landscape that is failing, to 
champion a new enhanced prescription – A post-Washington consensus – to replace 
the flawed original one [Ibid].  
What all three narratives have in common is that they involve a macro or top down 
approach to deliver a systemic solution for development, with what appears to be little 
bottom up input. This differs from my dissertation’s positioning: which seeks to 
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understand a process that is problematic – private investment in African electricity 
infrastructure – by seeking to understand and improve aspects of its organisation (its 
governance) in order to improve how it works. My dissertation does of course overlap 
with these three narratives, but I am not championing a new development narrative as a 
replacement. 
6. A generational opportunity needs embracing 
When I first commenced my PhD, I did so with a different research question in mind, 
which was ‘Why is the private sector reluctant to finance large-scale electricity network 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ I have a financial markets background, and due to 
this I was aware that there existed an unprecedented opportunity to reset a failing 
investment paradigm surrounding SSA infrastructure investment. Global interest-rate 
levels were, and still are, at historically low levels: denoting that there has never 
theoretically been a better time for Africa to attract private investment to build its urgently 
needed infrastructure, as the investment maths have never been more supportive.  
All privately financed infrastructure investments require long dated time horizons, 
usually more than 20 years. This is to ensure its viability as an investment, in order to 
repay the investor’s initial value and the expected investment return (see my conceptual 
framework in Chapter 2). This is because constructing infrastructure has very high up-
front cost to build it, but it is then expected to have a long useful life expectancy, as 
infrastructure after it is built is expected to be usable for many decades. Traditionally, the 
excessive cost associated with the ‘time value of money’3, made the maths of privately 
financed infrastructure in SSA, unviable – particularly after adding a risk premium for 
the African region. Therefore, infrastructure in SSA has usually only been paid for by 
governments, or by investors that do not have normal investment returns as a priority: 
such as Development Finance, Institutions (DFIs) or mining companies, who can justify 
cross subsidising the cost of electricity for other strategic reasons.  
Infrastructure as an asset class within the OECD has proved attractive to professional 
investment fund managers over the last decade. It has established a strong record of 
accomplishment that highlights its potential to enhance returns and mitigate risk as part 
 
3 Time value of money: the concept that money available now is worth more than the identical sum in the 
future, due to its potential earning capacity. This core principle of finance holds that provided money can 
earn interest, any amount of money is worth more the sooner it is received [Gallagher & Andrew, 2000]. 
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of a broader portfolio [J.P. Morgan Asset Management, 2017]. The international financial 
markets: which consist of pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign-wealth funds, 
mutual funds (to name the major constituents) – also have more than 100 trillion $US in 
assets under management to invest [Arezki, R. et al, 2016; AfDB, 2018]. These represent 
investors that are desperately seeking higher investment returns, in contrast to those 
currently on offer, as just alluded too – due to the current global low interest-rate levels.  
With historically low interest rates, infrastructure’s solid investment reputation, the 
total value of investment resource available, and Africa’s clear investment need for such 
infrastructure to be constructed – there is clearly a research priority to understand why 
there is such little enthusiasm by private investors, for financing SSA electricity 
infrastructure.  
7. What is my significant contribution to knowledge? 
I believe my thesis contributes to the body of knowledge in two ways. Firstly, I believe 
I am effectively redefining what is causing a very stubborn policy problem: why the 
private sector is reluctant to invest in sub-Saharan Africa electricity infrastructure. This 
includes in my discussion/conclusions chapter: identifying eight key findings which 
create investment inertia characteristics; and include a number of specific market 
breakdowns (see chapter 6, sec.3). In my policy discussion that follows (chapter 6, sec.4), 
I believe I add to this contribution, with some further interesting policy analysis of the 
findings.   
Secondly, I believe this thesis has carried out invaluable empirical research in South 
Africa, surrounding what has gone wrong with the Medupi and Kusile power projects: 
whose development have bankrupted Eskom over a fifteen-year period. When something 
goes wrong that is very costly and unaffordable, it is important to understand both what 
went wrong and what is required to prevent it from happening again (chapter 5). 
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Chapter 2:  
Research Design 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain why I constructed my thesis in the way that I 
have; and consequentially illuminate why I chose the three individual paper’s subjects 
and conceptual approaches, as presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5. I accomplish this by first 
outlining and explaining my working assumptions for my PhD research; I then clarify and 
explain my dissertation’s research questions and hypothesis, before unpacking my use of 
the term governance (a subjective term), as it is my lens of analysis. Finally, I move onto 
my conceptual framework for my entire thesis, including a defence of the conceptual 
approach of each individual paper. This defence includes an explanation of how each 
paper builds on the proceeding one (in a complimentary manner), and how together they 
contribute to the body of knowledge surrounding my greater research problem: why is 
the private sector reluctant to finance large-scale electricity network infrastructure, in sub-
Saharan Africa? 
1. Working Assumptions 
Before I commenced writing this thesis, I recognised during preliminary research that 
there has existed since the 1990s (and the Chairmanship of the World Bank by James 
Wolfensohn), a dominant international development policy narrative for resolving SSA 
electricity access [Collier, 2014; Eberhard, 2015]. This narrative advocates that the 
solution to SSA electricity poverty should predominantly require the private sector to 
finance the construction of much-needed new electricity infrastructure.  
It is observable that the private sector has been unenthusiastic in engaging with this 
policy narrative: evidenced by Africa only accounting for just 4% of global power supply 
investment, despite being home to 17% of the world’s population [IEA, 2019]. This 
percentage would be even lower in the sub-Saharan region (excluding the RSA, a 
statistical outlier) as North Africa (the balance) has almost universal access to electricity 
[Ibid] and therefore must be attracting a larger percentage of investment than SSA. This 
lack of enthusiasm to invest in the sub-Saharan region is despite this financing policy 
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narrative having been in place for more than 20 years. India, by contrast, between 2000 
and 2016 reduced the number of its people without electricity from 57% to 18% of their 
population [IEA, 2017]. 
Using the knowledge of this policy narrative for my thesis’ orientation, my working 
assumption for my research is that the central cause for electricity poverty in SSA 
(described in the introduction of this thesis) is due to an insufficient amount of electricity 
infrastructure required to deliver reliable and affordable electricity services to the 
continent’s ever-growing population. Further, this is due to an inability to finance the 
construction of such necessary electricity infrastructure, due to the existence of several 
excessive and unmanageable risks, which in turn have created several types of market-
breakdowns in the region (Chapter 6, sec.3).  
To support this positioning, it is observable that much of the sub-Saharan region’s 
economies are still semi-industrialised (or agrarian focused), with in excess of 60% of 
their populations located in rural areas where the vast majority of people rely on 
subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods [IEA, 2019]. The lack of economic 
development then leaves such populations compromised in their ability to afford the cost 
of electricity service supply, when using dominant classical (and linear) economic 
analysis. Further, such a lack of industrial development has left nearly all the region’s 
governments unable to finance such construction from their own internal revenues. As 
well as preventing these governments from borrowing from private sector sources, as 
their country’s financial rating are below investment grade (as defined by the global credit 
rating agencies4). Additionally, each sub-investable country’s electricity utility have even 
lower investment ratings than their governments [Kojima and Trimble, 2016]. I discuss 
and expand further this ‘financing reality’ and type of market-breakdowns in both my 
first two published papers, which form chapters 3 & 4 of this thesis. 
The central role of credit rating agencies (CRA), is to provide risk assessments 
surrounding the ability/willingness of an entity, to stand behind a contractual requirement 
to pay (are they credit worthy). These rated entities are usually financial instruments, 
companies, or governments. The agencies apply a specialist capability involving a degree 
of confidential methods that they have evolved over 100 years5, to evaluate whether an 
 
4 The three-principle dominant global credit rating agencies are Standard & Poor’s Investor Services, 
Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch Ratings. 
5 Standard and Poor’s trace their history back to 1860 
https://www.standardandpoors.com/en_US/web/guest/home 
Page 31 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
entity is reliable enough to pay their financial obligations [Deb et al, 2011]. Such 
institutions supply a form of risk management function, which surrounds knowledge 
asymmetries. They make themselves informed about credit worthiness of the companies 
that they rate, and then sell that knowledge to their clients – who do not have the resources 
available, to collect such a valuable evaluation for themselves. Part of what makes that 
knowledge valuable, is the reputation of the agency to provide accurate information: they 
therefore take the management of their reputations seriously [Becker & Milbourn, 2011]. 
The CRAs are private companies, whose business model also relies on charging the 
entities that they credit rate a fee. Their ongoing protection of their reputation means that 
they need to properly resource the process surrounding whatever entities they do rate – 
for fear of damaging their greater reputation. Widely rating African based entities, is not 
judged as commercially viable by these agencies, and so they do not offer such a service. 
Furthermore, investors do not like to invest where there is currently no CRA rating. This 
represents a type of market-breakdown. 
2. My hypothesis and research questions 
My dissertation’s methodology uses a Hypothetico-deductive approach. 
My Hypothesis: The private sector is reluctant to finance the development of new 
electricity infrastructure in SSA because there exist excessive and unmanageable risks – 
which in turn have created several types of market-breakdowns (see Chapter 6, sec.3). 
These risks principally arise out of issues of governance and capabilities.  
My Primary research question: ‘What aspects of governance deter private investors 
from financing large-scale electricity network infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ 
I am hypothesising that the ability to finance the construction of new electricity 
infrastructure capacity in SSA privately, is a dependent variable, which is constrained by 
excessive risks that arises from two types of enabling variables. These two enabling 
variables are associated with issues of governance [Hufty, 2011; Booth, 2012; Florini & 
Sovacool, 2009] and an adequate level of capabilities: both individual [Cook, 2011; IEA, 
2019; Sen, 1999] and institutional [Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & Pavitt, 1993]. Due to the 
considerable scope that an analysis of both sets of variables would entail (and on the 
advice of my supervisors), this thesis has just focused on identifying and understanding 
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the variables derived from the issues of governance, that deter private investment. I have 
also identified some of the variables derived from capability issues, as the two factors 
overlap, but I have not specifically applied a capability lens to my research in the way I 
have applied a governance one. 
My motivation for my initial analysis that led to my hypothesis, arose out a greater 
research problem, which presented an original research question: ‘Why is the private 
sector reluctant to finance large-scale electricity network infrastructure in sub-Saharan 
Africa?’ – Which I have already contextualised. As my research continued to evolve 
whilst unpacking this problem, so has my appreciation of my original research questions 
lack of precision. Consequentially, I re-evaluated what I needed to understand, and 
instead sought to appreciate how governance creates risks that impact investment. 
As I am just focussing on issues to do with governance in my PhD, I am now interested 
in answering two different research questions. The first replaced my original thesis 
research question, as well as becoming the research question of my second published 
paper: ‘What aspects of governance deter private investors from financing large-scale 
electricity network infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ The second arose as I started to 
unpack the development problems surrounding large scale network infrastructure 
(megaprojects), which then became the research question behind my third published 
paper: ‘What aspects of project governance are important, to prevent time delays and cost 
overruns, when building large scale electricity infrastructure in South Africa?’ 
3. Governance: my lens of analysis 
Governance is a subjective term, with great variance amongst academics for what it 
encapsulates. In this thesis, it describes an organisational process that has two 
dimensions: firstly, what it involves; and secondly, who/what it embraces. Broadly, it 
involves any multitudinous processes or institutions in place: by which people set and 
enable any rules needed, to attain desired outcomes [Florini & Sovacool 2009]. While 
frequently applied to the domain of governments, many other contexts are observable 
for using an organisational process of governance: including civil society organisations, 
projects, corporations, and institutions of finance.  
Traditionally, when the literature utilises the term governance to explain why the 
private sector is unenthusiastic for investing in the region's electricity infrastructure, it is 
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applied with a narrow interpretation that centres on negative behaviours such as 
corruption [Booth, 2012]. Such a narrow application of governance I argue in this thesis, 
oversimplifies the extent of the inclusion for what the term should capture, as it ignores 
the polycentric or systemic level complexity that cuts across the actors, networks, and 
knowledge structures, needed to address investment.  
In this dissertation therefore, I argue that governance as a term when being applied to 
electricity service delivery in SSA must have a wide scope, that encompasses all 
organisational processes between all applicable stakeholders within the electricity service 
delivery system. This would include factors such as institutional capacity, political 
stability, bureaucratic flexibility and system and sub-system organisation. I develop these 
ideas further in chapter four; and give them further dimensions, in chapter five. 
4. Conceptual framework  
During the analysis of the results of my systematic review, summarised in my first 
published paper (chapter 3), I theorised that the concepts surrounding private investment 
and how it is influenced by risk, are not well understood by many development 
academics. This is probably because ‘international-development’ as an academic 
discipline is usually viewed through a public sector lens rather than a private sector one 
– and private investment theory is only relevant to a private sector narrative. In this 
section, I therefore clarify what factors are important surrounding private investment, 
within my conceptual approach. 
4.1 What does ‘private investment’ mean in this thesis 
In most of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), each country’s financial 
institutions are unable to privately finance any significant capacity increases in network 
electricity infrastructure, as there are few significant banking, corporate, non-government 
institutional, or ‘private office’ investors with the capabilities to carry out such types of 
investment [IFC, 2016; Gregory & Sovacool, 2019; Sovacool and Cooper, 2013]. 
Therefore, in the context of this thesis, private sector investment will refer to 
internationally sourced (out of region) private investment.  
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4.2 Why is private investment influenced by risk? 
Applying Occam’s razor: an investment can be defined “as the act of incurring an 
immediate cost (the value of the investment) in the expectation of receiving future 
rewards (the investment return)” [Dixit & Pindyck; 1994:3]. By using this definition, it 
can be observed that there are two related, but separate elements involved in an 
investment decision; and that investors require certainty of outcomes from the second 
element, in response to the first, for an investment to proceed. Yet this gap in time 
between these two parts of the investment process, also introduces the possibility of 
uncertainty to an investment decision, as the reward expectations may not have been 
realised by the time the second part of the process is meant to conclude. Adding to this, a 
decision to proceed with an investment is a relative decision, as any individual investment 
opportunity does not exist in isolation. There are otherwise many alternative investment 
opportunities that are pursuable – or applying economic theory: an opportunity cost 
occurs after the confirmation of an investment decision, as the committed resource is no 
longer deployable elsewhere. [Bessis, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; de Jager and 
Rathmann, 2008; Garcia, 2017; Pindyck, 1986].  
Additionally, an investment in the development of new electricity infrastructure in 
SSA will be illiquid – meaning that the investment cannot be easily: removed, sold, or 
exchanged for cash without a potential significant loss of value [Longstaff, 2001; 
Pindyck, 1986]. In any sort of electricity infrastructure development in SSA, the 
investment’s value will be tied to the location that the asset has been constructed within 
(the asset cannot simply just be removed and taken away intact) [Levy, 2014]. The only 
way therefore for the investment to realise its value as an investment, is for it perform as 
it was intended when the investment was planned.  I understand from the economics 
academic literature, that this issue is describable as a ‘Hold-up’ Problem from Game 
theory [Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004]. Finally, infrastructure investments of this type 
will be long dated, usually more than 20 years (see chapter 1, sec.6); and if their tariffs 
are correctly set and regulated, such infrastructure will represent a ‘normal’ margin 
business6, without excessive profitability [Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; Garcia, 
2017; IEA, 2019; UNCTAD, 2017].  
 
6 Normal Margin is determined by a ‘benchmark’ interest rate such as LIBOR, plus a weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC). WACC is a calculation of a firm's cost of capital, where each category of capital 
is weighted to represent its relative exposure to risk compared to its alternative uses, and its absolute risk 
profile [Garcia, 2017]. 
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So, after taking all these factors into account – it is deducible that a private investor’s 
willingness to proceed is determined by the perceived level of risk that surrounds the 
ongoing value of their ‘immediate cost’ of entering that investment; and the likelihood of 
attaining the expected ‘future rewards’ [Bessis, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, Garcia, 
2017; Pindyck, 1986]. Moreover, a negative causation is clearly observable: an increase 
in risk decreases the desire to invest.  
4.3 Why risk is particularly problematic for investment in SSA 
To protect an investment’s ‘immediate cost (assuming there is enough comfort in the 
assumptions underlying an investment proposal, to make it appeal enough to proceed), an 
experienced investor usually seeks a form of surety7 through one of following three risk 
mitigation strategies, to manage their value exposure [Bessis, 2015, Garcia, 2017]: 
1. Asset backed ‘surety’ – the entire value of the ‘immediate cost’ of the investment 
is secured against the value of another, separate and unrelated asset. The value of 
the risk is therefore directly protected from being lost. 
 
2. Balance sheet ‘surety’ – an entity (in my thesis’ context, usually a company or 
government) has the financial size and strength to be accepted to guarantee directly 
the value of the ‘immediate cost’ of an investment; and/or the investment’s expected 
financial outcomes: the ‘future rewards’, such as interest payments or dividends. 
The value of the risk is therefore transferred to a third party, which guarantees the 
value against being lost. 
 
3. Project financing – A project’s cash flows (‘future rewards’) are pre-determined 
and discounted back to a value today, to create an NPV (net present value); and 
then protected or guaranteed in some way. Provided the NPV is significantly above 
the actual cost of construction and delivery, with a suitable risk-weighted return – 
The project is deemed as bankable8, and the required financing can be secured and 
advanced against this projected value [Yescombe, 2002]. In this way, the NPV 
value acts as the surety, and the value of the initial investment is protected. 
 
 
7 Surety: in this context, is where something valuable that is not money, is offered by an investment 
recipient  (the insider) to an investor (the outsider), to help assure the value of the initial investment is 
secure and returnable 
8 Bankable: A project or proposal that has sufficient substance, cash-flow, and likely future success to be 
acceptable to future institutional lenders 
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All three approaches exist to either offset the risk of losing the value of the immediate 
cost of an investment and/or guarantee the future rewards. In SSA however, the first two 
approaches are difficult to apply. There are few suitable assets available to act as surety; 
and most of the relevant government owned electricity utilities are not sufficiently credit 
worthy to be an acceptable ‘counterparty’ for such surety, to the investor [Gentzoglanis, 
2013; Kojima and Trimble, 2016] – both are a form of market-breakdown. Further, the 
relevant governments are either unwilling or unable to offer surety [Amars 2017; 
Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012]. The only realistic lending approach that is available in the 
SSA context is Project Financing. However, the reliability and security surrounding 
construction costs and ownership of the assets; and the predictability of the required cash 
flows, are hard to guarantee due to the existence of significant risks that can undermine 
the certainty of both these values – and this is one point of focus for my PhD. 
4.4 Network infrastructure: a doubling of the problem 
The predominant type of structure that is utilised in SSA for delivering electricity 
services, is a top down network ‘hub & spoke’ system [Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; 
IEA, 2019; UNCTAD, 2017]: organised as a series of large-scale electricity generating 
assets, with supporting transmission and distribution networks. This is also the standard 
and successful model used by all OECD countries for delivering electricity services.  
This standard model is however proving unfit for purpose in a SSA context. It is a 
‘path dependent’ model [David, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982], which in SSA is 
inflexible towards accepting new technologies and organisational improvements; and 
therefore, is proving both expensive and problematic to extend and operate. In SSA, it 
manifests as a government-controlled monopoly utility that is both under resourced and 
ineffectively managed [Ibid]. Also, unfortunately for investors, as a structure of 
organisation its efficiency is co-dependent on its constituent parts – meaning any 
deficiencies in one part of system, will negatively influence the entire system.  
“Under-investment in existing transmission and distribution assets and the inability 
to meet peak load due to installed capacity deficit result in frequent service 
disruptions (unscheduled outages or regular load shedding), ranging from a few 
hours to a few days. Between 2006 and 2018, around 80% of sub-Saharan African 
firms suffered frequent electricity disruptions, typically six hours in length, 
imposing losses of around 8% of annual sales on average” [IEA, 2019:135; citing 
World Bank, 2018].  
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As an investment proposition for a private investor, SSA electricity infrastructure 
represents a double challenge as an investment. Must not only the direct asset that is being 
invested in, function as planned for to permit a successful investment – but so must the 
larger system that it will operate within. A very challenging proposition in this context. 
4.5 What is relevant: my risk filter 
When applying the above dynamics surrounding an investment as a backdrop, I can 
reason that a potential private investor will always apply the following three questions, to 
determine whether to proceed with an investment: 
(i)  Is it realistic to expect a reimbursement of the value of the investment (the 
initial cost) in the future? 
(ii)  Is it realistic to expect to receive the anticipated returns (the rewards) when they 
are expected?  
(iii) How does this investment opportunity, compare with every other investment 
opportunity that is available?  
I use these three questions continually during my research, to determine what makes a 
project bankable: they have acted as a filter, verifying the veracity of my research 
analysis. 
4.6 Public, private and hybrid ownership models of electricity systems 
It can be easily observed throughout the international system of  sovereign states that 
we all inhabit, that there exist three accepted models of ownership and control of 
electricity service delivery. Firstly, there is a full public ownership model, where the state 
owns and manages this type of infrastructure on behalf of its citizens. At the centre of this 
model is the ethos that electricity is a ‘merit good’: a commodity which is considered by 
society as fulfilling a social need and so its allocation is not just decided upon by price 
[Dilnot & Helm; 1987].  
Secondly, there is a private sector model, where the infrastructure is fully owned and 
managed by the private sector. In this model, the social aspect for allocation is removed 
and instead the provision of electricity is determined principally by price [Ibid]. In this 
model, government has determined that they do not required ownership of the system, to 
have influence over how it operates, as they still can act as regulator. In the judgement of 
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its private owners, the primary function of the business is to maximise profits rather than 
supply a social good [Ibid]. 
The third model type is a hybrid of the two. Usually this entails total government/state 
ownership of at least the transmission/distribution part of electricity supply; the 
generation of electricity is usually opened to competition from non-state actors. The 
ambition of this model is to appropriate any ‘efficiency benefits’ of private operation, and 
to make the delivery system less hierarchical and more responsive to the needs of its users 
[Hood, 1991], To enable this, the utility is corporatised and its management are expected 
to adopt private sector ‘best practises’ to gain operational efficiencies and make the utility 
responsive and focused towards its end users [Pollitt and Bouckaert; 2004].   
The hybrid model exists in both the RSA and Kenya and are discussed in this thesis’ 
Chapter five and Chapter three, respectively. The dominant model in much of SSA 
however, is a public sector ownership model, where the entire electricity delivery system 
is controlled by their respective governments. The functioning of this type of model is 
then often captured by the needs of the ruling party, to serve its own neo-patrimonial 
interests first (see Chapter 4, sec.5). As can be observed in my fifth Chapter, the hybrid 
model can also be vulnerable to political capture too (Chapter 5, sec.4). If the ANC 
(African National Congress) had not been so dominant over the South African Political 
landscape since 1994, it is possible the situation researched in Chapter five, may have 
been very different.  
4.7 Public verses private and the impact of spillover externalities 
A financially well-resourced government as the owner and manager of electricity 
infrastructure, can operate its infrastructure in a fundamentally different way to the private 
sector. Governments are able to capture a much higher level of reward from the existence 
of the infrastructure, as the wider country (and therefore the government) benefits from 
the ‘positive externality spillover benefits’ that accompany such infrastructure [Pigou, 
1932], and they have an ability to recoup the value through their tax system (which they 
control). They can also dilute the consequences of costly mistakes, by absorbing and 
mutualising them into the national structure of the state. This reality, from the perspective 
of policy, can allow them to therefore operate their electricity infrastructure assets at a 
commercial loss.  
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The private sector enjoys no such luxury. When the private sector builds and operates 
infrastructure, it is not able to capture any of this spillover benefit, due to the linear nature 
of the rewards of such an investment (see chapter 6, sec.4.5). Instead, all it can capture is 
the proposed asset’s revenues (electricity sold and paid for, in this case) whilst being fully 
exposed to the financial consequences of any mistakes in planning and operation. The 
private sector can only protect itself by the management and reduction of risk surrounding 
their infrastructure investment [Dixit and Pindyck, 1994]. A belief in the existence of 
Hirschman’s hiding hand [Hirschman, 1967] – where the costs or challenges of building 
an asset are under-represented, and the benefits and revenues that can be derived form 
that asset are over represented – is also a substantial negative for private investors, 
particularly if the scale of investment asset is substantial [Flyvbjerg, 2017a]. There will 
also be a greater knowledge asymmetry against the investor, in a development context – 
this is a form of hold-up problem, discussed in chapter 6 in my key findings V. 
The public-sector perspective, which perceives electricity delivery as a merit good, is 
still the default narrative within many SSA governments and much of the international 
development policy communities and literature (see my systematic review, chapter 3). 
This narrative still assumes that governments will drive a solution to SSA electricity 
poverty. However, the governments of SSA do not have well-resourced balance sheets 
[Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; CEPA, 2015; Kojima and Trimble, 2016] and 
currently require external financial support to construct any meaningful amounts of 
infrastructure. It is likely that the acceptance of this reality, has dictated the continuing 
dominance of the multilateral development policy for advancing a private investment led 
solution.  
5. Defending the conceptual approach of each paper 
In effect, I believe the success of my PhD will be determined by two outcomes. Firstly, 
my ability to identify any factors that can remove value from the immediate cost of an 
investment in electricity infrastructure in SSA and ascertain their probability of occurring 
(the investment risks). Additionally, I need to establish how to improve the certainties 
surrounding the appropriation of the future rewards of such investments, which were 
anticipated when the investment was planned (sec.4.2, Chapter 2). This is the essence of 
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making a project bankable, discussed above in sec.4.5. Each of my published papers 
achieves this, in some manner. 
5.1 First paper - “The financial risks and barriers to electricity infrastructure in 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique: A critical and systematic review of the 
academic literature”.  
(I co-authored this paper with my principal supervisor Professor Benjamin Sovacool; Energy 
Policy accepted it for publication in October 2018 – see earlier Declaration of previously 
published works, at the start of this thesis).  
The research objective of our (co-authored) first paper was to deliver two requisites: 
firstly, to understand how the recent academic development literature (1st January 2012 – 
30th June 2017) explains the barriers (or risks) that obstruct the private financing 
surrounding the development of SSA electricity infrastructure. Secondly, we classify 
these risks as part of a broader landscape. This landscape also includes any likely risks 
from a greater indirect, but still relevant, interdisciplinary literature, which could also 
negatively influence a private financier’s willingness to invest in this type of 
infrastructure – based on my thesis’ conceptual framework.  
This paper’s data is only for a five-and-a-half-year period, to ensure it was a 
manageable sample – whilst still being deemed a sufficient length of time, to deliver a 
complete enough picture for a meaningful and useful analysis. We were in effect, 
validating the novelty of my thesis’ hypothesis and my theoretical approach, to confirm 
that I will be contributing to the body of knowledge.  
To further ensure that my research sample was manageable, we chose only three 
African countries that already had a notable body of academic literature concerning them: 
Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Whilst we recognised that using just three countries 
to represent the entirety of the SSA region is problematic – as is to extrapolate any country 
factors to represent the entire sub-Sahara African region, when carrying out research – 
we have done so, as the research is essentially ‘top down’ and focussing on the investor 
needs, not the recipient countries. Our research is actually seeking to understand the 
behaviours of the international investment community's approach to a type of investment, 
which can be standardised as they have a commonality of purpose in the way they 
approach investment: these investors are all seeking an investment return, from an initial 
commitment of investment value. 
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5.2 Second paper - “Rethinking the governance of energy poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa: Reviewing three academic perspectives on electricity infrastructure 
investment”.  
(I co-authored this paper with my principal supervisor Professor Benjamin Sovacool; Renewable 
& Sustainable Energy Reviews accepted it for publication in April 2019 – see earlier Declaration 
of previously published works, at the start of this thesis).  
The second paper is theoretical and utilises three separate perspectives to deliver a 
holistic and inclusive governance picture, to answer the following research question: 
‘What aspects of governance deter private investors from financing large-scale electricity 
network infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa?’ These perspectives comprise: 1) Financial 
Investment Governance, the private sector investor’s perspective, which focuses on the 
rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly influence the financial investment 
environment in SSA. 2) Political Governance, the political economy perspective, which 
relate to the negative, indirect investment consequences resulting from the way that SSA 
governments govern; and 3) Technological Governance, a ‘systems’ perspective, which 
encompasses how the standard structure and organisation of the wider electricity delivery 
system in each country in SSA, negatively impacts such investment. 
We believed the approach has novelty and academic value, due to the subjectivity and 
narrowness with which governance is usually applied to investment. We argue that 
traditionally researchers have not unpacked the term enough, to capture all the relevant 
variables that can influence such investments. The paper’s discussion section delivers a 
novel list of fifteen structural governance factors (some of which are unique to the SSA 
region) that require appreciation by ‘policy actors’ – which we believe particularly is an 
addition to the body of knowledge. 
5.3 Third paper - “Governance, scale, and scope: reviewing six South African 
electricity generation infrastructure megaprojects”. 
(I sole authored this paper, and it is currently undergoing peer review in Utilities Policy – see 
earlier Declaration of previously published works, at the start of this thesis). 
My third paper adds to the dynamics of governance, by focussing on the impact of 
governance surrounding large-scale electricity infrastructure development 
(megaprojects), by empirically analysing six case studies located in South Africa. The 
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paper’s fieldwork was determined by the following research question: ‘What aspects of 
project governance are important, to prevent time delays and cost overruns, when building 
large scale electricity infrastructure in South Africa?’ This research question is relevant 
to the thesis’ primary interrogation theme, as expectance to adhere to schedules and 
budgets are of central importance to investors. The completion of a project on time and 
budget is a primary requirement for the successful financing of infrastructure.  
Whilst recognising that South Africa (RSA) is an atypical country in the region, RSA 
only case studies are used, as it is the only country that can offer any megaproject 
variance, within a single country in SSA – as this paper is a study of project, not national 
governance. During the analysis of the fieldwork’s data, the importance of scale and scope 
to the primary interrogation theme was also observable and explainable. The impact of 
scale and scope now forms a part of the conclusion, for the entire thesis. 
5.4 The common thread  
Each paper is intended to add a new layer of understanding, surrounding the causal 
organisational relationships between governance, investment, and electricity 
infrastructure development in SSA. I anticipate that such a holistic understanding can then 
permit policy makers to improve the SSA infrastructure investment landscape.  
In my discussion and conclusions in Chapter 6, I lead with a defence of the policy of 
encouraging private finance to resolve SSA electricity poverty. I then highlight my key 
findings of my research surrounding current policy approaches, identified throughout my 
three papers. I then move on to discuss the problematic nature of my research landscape, 
including the examination of some new policy-tools to neutralise the different market 
failures that I have identified.  
My aspiration for this thesis is that it might finally deliver some meaningful progress, 
for resolving perhaps one of the most stubborn policy problems in international 
development – how to comprehensively deliver universal electrification to sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
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Chapter 3:  
The financial risks and barriers to electricity 
infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Mozambique: A critical and systematic review 
of the academic literature 
(Energy Policy 125 (2019); pages 145-153 – co-authored with Professor Benjamin Sovacool) 
Abstract 
The recent academic literature contains several hypotheses or reasons to explain why 
electricity infrastructure has not been widely developed in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 
the 21st century. In this paper, we argue that this literature is misdirected, or at least 
incomplete, in how it appreciates the impact of risk as an input behind this conundrum. 
We hypothesise that this lack of infrastructure development in the region, reflects a dearth 
of investment due to the existence of excessive negative uncertainties or risks – as 
investment is a function of uncertainty and reward. However, the recent academic 
development literature appears to not appreciate this as an explanation. To make this 
argument, we chose a manageable sample of three African countries, which already had 
a notable body of academic literature concerning them: Kenya, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania. Focusing on these countries, we then undertook a systematic review of 815 
‘peer reviewed’ papers published on the academic libraries of Scopus and/or the Web of 
Science on the topic of electricity, infrastructure, and risk over a five-year period to see 
how this literature evaluated the problem. Drawing from the most relevant 101 studies 
within that sample, we critically examine the methodological, conceptual, and empirical 
aspects of this literature.  
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1. Introduction 
It has been 139 years since Thomas Edison patented his lightbulb in 1879; 46 years 
since the structure of Overseas Development Assistance was formalised in 1972; and 18 
years since the United Nations Millennium Development Goals declaration in 2000. More 
recently the Sustainable Energy for All initiative was launched, and the Sustainable 
Development Goal 7, specifically dealing with energy access, was prioritised [Ockwell 
and Byrne, 2017; International Energy Agency, 2017; Gollwitzer et al., 2018]. Yet despite 
these supposedly positive ‘milestones’ for electricity accessibility, eastern Africa remains 
one of the world's most electricity deficient regions.  
According to the most recent data from the International Energy Agency [2018], 75 
million people living in Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique did not have any access to 
electricity. From an economic growth perspective, access to reliable and affordable 
electricity in Africa is a major developmental obstacle [AfDB, 2018; Briceño-Garmendia 
et al., 2008; Halff et al, 2014; Moyo, 2013].  
In this study, we argue that the academic community needs a more comprehensive 
structure for identifying risk on this topic. We operationalise risk as including the factors 
that are material and cannot be predicted, that negatively impact investment in electricity 
infrastructure, which we call risks or ‘negative uncertainties’. To make this argument, we 
undertook a systematic review of 815 academic studies published in two academic 
databases on the topic of electricity, infrastructure and risk in Kenya, Mozambique, 
Tanzania and SSA over a five year period of 2012–2017. Drawing from the most relevant 
101 studies within the sample, we investigate the methodological, conceptual, and 
empirical aspects of this literature.  
We find that there is a need to deliver a more useful conceptual framework concerning 
risk, as well as for creating ‘bankable’ electricity infrastructure development projects. We 
argue that new classifications of risk are needed to better understand the financing of 
electricity infrastructure development, than those that exist within the literature. This 
framework can then be used to influence policy, to support the development of such new 
infrastructure by the private sector, in the countries of Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique 
(and perhaps beyond).  
In proceeding on this path, the primary contribution of this paper is to reformulate the 
relevance of risk within the academic research community. Admittedly, electricity 
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demand (kWh) is a function of varying contextual factors such as availability of 
resources, electrical appliance ownership, duration of usage, and the viability of tariffs—
all of these impact the innovation ecosystem affecting energy services [Kowalska-
Pyzalska, 2018]. Moreover, there is often a direct or at least meaningful relationship 
between household economic poverty and energy burdens and energy poverty: the poorer 
households are, the higher their energy burden, yet poorer households tend to access 
cheaper alternative energy options, when electricity tariffs are high [Sovacool, 2012; 
Monyei et al., 2018a, 2018b; Bohlmann and Inglesi-Lotz, 2018].  
In an attempt to address energy poverty, the IEA initially estimated that US$389 
billion needed to be spent on the development of new sub-Sahara African (SSA) 
electricity infrastructure, to achieve the UN's Sustainable Development Goal of universal 
access to electricity for all in the region, by 2030 [Myers, 2013-citing the IEA]. More 
recently, the IEA estimated [2017: 5] that “providing electricity for all by 2030 would 
require annual investment of $52 billion per year, more than twice the level mobilised 
under current and planned policies. Of the additional investment, 95% needs to be 
directed to sub-Saharan Africa.”  
Thus, a significant portion of electricity investment will need to be directed at Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Mozambique. The only realistic source for the level of financing, that the 
IEA suggests is required by 2030, is from international financial markets. These 
international markets consists of pension funds, insurance companies, sovereign wealth 
funds, and mutual funds (naming the major constituents). Combined, these institutional 
investors have more than $US100 trillion in assets under management [Arezki et al., 
2016; AfDB, 2018]. Harnessing private sector finance therefore offers an incredibly 
promising but underutilized tool for expanding access to electricity and reducing the 
extent and severity of energy poverty. 
2. Research design: conceptualising risk and 
undertaking reviews 
This paper hypothesises that electricity poverty in Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique 
is caused by the inability to finance the construction of new electricity infrastructure in 
the region; and this inability is caused by excessive ‘risks’, that surround the development 
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process of electricity infrastructure. These risks then cause such developments as an 
investment proposition, to be unattractive to the private sector. 
2.1  Interdisciplinary conceptions of risk 
To make this case, we firstly carried out an interdisciplinary review of the literature 
on risk utilising four separate academic disciplines: investment finance, project 
management studies, innovation studies, and international development studies. The 
investment finance literature demonstrates how negative uncertainty or risk in our context 
influences electricity investment in eastern Africa. It utilises the highly cited theories of 
Dixit and Pindyck advocated in “Investment under Uncertainty” [1994], as they are the 
most applicable to the eastern Africa context. The project management literature delivers 
a framework for identifying and classifying risks, as this forms a major part of that 
disciplines theory. The innovation literature offers a contribution to theories on the 
‘diffusion of technology’ in developing countries [Rogers, 2003; Abramovitz, 1986], as 
electricity infrastructure development is essentially a diffusion of technology through 
projects. The development studies literature emphasizes linkages between energy 
infrastructure and dimensions such as aid dependence, governance, corruption, and 
democracy.  
From the project management literature, we can see that uncertainty does not 
necessarily constitute a barrier for such investment, as uncertainty can be a positive when 
it represents an opportunity [Chapman and Ward, 2011; Hillson, 2004]. Therefore, the 
uncertainty that needs to be identified, are the negative uncertainties ‘that matter’ 
[Hillson, 2004], which in this paper we will now call ‘risk’. Additionally, there are three 
further factors that need to be grasped from the literature about how risk can undermine 
a project's ‘bankability’. Firstly, are the illiquid properties of an electricity infrastructure 
investment, the investment's value will be tied to the location that the development has 
been constructed within (the asset cannot simply just be removed and taken away intact) 
[Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Levy, 2014]. Secondly, no risks occur in isolation, all risks are 
interrelated and affect each other; and thirdly, some risks are more significant in their 
level of impact to a project's deliverables than others.  
The first way to measure a risk's influence, is to evaluate whether it will lead to an 
absolute or proportional change in outcome; and if it is proportional, to what degree? An 
absolute change, in this context, is a change that will have binary characteristics – it will 
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alter the outcome completely or not at all. A ‘proportional’ change, in this context, is an 
incremental weakening of the expected outcome – but there will still be an outcome. 
Absolute risks are considered the most dangerous, but only if they are believed likely to 
happen [Hillson, 2004].  
Figure. 3. Micro, meso, and macro conceptions of infrastructure risk. 
(Data derived by the author)  
 
Note: Micro factors include those at the project or infrastructure level; Meso factors national aspects such 
as regulations or assets; Macro factors global dynamics such as exchange or interest rates.  
The figure is descriptive only. It has been derived by the authors from the simple risk analysis found 
throughout sec.4.3 – at the end of each sub-section. These are not fixed measurements and require 
reappraisal if the scale of a project dramatically increases, becoming a megaproject (see Ch.5). 
The second way to measure the influence of risk is in its probability of happening. 
Some risks are never likely to happen, and therefore can be ignored – for example, a 
meteorite might hit the asset and destroy it (possible, but very unlikely). Others must be 
empirically predicted, utilising a combination of relevant historical precedents of 
possibilities and the ability to control or manage human behaviours and the applicable 
environment. Both these impacts are subjective and are matters of judgement, which 
means they can be influenced as much by perception as reality. The project management 
literature usually applies a sliding scale to both these factors [Hillson, 2004]. A high 
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impacting risk that is likely to happen, will always make an investment proposal 
unattractive and causing it to be rejected.  
To help classify the relevant risks, two approaches are utilised here. Firstly, a bottom 
up approach, which separates risk into three separate fields: micro, or project specific 
derived risk; meso, or country specific risk; and macro, or systematic risk (see Figure 3). 
As the figure indicates, these risks occur not only across scales, making them polycentric. 
They also occur to different degrees, with some (construction costs or interest rates) 
reflecting low risk to project cancellation, whereas others (planning delays, poor 
exchange rates) reflect high degrees of risk that can scuttle projects, and still others fall 
between at a moderate or medium degree of risk. 
Secondly, a linear approach can be applied to the micro risks, as these are all project 
specific. Standard project management theory, such as that used by the Project 
Management Institute, utilises a linear process of distinct management stages in a 
project's development. Extrapolating from this, we can separate three phases that can be 
impacted by risk. These are the planning, the construction, and the operation phases. A 
comprehensive planning stage will identify the construction and operational risks, as well 
as instigate remedies to manage them: these aspects have been split, for transparency. 
Lastly, there is a fourth important class of risk associated with the linear approach, but 
not specific to a single phase: this is stakeholder risk [Hillson, 2004]. 
          Figure. 4 – A linear illustration of project risk (Author’s descriptive interpretation) 
 
                            
2.2 Systematic literature review 
To understand how the current peer-reviewed literature understands the issue of risk, 
the methodological tool of a critical systematic review was employed. A defined period 
was applied to the search, January 1, 2012 until June 30, 2017. Four geographic entities 
were interrogated: Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and sub-Saharan Africa. Six search 
strings were utilised and examined in Scopus using the “Title, Abstract, and Keywords” 
and in the Web of Science applied to “Title and Topic”: 
1. Electricity and Finance. 
2. Electricity and Risk. 
3. Electricity and Challenges. 
Design/planning Construction Operation
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4. Infrastructure and Finance. 
5. Infrastructure and Risk. 
6. Infrastructure and Challenges. 
This search originally delivered 815 studies, but these were reduced to 116 after 
filtering the title and abstract for relevance. After reading and reviewing the 116 papers, 
a further fifteen were also excluded on the grounds of relevance. The 101 remaining 
papers were then analysed and classified according to a coding schema.  
The first two attributes coded, were about the demographics of the author and the 
research designs undertaken: 
1. Where were authors located geographically?  
2. What research methods were employed in the paper? 
The third through eighth attributes concerned the analytical frames and qualitative themes 
and topics examined, namely: 
3. Was access to financing, understood to be the principal cause of electricity poverty?  
4. Was uncertainty discussed with reference to financing? If yes, what was its 
definition?  
5. Was risk defined with reference to financing? – If yes, what was its definition?  
6. Was the subject of ‘bankability’, discussed?  
7. Were policy mechanisms to mitigate risk, such as Power Purchase Agreements or 
Feed-in Tariffs, discussed?  
8. Were barriers to electricity infrastructure development, discussed? If yes, what form 
did they take? 
The idea behind coding these eight categories, was that it would enable a deeper and 
systematic reflection of the geographies, research methods, and themes being applied in 
our systematic sample of the academic literature. 
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3. Results: Authors, methods, and themes in energy 
poverty scholarship 
This section of the study summarizes our results of the systematic review, under the 
three broad headings of author demographics; research methods and designs; and themes 
and topics. 
3.1 Author demographics 
Disappointingly, our systematic review uncovered that researchers located within 
African countries do not do the bulk of research carried out on eastern Africa. As Figure 
5 indicates, authors at institutions in Europe and North America accounted for a sobering 
59% of the sample, with Africa (as a whole) only at 27%. This finding is potentially 
troubling given it suggests much work is perhaps desk based and/or done at institutions 
with stakes in the region (shaped by patterns of colonialism and imperialism). It may also 
be incredibly hard for African researchers to be published in European scientific journals, 
due to cost and access. This becomes even more troubling given our findings about 
methods, in the next section. 
             
Figure 5. Author Demographics for Research on East African Electricity and Risk, 2012 
– 2017. (Data derived by author). 
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3.2 Research methods and designs 
Figure 6 reveals that while the most popular utilised method among all articles 
examined was a qualitative geographic case study, the second most dominant method was 
none at all —studies that had no detectable research design or methods section, commonly 
a non-systematic (convenience sample) literature review. Indeed, only a fraction of the 
sample (about 5%) utilised human centred, original data collection methods such as 
interviews, surveys, or experiments. 
       
Figure 6. Research methods utilised by Research on East African Electricity and Risk, 
2012 – 2017. (Data derived by author) 
3.3 Themes and Topics 
Lastly, and perhaps most problematically, we find that the bulk of papers examined 
do not meaningfully discuss various elements of infrastructure development risk. As 
Table 1 summarises below, general risk and the causes or drivers of energy and electricity 
poverty are more frequently investigated; but access to financing, uncertainty, 
bankability, and policy mechanisms are not. For instance, only thirteen papers discussed 
the issue of how to facilitate access to finance as being the central challenge for resolving 
electricity poverty: Eberhard et al., 2017; Chirambo, 2016; Williams et al., 2015, 2016; 
Gujba et al., 2012; Onyeji, 2014; Labordena et al., 2017; Kagimu and Ustun, 2016; 
Experimental
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Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012; Eberhard, 2015; Doorsamy and Cronje, 2015; Ekholm, 
2013; Ekouevi and Elizondo-Azuela, 2013. 
Table 1. Scope of themes, topics and lacunae in research on East African electricity and 
risk, 2012–2017. (Data derived by author) 
Coding 
Category 
Dimension Number of papers addressing 
the dimension 
Number of papers addressing 
the dimensions (%) 
3 Access to financing 12 11.9% 
4 Uncertainty 2 2.0% 
5 Risk 29 28.7% 
6 Bankability 3 3.0% 
7 Policy Mechanisms 13 12.9% 
8 Causes of Poverty 69 68.3% 
 
Only two papers discussed uncertainty and only one defined it: “the future evolution of 
relevant parameters, which cannot be derived on past observations” [Tinoco et al., 2012]. 
Twenty-nine papers discussed risk, but only five actually defined or conceptualized it: 
Labordena et al., 2017; Ogando and Pretorius, 2015; Tinoco et al., 2012; Ekholm et al., 
2013; and Amars et al., 2017. Bankability of electricity infrastructure project proposals 
was only discussed three times. Types of electricity offtake agreements were discussed 
only 12 times: The causes of electricity poverty were most discussed, happening in 69 
papers. 
4. Discussion: framing, causality, and risk in energy 
poverty scholarship 
As our systematic review indicates, the discussion of uncertainty and bankability 
within the literature is artificially narrow, and this appears to be due to the narratives 
utilised (alternatively with uncertainty, as its meaning can be quite subjective and varied, 
it could also be that the literature is just focussing on risk in different ways).  
A public-sector perspective of electricity delivery is still the default narrative within 
the governments of Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania, as well as much of the academic 
literature. This is important: as the significance of uncertainty as a variable, and its impact, 
is completely different between a public and private sector context. Bankability as a 
variable is only relevant when applying a private-sector context. The standard default 
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perspective still assumes that a country’s government will drive a solution to electricity 
poverty. However, the governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique, do not have 
well-resourced balance sheets [CEPA 4, 2015]: for example, “Tanzania is one of the 
biggest recipients of donor aid of which a large share is going to general budget support” 
[Amars et al., 2017: 90]; Foreign largesse accounts for more than half of Mozambique's 
national budget” [Darley, 2012: 62]. Further, due a lack of institutional capabilities 
[Abramovitz, 1986], each country has a very inefficient tax collection regime, whereby 
they are not able to cross subsidise their electricity infrastructure through their tax system 
[CEPA 4, 2015]. The government narrative must be adapted therefore towards a private 
sector one, especially if the private sector is going to be successfully persuaded to finance 
these three countries’ electricity infrastructure expansions. For privately sourced 
financing to be forthcoming for electricity infrastructure development in eastern Africa, 
the risk landscape must be able to fit within acceptable parameters. If it does not, such 
investment will not be accepted as an attractive commercial proposition – it will not be 
considered as ‘bankable’ – and there will be no ‘private sector’ participation. Therefore, 
we encourage academia to consider the following factors in this section. 
4.1 There is a need to widen electricity poverty themes, topics, and 
narratives 
When a theoretical explanation for electricity poverty in our review is presented, most 
papers adopt one of two systems approaches. 
4.1.1 A Socio-technical systems narrative 
Twenty-nine papers within the systematic sample, adopt a ‘sociotechnical’ narrative 
[Geels, 2004]: that attributes the problem of electricity poverty to a lack of demand or 
resistant regimes. This narrative suggests that within the three countries being analysed, 
there is a lack of household income (a social constraint), which limits demand for 
electricity as it cannot be afforded. This lack of demand in turn undermines the 
commercial basis for a supply of electricity from larger scale electricity infrastructure – 
the grid – resulting in a continuance of the electricity poverty. This narrative views finance 
as a limiting constraint that restricts the range of solutions to electricity poverty – much 
as the hours of sunlight are a constraint in generating solar electricity, or water hydrology 
is a limitation to the generation of hydroelectricity.  
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Solutions for electricity poverty within this narrative are therefore built around which 
technologies are possible to deliver electricity, within this financially-constrained 
environment. In the papers included in the systematic review, this usually involves the 
utilisation of small-scale distributive generation technologies [Ackermann et al., 2001], 
such as micro-grids powered by either small scale photovoltaic solar (PV) or Pico-hydro9 
[Brix Pederson, 2016; Hofmeister et al., 2015]. 
4.1.2 A national innovation system narrative 
Alternatively, twenty-four papers adopt a ‘supply side’ narrative that is determined by 
a ‘national innovation system’ framework approach [Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1985; 
1992]. This perspective generally explains electricity poverty in eastern Africa as being 
the consequence of an inefficient and dysfunctional electricity services delivery systems: 
in the form of each country's electricity utility and surrounding government institutions, 
private enterprises and any other relevant actors [Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012; Amars 
et al., 2017].  
A national innovation system is a theoretical framework, that can be used to explain 
how a country’s economic and political structure is organised to disseminate and operate 
complex technology [Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1985; 1992]. This framework is relevant 
to understanding a country’s electricity service delivery network, as such networks are 
essentially the diffusion and operation of complex technologies. To function effectively, 
a country requires a minimal level of knowledge and capabilities between the relevant 
actors within the system [Ibid]. This would include shared perspectives, shared ambitions, 
compatible technical skills, compatible technology, and organisational standards within 
the system – at governmental, institutional and employee levels [Ibid]. Any 
dysfunctionality arises from poor structures of governance and levels of capabilities 
within the electricity system of each country [Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & Pavitt, 1993 
Nelson & Winter, 1982] which when combined with other factors prevent the supply of 
affordable and reliable electricity.  
The relevance of this theory focusses on each country’s utilities inability to recover 
their cost of generating electricity when they sell it. This can be for several different 
reasons, but the most common ones given by the literature are:  
 
9 Pico hydropower: Turbines smaller than 10kW are usually called "Pico". Pico hydropower is rarely fed 
into a power grid, but in most cases, electricity is delivered to a village or a workshop. 
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• The retail tariff is to low [Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012].  
• There is a significant loss of electricity in the transmission system – as high as 
25% in Tanzania [Amars et al., 2017] – before it reaches the customer;  
• Customers do not pay their bills [Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012]. 
A combination of these factors means that the utility is close to insolvency, and only 
manages to keep operating with ongoing government subsidies - which are never enough. 
This troubled condition then has a knock-on effect, due to too few resources to maintain 
and operate the system efficiently: there are no spare parts, and the infrastructure just 
wears out [Amars et al., 2017]10.  
We advocate that both these narratives are too limiting in their explanation of the 
challenge. 
4.2  Appreciate the relevance of finance and causality 
Even though both these narratives acknowledge that finance is a barrier to electricity 
access within the region, and in that sense in general agreement with study, they differ 
from our premise in their perspective of causality and the centrality and significance of 
this financing restriction. We postulate that electricity poverty in eastern Africa is as much 
an issue of causation as it is about the underlying challenges that impact access to 
electricity: what causes what to happen, rather than just a sum of everything.  
Further, the ability to finance is a dependent variable that is determined by the many 
challenges (risks) that are listed in the literature: which are all independent variables. The 
dependent variable of finance in a way determines the severity and nature of impact of all 
the other challenges. To apply an analogy: the issue of electricity poverty in eastern Africa 
is like a large funnel that has a wide top and narrow neck. At the top, we can place all the 
uncertainties that negatively affect electricity infrastructure financing, that are listed 
within the academic literature (these are our independent variables).The ‘neck of the 
 
10 It should also be noted, as this wasn’t picked up in the systematic review’s literature (probably as 
it was then too recent a phenomenon in mid-2017), that the dramatic fall in the unit cost of solar PV 
produced electricity over recent years, is probably causing many past credit worthy customers of the 
utility in the three sample countries, to rapidly abandon their country’s utility as customers [IEA, 
2019]. This reality is likely to be placing further financial strain, on each of the three country’s utility’ 
finances. 
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funnel’ represents the ability (or inability) to finance the building of new electricity 
infrastructure (a dependent variable). 
 We can potentially widen the neck of the funnel by either managing the current 
independent variables, by reducing their risk; or by being able to redefine the independent 
variables, by changing them for something with less uncertainty. As an example: 
governance issues surrounding the development of electricity infrastructure in eastern 
Africa primarily undermine the ability to finance such development, rather than the 
development process directly. 
4.3 A better understanding of risk 
Further we argue that the academic community must come to assess more dynamically 
(and grapple with) risk. We give six examples of different dimensions of risk that require 
more analysis that is rigorous: planning risk, construction risk, operational risk, 
stakeholder risk, meso or country risk, and macro or systemic risk (with Table 2 offering 
an overview summary). In this classification, we have utilised a limited amount of 
additional academic and grey literature for citation purposes, to fill evidence gaps in the 
systematic review literature. 
Table 2. Overview of risks to electricity financing in Sub-Saharan Africa. (Data derived by 
author) 
Category of Risk Description Degree 
Planning Planning, licensing, or approval costs and delays High 
Construction Engineering, procurement, and construction costs for both fossil 
fuelled and renewable electricity infrastructure. 
Moderate 
Operating Unexpected changes in performance, credit, regulation, and 
security. 
High 
Stakeholder Individual, group, or organisational actors that can affect a project. Moderate 
Meso/Country Changes in capabilities, policy regimes, governments, or 
complimentary assets. 
High 
Macro/International Global interest rates, appetite for long tail liquidity risk, or exchange 
rates 
High 
 
4.3.1 Planning risks 
The two principal negative features connected with the planning of infrastructure in 
the region are related to the amount of time taken (an associated cost), and the actual cost 
of dealing with the level of red tape, that surrounds the infrastructure development process 
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in all three countries. Both these issues are closely related and will be dealt with together. 
They stem from the lack of institutional capabilities, which our sample country suffer 
from, and governance issues [Collier, 2014; Amars et al., 2017]. The lack of institutional 
capabilities result in macro sociological and institutional barriers, which prevent the 
successful adoption of new technologies by a less developed economy [Abramovitz, 
1986; Bell & Pavitt, 1993]. These arise from deficient skills, processes, and knowledge, 
which prevent the successful diffusion of technology, which is what electricity 
infrastructure would qualify as.  
The infrastructure planning process for electricity in eastern Africa is considerably 
more risky and costly than its OECD equivalent. Planning costs can be as high as 10% of 
the project value, in contrast to the OECD standard of under 1% [Castalia, 2014:21]. This 
is partly due to a lack of available of institutional expertise within the government, but 
also mischievous ‘rent-seeking’ [Krueger, 1974] from politically connected individuals, 
who use their ‘power to delay’ to extract an ‘advantage’, particularly in Tanzania and 
Mozambique [Amars et al., 2017; Kihwele et al., 2012; Darley, 2012]. It can also be very 
difficult and expensive for an international investor, to obtain the necessary expertise that 
is appropriate for each country.  
This absence of institutional capability and governance adds to planning costs in two 
ways, as the government is responsible for both creating and authorising infrastructure 
schemes [CEPA 1, 2015]. Poor institutional capability within government, results in a 
deficient formulation of tenders, as there is little comprehension of investor prerequisites 
– for example, there are no set standards for structuring projects: “the supporting legal 
documentation for the off-take agreement in a recent Kenyan electricity project was a 
thousand pages long, resulting in prohibitive costs” …… . “The equivalent in India would 
likely be only 20 pages” [Collier, 2014: 40].  
There is also a lack of capacity to swiftly evaluate the requisites and suitability of a 
project proposal and its accompanying documentation, largely due to a bureaucratic 
structure, where a complicated administrative process stalls everything (even without 
mischievous motivations). The Lake Turkana wind farm project in Kenya, the largest in 
Africa, took far longer to reach financial closure than would be normally expected in 
other, more developed jurisdictions [CEPA 3, 2015]. The total number of proposals also 
overwhelm the bureaucracy, many of which are unsuitable for purpose. Kenya is better 
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in this area than Mozambique and Tanzania, where its governance is improving [CEPA 
2, 2015; CEPA 3, 2015].  
Applying our classification process discussed in sec.2.1: we give these risks a high 
rating: despite these risks being proportional, we give them a high rating because they 
can stop an investment evaluation from ever happening, and they a high probability of 
occurring. 
4.3.2 Construction Risk 
Construction risks are negative factors that are attributable to the physical construction 
of an electricity infrastructure asset. These can be reduced into two elements: the 
technology being utilised within the asset; and the contractor that is responsible for the 
asset's construction. 
 Technology risks surround the implementation and operation of the relevant 
technology to be utilised to generate electricity, which we subdivide into the traditional 
fossil fuel technologies and renewable technologies. We note the strong academic debate 
over which technologies should be utilised when developing electricity infrastructure in 
eastern Africa, due to climate change. To reflect this as well as for clarity of explanation, 
as both technology risks have different causalities, each will be reviewed separately.  
Fossil fuel technologies are better understood in SSA and therefore are not regarded 
as problematic – as such, they are easier and cheaper to finance. They are however more 
expensive to operate, due to their need to obtain feedstock (coal, oil, etc.); and this is a 
burden not just because of the cost of the fuel, but because that requires ‘hard’ currency 
(This will be discussed later under currency risk, which will be within the macro-risk 
section). Currently diesel generation is the major fossil fuel utilised for this reason, as it 
is the most flexible and cheapest technology to install, despite being the most expensive 
to operate, when compared to other technologies on a variable cost basis [Eberhard and 
Shkaratan, 2012; Labordena et al., 2017]. Mozambique has proven rich coal reserves, and 
all three countries have likely offshore gas reserves. These are yet to be fully exploited 
however, as governance issues are slowing the progress of this development [Robbins 
and Perkins, 2012]. The existence of this resource has created a bias within Mozambique 
and Tanzania towards fossil fuels, particularly as they do not yet see climate change as 
being an African issue [Amars et al., 2017; Kihwele et al., 2012].  
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Different renewable technologies, differ in their risk profile, which makes it necessary 
to split traditional hydro from modern geothermal, solar and wind technologies. Hydro 
technologies have been the backbone of all three countries electricity systems since their 
colonial independence, after being installed by each country's previous colonial 
administrations. Each system is suffering performance issues however, through poor 
maintenance [Adebayo et al., 2013; Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012]. The future of hydro 
in the region is now also very questionable, due to climate change, which has negatively 
influenced the regions hydrology and completely upset the technology's viability – 
particularly in Kenya and Tanzania [Amars et al., 2017].  
The unique hydroelectric arrangements in Mozambique deserve special note: Cahora 
Bassa is the country's principal hydro dam (which is located on the Zambezi river), which 
is responsible for over 95% of the country's electricity generation. More than 90% of the 
electricity generated from this dam is exported, as this was a necessary requirement to 
finance construction [Isaacman and Isaacman, 2015]. This issue clearly demonstrates the 
compromises that finance issue can lead to in the region.  
The risks surrounding other renewable technologies can be attributed to a high fixed 
upfront cost, which makes financing more expensive; and issues of capabilities when it 
comes to construction, operation, and servicing - as these are seen as new and unfamiliar 
technologies that require expensive overseas-trained labour forces. Expensive foreign 
expertise will have to be hired in, to implement the new technologies, but this can then 
create issue of friction politically with stakeholders, particularly over the longer term, as 
client countries in African sometimes demand the utilisation of a local workforce [Baker 
and Sovacool, 2017]. This can also lead to security issues (see below) [Eberhard and 
Shkaratan, 2012]. This then creates long-term performance risk, another important factor 
in being able to obtain finance [Labordena et al., 2017].  
In conclusion: both the governments of Tanzania and Mozambique favour the use of 
fossil fuel technologies, for the development of electricity generating infrastructure, as 
they have lower development costs and associated complications than renewables. Kenya, 
which is far more sympathetic to climate change, favours the use of renewables, 
particularly geothermal [CEPA 3, 2015]. The academic literature, as witnessed in the 
systematic review, has a definite positive bias towards the use of renewable technologies 
for the future of electricity generation in eastern Africa – due to the above technology 
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familiarity and lower financing costs, this debate cannot be regarded as a settled 
[Labordena et al., 2017].  
Contractor risk encompasses whether a contractor that is constructing the asset on 
behalf of the investor, can fulfil their contractual obligations: in terms of robustness, 
quality, cost, and timeframe – that has been itemised and accepted in the contract. If the 
contractor has experience in the region and the technology to be utilised, these risks 
should be proportional and of a low probability – but eastern Africa is a very challenging 
environment. It is standard practice for contractors to give performance guarantees with 
their work, within their contractual arrangements. There are also many financially well-
resourced engineering firms, which are interested in carrying out such work – so if proper 
‘due diligence’ is carried out when appointing a contractor, this will minimise such risk.  
Applying our classification (sec2.1) – Together, we give these risks a moderate rating: 
despite these risks being absolute and having a high impact, the option of choice of both 
technology and contractor allows for some degree of risk transfer and avoidance. 
4.3.3 Operating Risk 
Operating risks directly influence the revenues of the new infrastructure once it has 
been commissioned. They can be sub-divided into four groups: 
• Performance - will the technology function in the way it was engineered to do. 
• Credit - will the anticipated buyer of the electricity pay the anticipated price in a 
timely fashion.  
• Regulation – will the expected output and tariff be free of inappropriate political 
interference. 
• Security - will the asset's essential personnel be safe from physical interference, 
and will the physical asset be safe from theft and vandalism/terrorism. 
Performance risk has already been discussed as part of technology risk in the previous 
section – so, this will not be analysed further here.  
Credit risk can be attributed to each country's electricity utility's ability to pay its bills. 
In our sample countries, their utilities have monopoly rights to distribute electricity to 
customers in terms of the main grid where larger scale customers will be located [CEPA 
2, 2015; CEPA 3, 2015; Amars et al., 2017]. Consequentially the country's utility will be 
the customer for any electricity generated – but none of these utilities has an investment 
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grade credit rating and therefore cannot be considered a credit worthy counterparty 
[CEPA 2, 2015; CEPA 3, 2015; Amars et al., 2017; Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012]. A 
standard way around this is for the actual government to offer guarantees, but Kenya only 
offers these sparingly – it partly did so with the Lake Turkana wind farm project – and 
both Tanzania and Mozambique have both refused to do so [CEPA 2, 2015; CEPA 3, 
2015; Amars et al., 2017]. This poor credit rating also makes the credit management tool 
of ‘Power Purchase Agreements’ (PPA) in this environment ineffective [CEPA 4, 2015]. 
Regulation risk in all three countries is expressed through tariff restrictions, because of 
political lobbying (particularly from business) to keep electricity prices low [CEPA 1, 
2015; Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012]. These tariff rates are currently below the cost of 
generation – so when you consider there are substantial losses of electricity in the 
transmission process, 25% in Tanzania [Amars et al., 2017]; and a significant failure of 
customers paying their bills [Amars et al., 2017; Kihwele et al., 2012; Eberhard and 
Shkaratan, 2012] – this is a major negative factor for investment. The only reason each 
utility is still solvent is through government subsidies from general revenues (and aid). 
Therefore, whilst tariff limits are in place, any increase in access to each country's grid 
will put further financial pressure on each governments balance sheet (particularly as the 
incremental cost of the new supply, will be much higher than the existing supply) 
[Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012]. It should be noted that this is a policy that favours the 
country's urban elite, as the rural poor do not have any access to electricity that is 
subsidised [Eberhard and Shkaratan, 2012: citing Fritz et al., 2009]. Security risks are 
factors that affect both the asset and key staff. 
Assets can be damaged through acts of terrorism or criminality; key staff are 
increasingly under threat of kidnapping for ransom. Some examples would be: in 
Mozambique, RENAMO11 have threatened to resort again to conflict, although they did 
sign another peace agreement in May 2017 – during the country's civil war post-
independence, when RENAMO was a party to the conflict, the Cahora Bassa hydro-
electric project’s transmission infrastructure was continually attacked by them [Isaacman 
and Isaacman, 2015]. In Kenya, transmission infrastructure is continually vandalised 
(particularly by aggrieved stakeholders) or has electricity stolen from it; key personnel 
are subject to kidnapping [Gumbe, 2016].  
 
11 RENAMO is Mozambique’s principle political opposition, which evolved from one of the country’s 
previous civil war antagonists. 
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Applying our classification – We give these risks a high rating: both impact and 
probability are high, due to the likelihood of the four sub-factors working in combination. 
4.3.4 Stakeholder Risk 
Stakeholders in our context are any significant individual, group, or organisation that 
has both an interest and an ability to influence the development of an electricity 
infrastructure project [Hillson, 2004]. Stakeholder influence is not necessarily specific to 
any stage of the development process, and it can be either proportional or absolute in its 
impact, depending on the level of power and willingness to wield it. A relevant 
government minister could be absolute in impact, if they chose to nationalise an asset for 
instance; a bureaucrat could be very troublesome, but in a more measured way. Examples 
of stakeholders include senior government ministers, government bureaucrats, 
infrastructure effected populations, business customers, residential customers and donors. 
Their capturing qualification is that they are all impacted in some way by the existence of 
electricity infrastructure; all have a legitimate interest in its operation, and all can 
negatively influence it if they feel the need to do so. Therefore, if they are not appreciated 
and managed, they can be very troublesome [Hillson, 2004].  
Many of the stakeholder issues will be covered under meso-uncertainties in the next 
section, under political risk.  
Applying our classification – We offer a medium/high rating for these risks: their 
impact is proportional and medium, but the probability is high. 
4.3.5 Meso or country risks 
This ‘field’ of risk is specific to a country and its institutional and social structures, 
which are often to do with issues of governance. Four primary meso risks exist: 
capability, legal/regulatory, political, and complimentary assets.  
Capability risk has already been partly discussed under planning uncertainty; and the 
remaining aspects will be assessed in the macro risks section, where it creates exchange 
rate structural risks – so these risks will not be analysed further here.  
Legal/regulatory risk have been mostly covered already in earlier sections and are 
intuitive in nature – so these risks will not discuss further.  
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Political risks are primarily issues of governance that arise from neo-patrimonialism, 
which is a predominant governance model to SSA. The governing elite's need to finance 
a political patronage system to maintain control of the political structure that delivers 
benefits to those that administer it [Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann and Engel, 
2006], brings about acts of financial misappropriation through informal ‘rent-seeking’ 
[Krueger, 1974], which is facilitated by an abuse of asymmetric power. The electricity 
infrastructure business model is not sufficiently robust when faced with any sizable rent 
seeking, due to the already discussed acute tariff regulation, and is vulnerable to becoming 
un-commercial when consistent illicit demands are placed upon it. As foreign investment 
in SSA is normally associated with the high ‘rent’ carrying business models associated 
with resource extraction, it is unclear how comprehensively SSA ‘policy actors’ 
appreciate this financing vulnerability (or care) that is applicable to electricity 
infrastructure projects. 
Applying our classification – We give these a high-risk rating, as neo-patrimonialism 
is embedded in each country's political system, and the business model of electricity 
infrastructure is not always robust enough to absorb any illicit payments.  
Complimentary assets [Teece, 1986] are structural factors, which are essential for 
enabling the electricity infrastructure to create and appropriate value. They can be 
absolute or partial in their impact, as without them the principal asset would not be able 
to operate effectively. They are often physical assets but can also include structural 
processes.  
The most significant of complimentary asset issues result from the embedded nature 
of electricity infrastructure. Unless a small-scale distributive technology is being utilised 
(such as home solar), electricity infrastructure can be divided into three separate 
components. Electricity generation, the creation of electricity from an alternative form of 
energy such as wind (kinetic energy) or coal (potential energy); electricity transmission, 
the grid that utilises pylons and wires; and local area distribution, the connectivity 
between the closest electricity substation and a home. It is not just the existence of these 
separate components, but also how effectively they are operating that makes them 
complimentary to each other.  
In all our three countries, as already mentioned earlier under the operational 
uncertainties, the transmission infrastructure and local area distribution network is the 
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responsibility of the country's national utility. The commercial viability of these utilities 
is questionable and the performance of the transmission assets unreliable, Tanzania loses 
25% of the electricity generated through its transmission infrastructure [Amars et al., 
2017]. This makes the uncertainty that surrounds the availability of efficient 
complimentary infrastructure in eastern Africa substantial – even when/if they are 
promised during planning.  
Further examples of complimentary assets would be effective hydro generation 
requires water sources to be dammed and flooded, with affected populations to be 
relocated. A solar photo voltaic (PV) power station necessitates that its PV panels are not 
stolen. An efficient tendering process requires standardised and comprehensive 
paperwork, which efficiently sets out required guidelines; effective payment for electricity 
used requires an effective billing system.  
Applying our classification – We give these risks a medium rating: responsibility for 
their supply relies on the country's institutions and the commerciality of any new 
infrastructure is completely reliant on it – however, these risks can often be identified in 
advance and planned for. 
4.3.6 Macro or international systemic risks 
In our three countries, the domestic banking system is mostly too undeveloped to 
finance any significant value of electricity generation infrastructure projects, although 
Kenya has enjoyed some success [CEPA 3, 2015]. However, for the private sector too 
fully or effectively finance infrastructure it will require facilitation from the international 
financial markets. This will then expose electricity infrastructure development, to 
international systematic financial risks.  
There are at least three key variables that need to be appreciated from this risk field. 
First is international interest rates - which will determine the rate of return the investment 
will demand. Interest rates affect all private sector investments in that they determine the 
‘benchmark cost’ that finance will be available for infrastructure development. On top of 
this ‘benchmark’, is then added the risk premium demanded for the country and project 
uncertainty – known as the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)12. If both these 
 
12 WACC - Weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a calculation of a firm's cost of capital, in which 
each category of capital is proportionately weighted to represent its relative risk to its alternative uses and 
its absolute risk profile [Garcia, 2017].  
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figures are high (assuming there is still a willingness to finance within eastern Africa), 
this required return is likely to be too great, for the underlying commerciality of the 
project.  
Second is a long tail liquidity appetite, the financial markets inclination to hold long 
dated illiquid investments. This is a measure of the sentiment of the financial markets: 
whether they are ‘bullish’ or ‘bearish’, to use a ‘markets’ cliché. Infrastructure investment 
by the private sector requires long time horizons to function: usually more than 20 years. 
If the markets are bearish (pessimistic), it is unlikely that market sentiment would enable 
long-dated investments in eastern African electricity infrastructure to occur. As a ‘rule of 
thumb’, the more bullish (optimistic) the markets are, the more willing they are to finance 
such investments.  
Third is exchange rate risk, or how much value is potentially at risk in the repatriation 
process of the value of the investment. Our three country's currencies are classified as 
‘soft’, which means they are illiquid and not easily transferable in large value transactions. 
Such characteristics create significant negative uncertainty for the revenues to be received 
in the borrowed hard currency, which can be reduced sizably from the nominal level 
during the conversion process, obstructing the willingness to finance. This issue can then 
be compounded by exchange controls, which prevents any repatriation of money from 
the country. Mozambique currently has such restrictions, where unless the funds have 
been earned through export, they cannot be repatriated from the country [Amars et al., 
2017]. Such restrictions would affect electricity infrastructure investments, as their 
revenue would be domestically sourced.  
Clearly, the threat of not being able to repatriate both the initial investment value and 
any anticipated profits, is an investment killer – as this removes the raison d'être of most 
foreign sourced investment. This is a factor that is rarely considered by the development 
literature – exchange risk was only mentioned in 6 of the 101 papers reviewed, as part of 
the systematic review.  
Applying our classification – We give these risks a high rating: the three factors in 
combination will ultimately determine whether an infrastructure project can be 
internationally financed. 
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5. Conclusion 
This study accepts that causes behind electricity poverty in eastern Africa are many 
and complex, with numerous variables negatively affecting the delivery of electricity in 
the region. Rather than supposing that the obstacles identified in the literature result in 
electricity poverty directly, instead we argue that they are independent variables that 
control the ability to finance the construction of new electricity infrastructure – their 
impact is therefore indirect. This means that a standard systems narrative is an incomplete 
explanation of electricity poverty, which instead needs to be broadened to include 
uncertainty and its impact. In sum: the academic community, and the policy regimes that 
it informs, needs to adopt a more complex and dynamic approach to financing 
electrification. 
Further, our study notes a lack of authors writing on this subject are located within 
eastern Africa (only 27% of our sample), and a paucity of human centred methods (fewer 
than 5%) such as original data gleaned from interviews, surveys, experiments, and other 
stated preference techniques. Worryingly, more than one-third of articles examined 
(37%), had no formal method at all. This suggests the energy studies academic 
community needs more inclusive yet robust and rigorous research, a finding also noted 
by Sovacool [2014b] and Sovacool et al. [2018].  
Lastly, as evidenced from our systematic review, much of the development literature 
sees the financing of electricity infrastructure in eastern Africa as a fixed and peripheral 
constraint, which is limited by low household incomes. Instead, we argue that the ability 
to finance is a limiting factor whose confines can potentially be alleviated when they are 
fully understood, and then managed. As such, they are potentially resolvable or at least 
relievable.  
For if this understanding of the causes of electricity poverty in eastern Africa can be 
appreciated and be incorporated into policy: then meaningful progress can be made in 
reducing this electricity poverty. This is the goal of this study – to redirect the policy 
debate so that finally the eastern African region can enjoy access to reliable and affordable 
electricity, and consequently more meaningful and sustainable economic growth. 
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Chapter 4: 
Rethinking the governance of energy poverty 
in sub-Saharan Africa: Reviewing three 
academic perspectives on electricity 
infrastructure investment 
Abstract  
Since the 1990s, the World Bank and other relevant and respected multilateral 
organisations have consistently advocated that the required finance to develop sub-
Saharan Africa's essential electricity capacity should be sourced from the private sector. 
However, despite this ongoing advocacy, the private sector has been unenthusiastic to 
answer this call. Much of the literature attributes this reticence to a lack of ‘good 
governance’: principally negative behaviours such as corruption. Instead, in this paper we 
argue that this is too simplistic an explanation, as private investment has still been able to 
thrive in other locations where such negative behaviours have existed. To support this 
argument, we utilise an interdisciplinary approach to review three separate academic 
governance perspectives, to deliver a more comprehensive view. These are: 1) Financial 
Investment Governance, the private sector investor's perspective, which focuses on the 
rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly, influence the financial investment 
environment. 2) Political Governance, the political economy perspective, which relates 
to the negative, indirect investment consequences resulting from the way that 
governments govern; and 3) Technical System Governance, a ‘systems’ perspective, 
which encompasses how the standard structure and organisation of the wider electricity 
delivery system in each country, negatively impacts such investment. In the discussion 
and conclusion, we find that if the development policy perspective for delivering 
electricity access to the region is to be successfully constructed around private investment, 
as the multilateral development community advocates, it will need to accommodate 15 
distinct issues that can be identified from this comprehensive review of governance. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper revisits how governance theory explains why the private sector has been 
unenthusiastic towards investing in Sub-Sahara African (SSA) electricity infrastructure, 
by applying a multidimensional application of governance, which uses interdisciplinary 
perspectives. We do recognise that there has been a recent growth in private sector 
investment interest, through independent power producers (IPPs) in the region [Eberhard 
et al, 2017]. However, this has been from a very low base and has a bias towards South 
Africa and partially Kenya, which are regional statistical outliers.  
Electricity capacity growth rates in sub-Saharan Africa, not including South Africa 
(RSA), over the last 40 years have been half those found in other developing regions 
[Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012]. Holstenkamp [2019] writes that 95% of the population 
without access to modern forms of energy live in developing Asian and African countries, 
and that ‘the challenge is considerable, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.’  
Historically, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was used to finance electricity 
capacity growth in SSA, but ODA was never able to deliver the level of resource that was 
required to satisfy the scope of this investment need. Towards the end of the last 
millennium, expectations shifted under Wolfensohn's presidency of the World Bank: so 
that the dominant multilateral development narrative surrounding financing, became a 
private sector sourced one [Collier, 2014; Eberhard, 2015]. Since then, both senior 
personnel and policy papers from the World Bank and other respected multilateral 
organisations, have repeated this call for the private sector to finance SSA electricity 
capacity growth [AfDB, 2010; Africa Progress Panel, 2017; G20, 2017; World Bank 1, 
2017; World Bank 2, 2017; World Bank 3, 2017; World Bank, 2011; World Bank, 2010]. 
However, despite these constant calls for support, the private sector continues to show a 
dearth of enthusiasm for investing in SSA electricity infrastructure development projects 
– ignoring the current generationally low global interest rate levels and a recognisable 
desire from the international financial markets for investment opportunities surrounding 
infrastructure.  
This private investor reluctance is recognisable by the lack of SSA sourced ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (CDM) projects that have been registered, whilst conceding 
the technology restrictions of this measure. The CDM was designed in 2007 and is a 
market-based mechanism designed to elicit private sector participation: yet by the end of 
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2014, the SSA region represented only 0.63% of the total of CDM projects globally 
[Kreibich et al, 2016]. This is despite the financial markets – consisting of pension funds, 
insurance companies, sovereign-wealth funds, mutual funds, (to name the major 
constituents) – having more than 100 trillion $US in assets under management to invest 
[Arezki, R. et al, 2016; Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a]. With this level of resource, and the 
clear investment need for such infrastructure to be developed within SSA – a lack of 
enthusiasm could still be argued to be a generous description of the private sector's 
unwillingness to invest.  
Governance – a term that encompasses factors such as accountancy and institutional 
capacity, political stability and bureaucratic flexibility – can play a vital role in shaping 
the direction and scope of private sector investment [Zaman & Brudermann, 2017]. 
Yadav et al. [2019: 1] even go as far as to write that a transformation of ‘governance 
models are required to meet the needs of communities living in rural and remote areas 
and particularly for those subject to energy and economic poverty.’ Yet many approaches 
to ‘governance’ oversimplify the extent of the challenges and tend to ignore the 
polycentric or systems level complexity that cuts across the actors, networks, and 
knowledge structures needed to address poverty [van Noordwijk, 2019]. 
 Traditionally, when the literature utilises ‘governance’ to explain why the private 
sector is unenthusiastic for investing in the region's electricity infrastructure, it often 
applies a narrow interpretation that centres on negative behaviours such as corruption. As 
private investment has still been able to thrive in other locations where such negative 
behaviours have existed [Booth, 2012], we challenge this view and argue that the 
literature is too narrow in its governance focus. As a decision to invest is a function of 
risk and reward [Bessis, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; de Jager & Rathmann, 2008], we 
instead contend that the lack of investment interest is a result of a financing ‘market 
failure’ related to excessive ‘negative uncertainties’ or risks13. Further, these risks derive 
from the indirect unintended consequences of the governance process, rather than the 
governance process itself. To do this, we utilise three separate academic perspectives to 
build a more holistic picture of how the current governance application surrounding the 
 
13 In this paper, both 'uncertainty' and 'risk' refer to the factors that cannot be pre-determined and can 
negatively affect an investments performance. It is accepted there is a degree of ambiguity and subjectivity 
surrounding the exact meaning of both these terms – within the financial markets (as this is a paper 
concerning private investment) and within the project management academic literature, the term ‘risk’ is 
usually regarded as being interchangeable with ‘negative uncertainty’ [Bessis, 2012; Chapman & Ward, 
2011; Hillson, 2004]. 
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development of electricity infrastructure contributes to risk. In this paper, we call these 
three perspectives: 
• Financial Investment Governance: the private sector investor's perspective, that 
focuses on the rules and institutions (or lack of) that directly influence the 
investment environment in SSA. 
• Political Governance: the political economy perspective, that focuses on the 
indirect investment consequences resulting from the way that SSA governments 
govern. 
• Technical System Governance: a ‘systems’ perspective, which encompasses 
how the standard type of structure and organisation of the greater electricity 
delivery regime in SSA, negatively impacts such investment. 
Before scrutinising each of these perspectives: first we define what is meant by ‘good 
governance’ in this paper, as there is no common definition of the term and it is often 
ideologically charged [Hufty, 2011]. We then explain what is meant by private 
investment. Next, we clarify why investors invest. Finally, we summarise the standard 
characteristics of this type of infrastructure investment and we explain how negative 
uncertainty deters investment.   
To define our three academic perspectives, an extensive interdisciplinary literature 
review was conducted, principally integrating insights from across four separate 
academic disciplines: investment finance, project management, development studies, and 
innovation studies. The investment finance literature contributed to dimensions such as 
why investors invest, why excessive negative uncertainty deters investment, and outlines 
the parameters of investment governance. The project management literature furnished 
its theories on risk: as most electricity infrastructure is developed through projects and 
risk forms a major part of that discipline's theory. The development studies literature 
supplied its theories on political economy; and data for the three perspectives. The 
innovation literature offered its theories on systems and regimes; and the ‘diffusion of 
technology’, as electricity infrastructure development is essentially about socio-technical 
transitions. 
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2. Conceptual approach and key terms 
Here, we introduce readers to three core concepts or terms used throughout the article: 
good governance, private investment, and risk. 
2.1 Grappling with good governance 
Governance broadly refers to any of the multitudinous processes or institutions in 
place, by which people set and enable rules needed to reach desired outcomes [Florini & 
Sovacool 2009]. While most commonly envisioned as the domain of governments, many 
other actors are involved in governance, including civil society organisations, 
corporations, and institutions of finance.  
Governance, when it concerns SSA, is often applied narrowly, negatively, and 
ideologically as a description of an act of financial misappropriation [Hufty, 2011; Booth, 
2012], through a ‘principal-agency’ framework [Eisenhardt, 1989]. Such 
misappropriation is possible through the abuse of a power asymmetry, often held by 
individuals on behalf of the structure of state: this imbalance is then used to obtain a non-
state obligatory financial gain [Levy, 2014]. Although this is a legitimate perspective of 
governance in our context, it represents only a small part of the theoretical lens that shapes 
the governance matrix that we use in this paper. Instead, we apply the term governance 
less rigidly and ideologically, using a much wider definition and utilising different 
stakeholder perspectives.  
Firstly, our definition of governance will apply a systemic approach: encompassing 
interactions and decision-making among all the various relevant stakeholders, reflecting 
the gradients of power and influence, involved in a collective problem – that being in this 
paper, the development and operation of electricity infrastructure within SSA. These 
interactions then lead to the creation or reinforcement of rules and social norms, along 
with accompanying institutions [Hufty, 2011]. Secondly, governance efficiency and 
sustainability (good or bad) is determined by its ability to deliver acceptable outcomes 
for all the relevant stakeholders, by successfully aligning stakeholder interests [Freeman 
R.E. et al; 2004].  
We argue, that the principal reason there is so much ambiguity in establishing what 
‘good governance’ entails and the reason for the apparent obstinacy in achieving it in a 
SSA context, is due to its effectiveness being normally defined from the perspective of 
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the stakeholder that is applying it. In other words, it is normative in its application [Hufty, 
2011]. This dichotomy is quite easy to observe in our field of study, by the apparent 
conflict of application between the interests of SSA national governments and those of 
the external financial donor countries over accusations of corruption.  
As successful electricity infrastructure development is supposedly the desired 
outcome for all stakeholders, all sponsors apparently want the successful delivery of 
affordable and reliable electricity – good governance should not in fact be the issue at all. 
The reason that it is we argue, is because the negative impact of the unintended 
consequences of governance outcomes, are not equally appreciated by all stakeholders 
and the benefits of such development are being contestably apportioned. Good 
governance is in fact a ‘collective action’ problem [Booth, 2012]: achieving it requires a 
holistic understanding of what it should entail for all relevant stakeholders, and agreement 
about its fairness by all sponsors in its application. Good governance, therefore, requires 
a belief in its legitimacy [Tyler, 1990]. 
2.2  Conceptualizing private investment and how it is impacted by 
risk 
In most of sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa), the domestic banking system 
is not able to privately finance any significant capacity increases in electricity 
infrastructure; compounded by there being few significant corporate, non-government 
institutional, or ‘private office’ investors in the region [IFC, 2016; Gregory & Sovacool, 
2019a; Sovacool & Cooper, 2013]. Therefore, in the context of this paper, private sector 
investment will refer to internationally sourced (out of region) private investment.  
Applying Occam's razor: an investment can be defined “as the act of incurring an 
immediate cost” (the value of the investment) “in the expectation of future rewards” (the 
investment return) [Dixit & Pindyck, 1994:3]. This definition suggests that there are two 
related, but separate elements involved in an investment; and that investors require 
certainty of outcomes from the second element, in response to the first.  
A decision to proceed with an investment is also a relative decision, as any individual 
investment opportunity does not exist in isolation: there are always many alternative 
investment opportunities that exist [Bessis, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, de Jager & 
Rathmann, 2008]. This means that there exists an opportunity cost when investing in 
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electricity capacity in SSA, as the financial resources of that investment can no longer be 
utilised elsewhere. Investors will therefore discount the perceived future rewards of an 
investment, in response to any risks that can affect those rewards. Further, an investment 
in the development of new electricity infrastructure in SSA will be illiquid – meaning that 
such an investment cannot be easily removed, sold, or exchanged for cash, without a 
potential significant loss of value [Longstaff, 2001]. In any sort of electricity 
infrastructure development in SSA, the investment's value will be tied to the location that 
the asset has been constructed within (the asset cannot simply just be removed and taken 
away intact) [Levy, 2015]. The only way therefore for the investment to realise its value 
as an investment, is for it perform as it was intended when the investment was planned. 
Additionally, infrastructure investments of this type need to be long dated, usually more 
than 20 years; and if their tariffs are correctly set and regulated, such infrastructure will 
represent a ‘normal’ margin business14, without excessive profitability [UNCTAD, 2017]. 
2.3 Consequences of risk through optionality cost and reward 
So, when applying an investment's relativeness, illiquidity, normal margins, and long 
dated timeframes into account – a private investor's willingness to proceed with an 
investment opportunity, will be determined by the perceived level of ‘negative 
uncertainty’ or risk that surrounds the ongoing value of their immediate cost of entering 
that investment and the likelihood of attaining the expected future rewards [Bessis, 2015; 
Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; de Jager & Rathmann, 2008; Garcia, 2017; Longstaff, 2001].  
Risk affects a decision to progress with an illiquid investment in three ways: it firstly 
delays a decision to proceed, by amplifying the value in deferral (a type of optionality). 
Secondly, it forces an investor to discount the future rewards for participation, which both 
reduces the desire to proceed and makes alternative investment opportunities relatively 
more attractive; and thirdly, it discourages opportunity evaluation by professional 
investment managers. 
In SSA, from the private investor's point of view, there is no urgency to invest – as 
there are many more electricity projects needing investors, than investors needing 
 
14 Normal Margin is determined by a ‘benchmark’ interest rate such as London Inter-bank Offered Rate 
(LIBOR), plus a weighted average cost of capital (WACC). WACC is a calculation of a firm's cost of capital 
in which each category of capital is proportionately weighted, to represent its relative risk to its alternative 
uses and its absolute risk profile [Garcia, 2017]. 
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electricity projects. If we treat the ability to delay an investment, as being ‘like having the 
right to choose when to invest at some point in the future’– we can place a value on that 
right to delay, by treating it as a synthetic option which has a value15  [Dixit & Pindyck, 
1994]. This ‘optionality’ value will then cease to exist once an investment proceeds – just 
as a normal option ceases to have value once it is exercised. Therefore, proceeding with 
an investment, destroys the synthetic options value. Further, the more risk that surrounds 
an investment, the greater the value that can be implied to the right to delay the 
commencement of an investment [Dixit & Pindyck, 1994, Hull, 2018].  
As an investment is a relative decision, investors will discount the perceived ‘future 
rewards’ of an investment in SSA in response to excessive negative uncertainty (in SSA, 
often to zero), against any alternative opportunities that are not so burdened. Risk makes 
the investment a less/un-attractive proposition. In response to risk, either investors will 
demand a higher return, undermining the project's commerciality and attractiveness as an 
investment; or they will just invest elsewhere, probably in an unrelated location [Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1994; Longstaff, 2001].  
We also need to appreciate how excessive negative uncertainty influences the 
evaluation methods of the actual private sector investment management teams. In the 
competitive, highly paid ‘job market’ that is the finance industry – an investment manager 
can expect to lose their job if they make flawed investment decisions, particularly ones 
outside customary investment parameters which are illiquid [Longstaff, 2001] – 
colloquially termed: moving away from the heard. Equally, there is also an expectation 
of quality productivity: they are not expected to forever evaluate investment 
opportunities, without proceeding with some of them. For ongoing employment and 
productivity reasons therefore, investment managers prefer to evaluate opportunities with 
 
15 A financial option is a form of ‘financial derivative’: 
• It is a standardised contract, which is derived from the existence of an ‘underlying financial 
instrument’: such as an equity, bond, or currency. 
• It grants the owner of the option, either a right (but not an obligation) to buy or sell the underlying 
financial instrument before and/or at a ‘point in the future’, for an agreed price and terms.  
• This delayed right to buy or sell has a value, which can be calculated using a formula (commonly 
using an algorithm, known as Black and Scholes15).  
The option ceases to have value, after either it is exercised, or when it expires when the ‘point in the 
future’ is past. The options value both increases and decreases, with the level of risk over the price of the 
underlying financial instrument (volatility, in options language).  
A ‘synthetic’ option is a situation that presents the same characteristics and opportunities as those offered 
by a physical option: and can be valued as such) [Hull, 2018]. 
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more certainty of outcomes, not less. Finally, the investment attractiveness of normal 
margin businesses with very high up-front costs, such as electricity infrastructure, are 
particularly sensitive to risks.  
With these basic terms (which we will continually refer back to) laid out, the next 
three sections of the paper spell-out the three very different perspectives on electricity 
governance in SSA. 
3. Financial investment governance 
This governance perspective encompasses the rules and institutions (or lack of) which 
directly influence the investment environment in SSA. It is observable, by applying Dixit 
and Pindyck's definition of investment (sec.2.2) to governance, that there is a period of 
uncertainty between the initial cost and the future rewards. To reduce risk therefore, 
‘good’ investment governance will entail factors that protect the ‘immediate cost’ of an 
investment and then enable the delivery of the ‘future rewards’ proficiently and with 
certainty – consistent with the expectations of the investment when it was planned. Bad 
investment governance, concern factors that destroy or remove value from both the 
‘immediate cost’ and the ‘future rewards’ of the investment. These will now be 
characterised as the ability to appropriate.  
With SSA electricity infrastructure development, there are several observable 
structural governance factors that are perceived as being common in SSA by private 
investors, which can prevent the ability to appropriate, producing a compromised 
investment environment. These are now categorised below. 
3.1 Uncertain property rights 
Central to understanding how uncertainty influences an investment in new electricity 
infrastructure in SSA is the concept of investment's physical illiquidity discussed earlier 
(sec. 2.2). With standard electricity infrastructure development in SSA, the investment's 
value will be tied to the location of the development. The certainty of ongoing ownership 
of the asset and its revenues is therefore crucial. Any negative uncertainty surrounding 
the support of property rights is therefore a fundamental structural governance issue that 
destabilises investment [Williamson, 1990].  
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The governments of SSA take significant pride in their national sovereignty of their 
territories and the assets that reside within them; but as this pride is often realised by the 
usurping of property rights when deemed expedient, this creates unintended negative 
uncertainty, reducing the attractiveness for foreign private investment. The past behaviour 
of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, particularly over the ownership of land, represents 
a good example of such outcomes [Compagnon, 2011]; similarly, there are open political 
debates over whether such an approach should be repeated in South Africa. 
3.2 Excessive planning costs due to a lack of standardisation 
In much of SSA, there is no standardisation of the tender process and/or paperwork 
for a privately financed electricity infrastructure project, particularly for unsolicited bids 
[CEPA 1, 2015]. Because of this governance issue, “it takes projects in Africa on average 
seven years to advance through the project development cycle” [CEPA 1, 2015:6, citing 
AFDB & Africa50] and the planning costs can be as high as 10% of the project value, in 
contrast to the OECD standard of under 1% [Castalia; 2014:21]. For example, in Kenya, 
a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) is 1000 pages long, where an equivalent Indian off-
take agreement for electricity would be expected to be only 20 pages [Collier, 2014:40].  
It is challenging for an under resourced government that is already struggling to 
deliver all the services that are expected of it, to further facilitate such a specialist 
capability, but their failure to do so has unintended consequences. The costly commitment 
entailed in producing a comprehensive tender represents a significant ‘sunken cost’ for 
the sponsor, which is difficult to justify when there is no certainty of reimbursement. 
Delays and associated costs discourages investment interest from ever arising, 
particularly as tariff regulated electricity infrastructure is a relatively low margin business 
with very high up-front costs on top of this planning cost [Labordena et al, 2017]. The 
higher the fixed set up costs are as a percentage of the total value of the project, the more 
subdued investor interest will be [Bessis, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1994]. It is to mitigate 
such issues that South Africa has created its IPP Office 16 (some argue, with great success) 
and the IFC has instigated its ‘Scaling Solar’ program17  [IFC, 2016:30]. 
 
16 https://www.ipp-projects.co.za/ 
17 https://www.scalingsolar.org/ 
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3.3 Reallocation of project ownership/control 
Past-unexpected reallocation of larger scale infrastructure projects to an unrelated 
party (usually between the planning and construction phases) have created huge 
indecision amongst investors as it creates the perception of policy uncertainty [Friebe et 
al, 2014]. This transfer again results in an instant loss of value of the discussed preparation 
costs up to that point, discussed in (sec.3.2), by an investor. This is slightly different risk 
to uncertain property rights, discussed in (sec.3.1), as reallocation of projects usually 
occurs because of excessive delays in the commencement of a projects construction – but 
as excessive delays are ‘par of the course’ in SSA, due to the many challenges that 
surround projects in the region, this is questionable in its legitimacy. Examples of such 
reallocations are the Grand Inga dam project in the DRC and the MphandaNkuwa dam 
project in Mozambique. 
3.4 Equity dilution, ownership restrictions, and ‘local content’ 
procurement 
Conventions, both explicit and implicit, that convey a percentage of domestic 
(African) ownership are widespread for ‘greenfield’ infrastructure projects throughout 
SSA: where an extraterritorial privately owned project is expected/required to allocate a 
significant percentage of its ownership (equity) in that project to domestic interests (such 
policies are not unique to SSA). South Africa has its Black Empowerment legislation18  
and Mozambique has local equity ownership rules concerning Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) 19 of 5–20% of the equity in the project20, as examples; but these arrangements 
often can be less transparent21. This can be a very constructive feature of governance, 
when done in ways that deliver value to a project, as it helps to allocate value to domestic 
interest and align both domestic and foreign stakeholder interests (which forms part of 
 
18 https://www.thedti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp 
19 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs): This is the standard type of investment vehicle that is utilised by 
SSA governments, to attract private sector investment for infrastructure development. The World Bank 
PPPIRC defines it as: “A long term contract between a private party and a government entity, for 
providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management 
responsibility, and the remuneration is linked to performance.” (ppp.worldbank.org) 
20 Legislation: Law 115/2011, August 10 – Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), Business Concessions (BC) 
and Mega-Projects Law (MPL). 
21https://www.transparency.org/  
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our ‘good governance’ objectives – sec 2.1) – but equally destructive, when it removes 
value.  
The introduction of new stakeholders at the equity level 
“Even from the development stage of a project, {potentially} introduces cleavages 
between partners. As a project expands to include more participants, it becomes 
more difficult to allocate the project's potential value in a way that all stakeholders 
see as fair. Greed generates an imbalance in the distribution of the project's costs 
and rewards—an imbalance that grows with the scale of the project, generating 
seeds of resentment along the way. The award-winning construction project analyst 
Edward W. Merrow claims that the inability to allocate costs and benefits fairly 
dooms most {projects} before they ever get started. However, even when the 
projects do proceed, those who believe they have been treated unfairly never let go 
of their opposition. Instead, they generate what he describes as project 
“turbulence” that often overwhelms even the most well intended project 
management” 
 [Sovacool & Cooper, 2013:45 – citing Merrow, 2011]. 
Lastly, in South Africa there are also local content rules that dictate a necessary level 
of local procurement to be included in a project, even if this is sub-standard to or more 
expensive than alternative overseas sourced materials10. In other SSA countries, as there 
is no applicable industry to support, this is a less pertinent issue except for how it can 
influence employment. The employment of local unsuitable staff may be encouraged over 
better qualified expatriate alternatives.  
The worthy intention of all three practices is to enhance domestic ownership of 
important assets and/or increase domestic participation in the recipient country's 
economy; the unintended consequence of such directives is to create risk through the 
transfer of value, which then impedes the investor's ability to appropriate. 
3.5 Exchange rate convertibility 
This dimension from the financial governance perspective concerns the inability to 
repatriate the initial cost and the rewards of an investment, into the original currency of 
the investor [Sovacool & Cooper, 2013:49]. In SSA, all currencies are termed ‘soft’ 
(excluding SA), meaning they are illiquid and not easily exchangeable in large value 
transactions. As discussed earlier, electricity infrastructure investment needs to be 
sourced from overseas (sec 2.2), but the investment's revenues are domestically produced. 
This creates a significant inability to repatriate the immediate cost of an investment back 
into the original currency of the overseas investor [Sovacool & Cooper, 2013:49]. This 
becomes a governance issue, when the illiquidity is compounded by exchange controls, 
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which prevents any repatriation of money from the country. For example, Mozambique 
introduced such restrictions in 2016, where unless the funds have been earned through 
export (domestically sold electricity does not qualify), they cannot be repatriated from 
the country11 [Bloomberg22]. The inability to repatriate funds by an investor is the 
ultimate barrier to appropriation and is an investment killer: as this removes both the 
‘future rewards’ of an investment as well as destroying the ‘initial value’. This risk is a 
factor that is often missed by the academic development literature [Gregory & Sovacool, 
2019]. 
3.6 Monopoly control of electricity supply 
As the availability and affordability of electricity supply is widely regarded as a public 
good [Byrne & Munn, 2003], it is standard practice throughout SSA for the electricity 
utilities to be government owned and protected, with monopoly rights over grid supplied 
electricity [CEPA 1, 2015; UNCTAD, 2017]. This reality however requires that investors 
accept that their customer for any electricity commercially generated, will likely be a 
recipient country's utility. This is problematic, as these utilities do not have an investment 
grade credit rating, preventing them from being considered a credit worthy counterparty 
from the perspective of an investor [CEPA 1, 2015; Amars et al, 2017; Eberhard & 
Shkaratan, 2012; Eberhard et al, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017]. The unintended consequence 
of such monopoly control is again a disruption to investment: barely solvent monopoly 
utilities represent a significant investment risk.  
A standard way around this is for the actual government to offer guarantees. For 
example, Kenya has partially done so with the Lake Turkana wind farm project, through 
guaranteeing/underwriting connectivity of the project to the country's electricity grid23; 
Tanzania has granted sovereign guarantees to the Songas project. However, SSA 
governments are often reluctant to give such guarantees (see sec 5.3) [CEPA 2, 2015; 
Amars 2017], and when they do, they can refute their obligations giving rise to a ‘credit 
rating’ issues as well, as also happened in Tanzania surrounding the Independent Power 
Tanzania Limited:  
The dispute relates to a Claimant's alleged investment in Tanzania, by way of a 
loan acquired by its subsidiary, Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited 
 
22 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-05/mozambique-sets-foreign-exchange-limits-
standard-bank-says 
23 Aldwych International – the developer 
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(“SCB HK”), made to Independent Power Tanzania Limited (“IPTL”) in order to 
finance a Power Plant in Tanzania located in Tegeta, approximately 25km north 
of Dar es Salaam. 24 
3.7 Uncommercial tariffs 
Commercially unrealistic tariff regulation, which restricts the ability of an investor 
from capturing enough value to deliver a minimum suitable level of ‘future rewards’ from 
participation, is very common in SSA. The usual argument cited for the uncommercial, 
low levels of tariff is that it protects poor consumers against unaffordable and expensive 
electricity. The reality however is that low-income households are excluded from the 
electricity supply and will continue to be so if private investment doesn't increase; instead 
it is the successful political lobbying from wealthier consumers, particularly from 
business, that keep electricity prices low [CEPA 1, 2015; Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012 – 
citing: World Bank and Fritz et al 2009].  
Throughout SSA, electricity tariff rates are often below the actual cost of generation. 
So, when you consider there are also substantial losses of electricity in the transmission 
process, for example 25% in Tanzania [Amars et al, 2017]; and a significant failure of 
customers paying their bills [Amars et al, 2017; Kihwele, 2012; Eberhard & Shkaratan, 
2012; Eberhard et al, 2017], this is a major risk for investment. It is plausible that the 
recent electricity generation cost reductions through renewable technologies, could be 
starting to improve this issue: in 2016, Zambia completed a solar tender at (US) 
6.02c/kWh, the cheapest renewable tariff to that date in the region [IFC, 2016]. However, 
this creates a new kind of risk that will be discussed later, under Technology Governance 
(sec.5.). 
3.8 Uncertain, protective Law & Order 
This final type of financial issue, both impacts on the physical infrastructure and the 
key staff that are required for the efficient operation of an investment asset.  
Infrastructure can be damaged through acts of terrorism, vandalism or criminality; and 
key staff (especially expatriates) are increasingly under threat of unreasonable harassment 
by police and other ‘officials’, and in extreme circumstances kidnapping for ransom 
 
24 Case between Independent Power Tanzania ltd (ITPL) and Standard Chartered Bank 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1184.pdf 
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[Sayed & Bruce, 1998]. In Mozambique for example, RENAMO (the current political 
opposition and former military foe during the country's civil war) have recently threatened 
to again resort to armed conflict25. Alternatively, the local police may supplement their 
unreliable incomes through harassment of foreign identifiable personal, by issuing false 
traffic offences.  
In both Kenya and Zimbabwe (amongst others), significant political tensions exist 
between the government and opposition, which have manifested recently in major public 
disorder; where in Kenya transmission infrastructure is continually vandalised or has 
electricity is stolen from it, by marginalised populations; and key personnel are subject to 
kidnapping [Gumbe, 2016; Gregory & Sovacool, 2019]. In South Africa, as a legacy of 
the antiapartheid struggle, vandalism of electricity infrastructure is seen as a legitimate 
form of protest by the politically frustrated that are upset about continuing poor access to 
electricity; and large scale, organised theft of infrastructure is a common occurrence, 
particularly within the Gauteng municipality area [Egan & Wafer, 2004; Wenzel, 2016].  
The unintended consequences of this is to make it difficult to operate an investment 
efficiently, as the assets maintenance costs will be very high, and it is difficult to recruit 
and preserve the skilled staff that are required to manage or maintain the asset [Labordena 
et al, 2017]. This then requires levels of compensation or contingencies, which weakens 
appropriation 
4. Political governance 
This governance perspective concerns the indirect investment consequences resulting 
from the way that SSA governments govern.  
Statements delivered in an official capacity by various SSA government 
representatives at a recent African energy conference in South Africa26, suggest that their 
governments appreciate that having access to the necessary finance to construct electricity 
infrastructure, is central to their ability to deliver an affordable and reliable electricity 
service to their populations. Further, those governments appear to accept that the only 
realistic source for this finance is through the successful engagement of international 
 
25 https://www.ibtimes.co.uk/negotiations-between-frelimo-renamo-suspended-mozambique-war-
escalates-1573691 
26 The 2018, Africa Energy Indaba – February, Johannesburg, South Africa 
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private investors. Yet despite this declared recognition, we argue that there is still a failure 
by these governments to appreciate the un-intended consequences of how they govern. 
This is perhaps because the relevant ‘political actors’ are too focussed on their own direct 
political needs, rather than appreciating how their governance activities undermine the 
wider investment environment.  
To help appreciate this incongruity, it is possible to unpack such a political governance 
failure into three causal components: 
1) A power asymmetry – there is a power imbalance between the insiders (the political 
class) of the recipient country and the outsiders (the investors) without a reliable 
avenue of recourse if/when this asymmetry is abused [Booth, 2012; Levy, 2014];  
2) Neo-patrimonialism – the governing elite's need to finance a political patronage 
system, to maintain control of the political structure that delivers benefits to those that 
administer it [Bratton & Van de Walle, 1994; Erdmann & Engel, 2006];  
3) Policy confusion – uncertain and repeatedly changing policy priorities, driven by the 
contradictions of fulfilling the different needs of four separate constituencies: the 
political leadership, the leadership's principal supporters, the larger electorate (usually 
driven by an election) and multilateral stakeholders (such as aid donors or 
development banks). The resulting policy fluidity is then incompatible with the long-
time horizons that the standard method of financing such infrastructure requires: 
known as Project Financing (sec.4.2). 
From these three components, we can then extract two classes of investment risks: those 
that arise from financial misappropriation and those that arise from government policy 
fluidity. 
4.1 The risk of misappropriation on a ‘normal margin’ business 
model 
The dominant explanation for the lack of foreign investment and the standard 
interpretation of governance failure in the SSA region, is a form of financial 
misappropriation through informal ‘rent-seeking’ [Krueger, 1974] facilitated by an abuse 
of asymmetric power [Amars et al, 2017; Booth, 2012; Collier, 2014; Darley, 2012; 
Kihwele et al, 2012; Levy, 2014]. Whilst accepting misappropriation is a burden on 
investment, we advocate in this paper that this is an incomplete explanation of the 
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problem. Many forms of ‘rent-seeking’ have been apparent in the recent and rapid 
economic transformations in China, India, Brazil, and South East Asia, yet these regions 
have still enjoyed rapid and constructive economic growth and sizable foreign direct 
investment (FDI) [Booth, 2012] – so financial misappropriation cannot be a definitive 
explanation for a reluctance to invest on its own. Instead, we argue, it is excessive and 
uncertain rent seeking on a normal margin business model, which destabilises the 
investment landscape. If the value of any required appropriation is foreseeable and is not 
excessive for the structure of business model that it is being applied to, an investment can 
still proceed and be successful. Such appropriation could even be legitimately formalised, 
as has occurred in Australia with their various government sponsored ‘resource rent 
taxes’.27  
When analysing foreign direct investment into electricity infrastructure in Africa, 
policy makers must recognise that when effective regulated tariffs exist, such investments 
becomes a normal margin business (sec.2.2): tariff regulation limits the ability to charge 
a ‘rent’ creating revenue. In fact, it is often difficult to achieve even ‘normal’ investment 
return from the ownership of electricity infrastructure in SSA (sec.3.7). Overseas 
investors recognise this lack of ‘economic rents’ in utility investments, unlike say the 
large ‘rents’ that are available from within the resource extraction investments – yet from 
within SSA governments, it is unclear whether this dynamic is appreciated. Evidence 
suggests that rent-seeking’ practises often become disconnected from the existence of 
rents, particularly when pressures of the neo-patrimonialism system encourage rent-
seeking behaviour from its ‘political agents’, regardless of whether rents exist to be 
captured. Further, “privatisation and liberalisation might reduce rents, but increase rent-
seeking behaviour or endeavour to acquire rent”'– as it both introduces commercial 
transparency, efficiency, and competition; whilst also creating more layers of bureaucracy 
and therefore possible ‘rent-seekers’ [Erdmann & Engel, 2006: 27].  
Normal margins prevent electricity infrastructure investments from being sufficiently 
robust, when faced with any sizable uncertainty regarding misappropriation: as it is highly 
vulnerable to becoming, un-commercial when consistent illicit demands are placed upon 
it. As foreign investment in SSA is normally associated with the high ‘rent’ carrying 
 
27 https://www.ato.gov.au/Business/Petroleum-resource-rent-tax/; http:// 
www.minerals.org.au/file_upload/files/reports/Deloitte_WA_Iron_Ore_Royalty_ 
Analysis_7_Nov_2016.pdf. 
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business models associated with resource extraction, it is unclear how comprehensively 
SSA ‘policy actors’ appreciate this financing vulnerability (or care) that is applicable to 
electricity infrastructure projects [Gregory & Sovacool, 2019]. 
4.2 Policy fluidity risk 
Policy fluidity encompasses the issues of regulation and policy inconsistency, which 
disrupt the embedded factors that are necessary for the financing process during an asset's 
development and operation. These can impact either infrastructure cost inputs, caused by 
(but not limited to) issues such as technology application or procurement directives, 
creating investment risk; or infrastructure revenue outputs, caused by (but not limited to) 
such matters as controlled tariffs or taxes, which dilute investment return certainties. The 
reason government consistency is important, is due to the mechanics of the standard 
approach to financing electricity infrastructure that the private sector can use in SSA, 
which the finance industry labels ‘Project Financing28’. Any unpredictable behaviour by 
government for the life of this financing process, normally 20 + years, discourages 
potential investors [Friebe, 2014].  
Governments are inconsistent in their policy due to conflicting agendas and changing 
priorities, dictated by an attempt to satisfy the four different constituencies listed in this 
section's introduction under ‘Policy Confusion’. Erdmann & Engel [2006] developed this 
type of uncertainty even further, by including an additional structural component that they 
have added to their neo-patrimonialism governance theory:  
“Neo-patrimonialism is a mix of two types of domination. Elements of {both} 
patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination29, {that then} penetrate 
each other.” “The distinction between private and the public, at least formally, 
exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction – it is a 
different matter whether this is observed or not” [Erdmann & Engel, 2006: 18].  
 
28 Project financing – a project's cash flows (‘future rewards’) are pre-determined and then protected or 
guaranteed in some way, which allows it to be attributed a net present value or NPV. Finance is then 
advanced, against this NPV. The longer the guaranteed time-period, the greater is the value that is available 
to act as ‘surety’. Such a process requires both the reliability and protection of the required cash flows, 
which demands both cost and revenue certainties to exist [Yescombe, 2002]. 
29 A pillar of Max Weber’s tripartite classification of authority – whereby decisions are reached through a 
process of legal rationality, legal legitimacy, and bureaucracy. 
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Policy risk arises, as it is unclear whether rules will be followed, or ignored – and 
ironically, the increase in transparency and modernisation of bureaucracies can increase 
this confusion.  
These policy inconsistencies can often be the unintended consequences of 
‘international direction’. For example: a reforming government attempts to behave in a 
manner expected by multilateral stakeholders (such as the World Bank), but then such an 
approach brings it into conflict with the needs of the incumbent political system – which 
then pushes back, causing a reverse or further amendment of the policy. Alternatively, a 
government attempts to implement the unsuitable advice of ‘outside experts’, which is 
not compatible with the country’s capability and knowledge skillsets. This occurred with 
the advent of the CDM, where African governments were persuaded to believe that their 
countries would be huge beneficiaries of the CDM, resulting with many making 
significant reorganisations internally to support it – yet when the CDM commenced; it in 
fact had little impact [Kreibich et al, 2016; Byigero et al, 2010].  
It is possible that a policy misdirection is about to occur again, surrounding nuclear 
energy. Companies associated with the Russian nuclear industry, are encouraging African 
governments to adopt nuclear energy in their electricity policy mix (as witnessed at a 
recent African energy conference30). This is likely to have a substantial negative spill-
over effects on wider investment if pursued, because of an alternative highly negative 
narrative held by unrelated potential investors on the subject – nuclear energy introduces 
a new set of risks, related to safety, long-term commerciality, and issues of disposing of 
spent fuel. 
5. Technical system governance 
Technical system governance in this paper, is a ‘systems’ perspective that 
encapsulates the governance issues that arise from the ‘large technical system’ that 
surrounds the process of electricity services provision in a country [Hughes, 1983]: which 
in this paper we refer to as the ‘electricity delivery regime’. Such a system includes the 
various technology assets involved in the supply of electricity services: the generation 
assets, the electricity transmission and transformer assets, and the distribution technology 
 
30 The 2018, Africa Energy Indaba – February, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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that delivers the electricity service to the household. Any consumer technology, that 
allows the households to use the electricity once it is available [Ibid]: such as lights, 
washing machines, televisions, etc. Further, it also comprises other less obvious 
technologies, such as the actual electrical wiring of the house: does it exist, how easy is 
it to install, and is it safe? Beyond the technology properties, it captures all the various 
levels of institutions that are denoted within the production, delivery, and consumption 
of the electricity: extending from the levels of government, through to the actual 
household. This includes the utility, any relevant regulators, independent but related 
equipment suppliers, independent power producers (IPPs), as well as any other applicable 
actors and institutions [Ibid]. 
This governance perspective is not applying a specific systems theory, we are instead 
using the term ‘technical system’ as a means of defining our spatial and temporal 
limitations of study: what is in and out; and which actors (stakeholders) to include. The 
predominant type of electricity system is a top down network ‘hub & spoke’ system 
[UNCTAD, 2017], which is the standard model used in the OECD for delivering 
electricity. This standard model in SSA, is government controlled and surrounds the 
utilisation of a series of large-scale electricity generating assets, with supporting 
transmission and distribution structures. However, these types of systems are both ‘path 
dependent’ [David, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982] and contain systemic risks in both their 
development and operation, wherever they may exist.  
5.1 The universal systemic risks of technical systems 
An electricity delivery regime as a technical system, is in effect an innovation system. 
To function well therefore, it requires an efficient sharing of technology and knowledge 
between all the system’s actors summarised above [Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 1985; 
1992]. The system’s functionality also requires that all these actors have shared 
perspectives, shared ambitions, compatible skills, and universal technology and 
organisational standards within the system – both at an institutional and individual level 
[Ibid]. On the last point, as an electricity delivery regime this would include factors, such 
as the electricity system’s standard voltage capacity, or the standard current used for the 
electricity’s transmission (‘AC’ or ‘DC’).  
Consequentially, to facilitate the above, the system requires both a good governance 
structure between the various stakeholders of that system (see this chapter, sec.2.1); and 
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an adequate level of suitable dynamic capability (see this chapter, sec.5.2.3) [Teece et al, 
1997] within the relevant country’s political-economic-social framework that it is located 
within (and by inference, within the system’s institutions) [Freeman, 1995, Lundvall, 
1992]. It also has to be flexible enough, to continue to evolve, reform, operate and apply 
the most appropriate technologies and organisational arrangements (commonly known as 
best practice) to maintain the efficiency of the system.  
Such systems are also full of co-dependencies [Teece, 1986], where inefficiencies in 
one part of the system impact some or all the other parts of the system. In this paper’s 
context: the generation, transmission, and distribution parts of the system, rely on each 
other to achieve their own efficient functionality. A failure in one, equally disrupts the 
other two constituents simultaneously.  
Technical systems are likely to be inefficient if the system’s governance has a 
predisposition to managing up, towards the perceived interests the dominant institutions 
within the system and those that control them; rather than downwards, towards those that 
the system is meant to serve: the end users (customers). They can also be locked into 
technology and organisational path dependencies, which makes change for improvement 
(innovation and its diffusion) difficult to achieve [David, 1994; Nelson & Winter, 1982]. 
Capabilities, both at an individual level [Sen, 1999], and an institutional level 
[Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & Pavitt, 1993; Nelson & Winter, 1982], require a certain level 
of penetration of  relevant skill and knowledge to actually allow the system to function 
efficiently, and a certain level of continual application to keep them effective, functional 
and cumulative [Nelson & Winter, 1982; Scott-Kemmis & Bell, 2010]. 
Finally, the reliance of the system on a suitable level of dynamic capabilities, also 
creates another systemic risk. Many of those capabilities ‘walk out of the door every night 
and go home’, having the potential never to return. So, an electricity delivery regime can 
have at one point in time, a suitable level of capabilities – but at a later point in history, 
those capabilities may have retired or left the country. This has happened with the South 
African electricity delivery regime – which once had the capacity to build large generation 
assets but appears to not have that capability any longer (see chapter 6, sec.5.2.2). 
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5.2 Why the ‘standard model’ is unattractive to investors 
As a proven electricity delivery model, the standard model has served OECD 
countries well. However, in the SSA context, where significantly more than half of the 
region's population lives in rural areas and derive their livelihoods from subsistence 
agriculture, it is an unsuitable structure for attracting private investment support. This is 
because in SSA, the model is constrained by three systemic impediments: 
1) The inability of the majority of African households to afford both the cost of 
electricity connectivity, particularly in rural areas; and then to use the electricity 
once it is available – undermining the commercial proposition. 
2) A failure by the centralised monopoly utilities to manage and operate such a model 
efficiently and successfully in the region, where they lack the necessary dynamic 
capabilities described by Teece et al [1997] and governance structures – make the 
utility an unattractive investment partner, and the electricity system an 
unattractive investment destination.. 
3) A shortfall in the required political capital and support from the relevant political 
actors, to permit any necessary reform and system evolution – to ensure that this 
electricity delivery regime can maximise its potential efficiency and revenues. 
These hurdles do not necessarily mean that alternative models of electricity delivery 
cannot prosper, but it does mean that whilst these factors persist, this kind of electricity 
delivery regime will remain sub-optimal. We now categorise how aspects of technical 
governance undermines investment is SSA electricity infrastructure. 
5.2.1 The financing risks of technology transitional change 
As if these three impediments in SSA were not enough for potential private investors 
to contend with, a destructive ‘perfect storm’ has recently arrived. These three traditional 
challenges are now being compounded by a fourth: the global transition in what type of 
electricity service technology is best to use – the traditional one, utilising fossil fuels; or 
the challenger, that utilises distributive renewable technologies [Ackermann, 2001; 
Lammers & Diestelmeier, 2017]. From the perspective of a private investor, fossil fuel 
technologies are likely to become uncompetitive and redundant, a ‘stranded asset’ 
problem [Ansar et al, 2013]; but the replacement distributive renewable technologies are 
still perceived as immature, and not yet commercially delineated [Lammers & 
Diestelmeier, 2017]. Investors prefer to invest in proven processes, which utilise familiar 
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technologies with a competitive and predicable cost structure [Bessis, 2015] – this 
technology realignment, removes these certainties.  
Further, the current continuous improvement in renewable technology tariffs is also 
encouraging commitment delays surrounding new electricity infrastructure, from some of 
the region's governments, as they anticipate further reductions in tariff pricing; and 
fostering unrealistic tariff expectation from specific SSA governments. Apparently, 
Nigerian officials expect the recent low tariff struck in Zambia (US6.02c/kWh) to be a 
pricing benchmark for their own electricity projects. Such an expectation ignores the 
substantial difference in each country's perceived risk profiles to investors (their relative 
attractiveness as an investment destination) and specific factors such as the availability of 
soft loans that would not be available to Nigeria, that supported such a low tariff31.  
As most SSA governments remain committed from a governance perspective to a 
centrally controlled monopoly as its electricity delivery regime [Amars et al, 2017; CEPA 
1, 2015; Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012; Eberhard et al, 2017; UNCTAD, 2017], the impact 
of these systemic factors need appreciated in this context. 
5.2.2 Unaffordable electricity Services 
The inability of SSA households to afford electricity services is often offered as the 
principal reason for the existence of electricity poverty in the region [Williams N.J. et al, 
2015; World Bank, 2010; Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012; Gentzoglanis, 2013; CEPA 1, 
2015]. This is not just about paying for connectivity or delivering electricity to the front 
door of a household, but also includes the costs associated with being able to then use it, 
such as the cost of electrical appliances or safely ‘wiring’ the recipient's home [Sen, 1999; 
Cook, 2011]. Although these are not governance issues in themselves how to respond to 
their realities most definitely are; and how to successfully overcome these realities, we 
argue, should be a central governance priority.  
The network ‘hub & spoke’ system is somewhat suitable for electricity delivery in the 
region's principal urban areas, however its commerciality becomes unrealistic when it is 
deployed into rural areas, where the majority of SSA's population lives and electricity 
poverty is most extreme. Extending the grid is both very expensive to do and then 
properly maintain. In Kenya for instance, according to Parshall et al. [2009], it costs 
 
31 Comments received from several industry professionals, attending a recent conference in Johannesburg. 
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US$1900 to connect the more remote households (and this is likely to have increased), 
with no account for the cost of ongoing maintenance of the network or the further burdens 
of making it useable by households [Williams NJ et al, 2015:52]. This cost is beyond the 
resources of all, but a few select households. Such grid extensions are therefore difficult 
to justify commercially, a prerequisite for private investment, despite the obvious 
‘positive externality benefits’ [Pigou, 1932] offered by such connectivity [Cook, 2011; 
Collier, 2014]. For the grid to be extended a subsidy is required from an unrelated source: 
which is usually the government through a form of rural electrification agency or program 
[UNCTAD, 2017].  
The unintended consequences of persisting with this delivery system, for potential 
investors, is that it removes any likelihood of their participation in the distribution aspect 
of the infrastructure regime, as they are even more disadvantaged than the government as 
owner of such assets, as they are unable to capture any of the externality value [Collier, 
2014]. For an IPP, it weakens the utility's credit worthiness in their capacity as the 
‘offtake’ customer, as ongoing subsidies from fiscally weak governments are uncertain – 
this is, unless an unrelated to the customer (either the utility or end using consumer) 
financing structure can be identified. The extent of this challenge is probably best 
illustrated by the experiences of the RSA's ‘rapid electrification program’, during the 
transition period from apartheid. 
“Prior to 1990, less than a third of the population {of the RSA} had access to electricity. 
By the end of the decade that proportion had doubled” [Bekker et al, 2008:3125].  
By the mid-1990s, it had become evident to Eskom that further electrification through 
grid extension was not a commercial proposition and could only be carried out through 
deficit financing off its own balance sheet and through cross subsidisation from other 
industrial and wealthy municipality users. This, however, is not an option for other SSA 
countries, as they do not have such endowments – and some of Eskom's current financial 
vulnerability problems can be argued to have started with this balance sheet subsidisation. 
The SA government finally took over the responsibility for financing the program from 
the early 2000s, through a national electrification fund [Bekker et al, 2008] – but still 
electricity access is not universal, almost 20 years on.  
Distributive renewable technology can sidestep the grid extension issues just 
highlighted: as these technologies no longer require the utility grid network for delivery, 
as they can be operated on a smaller scale (reduced cost) and independently of the 
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electricity grid. Despite this however, affordability is still an issue as such technology 
options still require a large financial outlay relative to rural household incomes. More 
importantly, as such technologies are still making significant advances in both cost and 
efficiency – it is sensible for investors/developers of larger capacity infrastructure, to 
delay investing in this technology, until it has matured and become stable, from an 
electricity unit (kWh) cost basis. 
5.2.3 Operational inadequacies 
To effectively operate this type of electricity delivery regime requires a utility to have 
a minimal level of both technological skill and tacit knowledge (capabilities) within its 
management structure [Bell & Pavitt, 1993], as well as a need for enough working capital. 
Without adequate levels of capability, the likelihood that a utility will recover its cost of 
delivering electricity when it sells it becomes too uncertain due to both technical and non-
technical losses. Technical losses entail a significant loss of electricity in the transmission, 
through a lack of maintenance of the transmission system – as high as 25% in Tanzania 
for example [Amars et al, 2017]; or an inability to operate effectively a demand and 
supply load management, within the network [UNCTAD, 2017]. Non-technical losses 
entail a significant risk that customers will not pay for the electricity they use [Eberhard 
& Shkaratan, 2012]: either by not paying their bills, or stealing electricity directly from 
the grid, or bypassing their electricity meter [Bekker et al, 2008]. 
The issue of uncommercial tariffs (discussed in sect. 3.7) then compounds this 
looming spectre of technical and non-technical losses. A combination of these factors will 
then push the utility towards insolvency, which can only avert by ongoing government 
subsidies - which are never enough. This stressed condition then results in further poor 
maintenance of the network, and little carriage of spare parts, which results in the network 
wearing out [Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a]. Such a monopoly utility cannot be regarded 
as both a credit worthy and proficient commercial partner for a private investor. 
Transmission and generation electricity infrastructure are co-dependent and reliable 
on each other for their commerciality, as value cannot be appropriated from one part of 
the infrastructure chain, without the other parts. The construction of the Lake Turkana 
wind farm in Kenya was completed in mid-2017, but the required transmission lines 
connectivity was delayed into the second half of 2018, as the utility KETRACO has been 
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unable to keep to its construction schedule32. This reliability on third parties for 
connectivity is important in SSA, as it can be difficult to receive compensation for any 
failures elsewhere in the infrastructure jigsaw.  
5.2.4 Utility insolvency and subsidy dependence 
When utilities only stay solvent through government subsidies from general revenues 
(and indirectly, aid), this puts financial pressure on each governments balance sheet: 
particularly as the incremental cost of the new supply, has been much higher than the 
original existing supply [Eberhard & Shkaratan, 2012], markedly when mobile diesel 
generators are used. An aggressive pursuit of such a strategy has a danger of forcing a 
financially stretched national government into financial default [Bekker et al, 2008], 
which introduces a completely new set of risks. This clearly dampens a government's 
willingness to underwrite a private investor's commercial risk. It is too early to judge how 
renewable technology will alleviate this issue. They also must justify their financial 
support of a commercial enterprise over alternative political priorities that are more 
electorally visible. 
5.2.5  Technical system patrimonialism 
Lastly, when a government is ‘closed minded’ to the electricity delivery regime's 
efficiency. This can either due to hostility for a new technology application, such as the 
application of distributive renewable technology over existing fossil fuel technology – as 
it potentially weakens its control over that delivery regime. Alternatively, the current 
electricity regime is used to reward the political incumbent's supporters and is integral to 
their neo-patrimonialism political structure: preventing investment, as it creates an 
unreliable investment partner. 
6. Discussion: synthesising governance perspectives 
If SSA governments genuinely believe that the most suitable policy for increasing 
access to electricity for their populations involves attracting private investment – then 
they must also be prepared to amend their current governance structures, to nullify those 
unintended consequences that make such investment unattractive. Further, these 
 
32 Aldwych International – the developer 
Page 93 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
governments must also recognise that unlike natural resource extraction industries, a 
correctly regulated electricity infrastructure is a ‘normal’ margin business, that can 
quickly become uncommercial, and therefore unattractive as a private investment 
proposition, if costs increase or revenues decline.  
Similarly, the development community must also appreciate that the challenge of 
delivering electricity access within SSA is essentially an issue of finance. Finance is 
therefore an enabling variable and a ‘gatekeeper’ to the resolution of accessibility – 
electricity connectivity requires a supporting infrastructure for its delivery, which will 
only exist if it can be paid for (and this includes smaller scale solutions). However, the 
ability to attract private finance is a dependent variable that relies on its own enabling 
variables, which include those that surround the process of governance. If the dominant 
development policy narrative for delivering electricity access to the region is to be 
successfully constructed around private investment, as the multilateral development 
community advocates, their approach to governance design also needs to be reprioritised, 
to include the reduction of investment risk.  
Ultimately, each of the three governance perspectives – investment, political 
economy, and systems – has different foci, and as such each misses aspects that the other 
perspectives offer. However, a synthesis of all three yields a more holistic governance 
framework, which points the way towards what a supportive environment for electricity 
investment might look like. Drawing from Dixit & Pindyck, [1994:3] (sec.2.2) – an 
illiquid investment displays three important characteristics.  
• Firstly, the investment will be irreversible, once an investment has commenced, it 
cannot simply be unwound without a significant loss of value. In this paper’s 
context, construction must be completed, and the commissioning of the asset 
delivered as envisaged during the planning of the infrastructure, before any value 
can be realised. 
  
• Secondly, there will be uncertainty over future value of the investment: 
unanticipated things can happen to an electricity infrastructure development project 
that could negatively affect the project's deliverables before an assets operation 
commences.  
• Thirdly, an investor controls their decision where and when to physically commit 
their financing and proceed with an investment [Dixit & Pindyck, 1994].  
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Using these three dynamics, it is possible to create three effective ‘good governance’ 
filters to determine how to evaluate a supportive governance structure for investment: 
(i) Will a country's investment structure allow the reimbursement of the value of 
the initial investment (the initial cost), in the future?  
(ii) Will a country's political structure undermine the appropriation of the 
anticipated returns of an investment (the rewards); or meaningfully delay 
them?  
(iii) Will a country's electricity delivery regime put an investment at a 
disadvantage, when compared to alternative comparable technological 
investment opportunities in alternative countries? (As every investment 
decision to proceed for a private investor, is a relative decision). 
These filters affirm the salience of Financial Investment Governance: the private sector 
investor perspective, which embodies the ability to efficiently create and repatriate 
investment value. They affirm the salience of Political Governance: the political economy 
perspective, concerning the application of one-sided asymmetric power, and how this can 
permit the misappropriation of uncertain and excessive value. They affirm the salience of 
Technical System Governance: the electricity delivery regime perspective, where the 
system's inability to efficiently innovate and diffuse electricity technology prevents a 
necessary appropriation of value that is necessary to make the application of the 
technology attractive.  
When applied to SSA investment in new electricity infrastructure development, our 
synthesized approach to governance suggest 15 structural factors (some of which are 
unique to the region) that require appreciation by ‘policy actors’. These factors negatively 
influence the ability of the investor to generate and repatriate revenue (which represents 
both the initial value and the rewards of the investment). Identified structural factors 
synthesisable from across our three unique governance perspectives include: 
1. Insufficient local banking capabilities: In most SSA countries, the domestic 
banking systems are unable to finance any significant value of electricity 
infrastructure projects, even at a household level.  
2. Exchange rate convertibility: the inability to repatriate the principal investment 
and the investment's returns, into the foreign investor's original currency – usually 
attributable to either exchange controls or insufficient African currency liquidity.  
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3. Uncommercial tariff regulation: electricity tariffs are not permitted to be 
commercially reflective for the cost of the investment.  
4. Inadequate law and order structures: In many SSA countries, the institutions of 
legal enforcement do not prevent theft of various forms of value from an investment, 
as there is no effective recourse, or they represent the actual perpetrators.  
5. Uncertain security of the physical asset: the probability that the value of the 
investment will be diminished or destroyed by an independent third party’s action, 
such as theft, vandalism, or terrorism.  
6. Uncertain revenue security of the asset: the probability that an unrelated third 
party will unexpectedly misappropriate the anticipated revenues (or a percentage of) 
from the investment. 
7. Unearned equity dilution: the requirement to allocate significant percentage of 
ownership (equity) of an investment, in return for nothing other than a permission to 
proceed.  
8. Rent-seeking: the attempt to appropriate excess value or ‘rent’ from an investment 
that does not exist, by non-related beneficiaries of the investment. 
9. Corruption by officials: the abuse of a power asymmetry, in return for non-
obligatory financial gain. 
10. Patrimonialism: the transference of value to an unrelated party (an insider) to 
support a political patronage system.   
11. Reallocation of the ownership of a project: a project's ownership can be 
unexpectedly removed and reallocated to an unrelated party (usually between the 
planning and construction phases). This means an instant loss on all preparation costs 
up to that point by an investor (which are already excessively high) [Castalia, 2014].  
12. Path dependency and regime resistance: the government or the monopolist utility 
are locked into a technology paradigm, which makes them hostile to change. For 
example, the ongoing preference to use coal as an electricity generating technology 
(often due to personal conflicting priorities).  
13. Insufficient working capital: there is insufficient working capital available within 
the utility, to support, operate and maintain the technological system at efficient 
levels.  
14. Deficient technological tacit knowledge and skills: the successful diffusion of 
different electricity technologies are impeded, due to a shortfall in both household 
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[Sen, 1999] and institutional technological capabilities [Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & 
Pavitt, 1993].  
15. A lack of complementary assets: the supplementary assets or capabilities that are 
required to allow the primary asset to operate optimally are not available [Teece, 
1986] such as an efficient and working electricity grid. 
All 15 factors are significant or at least meaningful, and they offer ‘policy actors’ and 
researchers a novel checklist when attempting to determine the particular risks facing any 
given SSA country's infrastructure development. 
7. Conclusion 
We recognise that whilst we must resist the dangers of overly homogenizing each of 
the three governance perspectives, many of the themes or factors may exist in most SSA 
countries: national context, resources, business patterns, industry strategies, levels of 
affordability and types of electricity infrastructure (to name a few) – do have regional 
applicability. When applied to each country however, we accept that they will still yield 
different shapes, and unfold differently (and indeed, even sub-nationally).  
Thus, it is critical to treat SSA countries as heterogeneous, and to design specific 
policies attuned to this complexity, accordingly. That said, there is still value to the meta-
theoretical governance principles underlying the three perspectives. There is a ‘top down’ 
challenge: why internationally sourced private investment is deterred from investing in 
SSA electricity infrastructure, as well as a ‘bottom up’ one for why individual 
governments might or might not constrain such investment. It is also reasonable to apply 
homogeneity to the international investment community's approach to this challenge, as 
they have a commonality of purpose in the way they approach investment (sec 2.2): they 
are all seeking an investment return from an initial commitment of investment value.  
The implication that arises is a mix of bottom up heterogeneous factors need balanced 
with the commonality of barriers (and perceptions from private sector finance) to create 
more attuned policy that arbitrates or mediates local factors with transnational 
expectations. To minimise these unintended consequences, SSA governments need to 
redesign their governance structures to deliver a minimisation of negative uncertainty to 
the value of the immediate cost of an electricity infrastructure investment, and a 
maximisation of certainty towards the future returns of that investment. This will require 
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a government to deliver both cost and policy certainty to investors – as excessive change 
in either of these, increase costs, which then retards private investment. Finally, 
governments should discard (or at least adapt), the ‘network, hub and spoke’ model, and 
relinquish their utility's monopoly control. Electricity service delivery needs to be 
decentralised, to permit flexibility in the adoption of new technologies and electricity 
delivery solutions, to facilitate electricity access in poorer rural areas, where all possible 
costs need to be stripped out of the process, and maximum flexibility is essential.  
The ambition of this paper has been to realign our understanding of the impact of 
governance, when it is applied to the private financing of electricity infrastructure 
development in SSA. Perhaps when this occurs in practice – if policy actors, financial 
institutions, and development practitioners calibrate their investment, political, and 
technological systems of governance accordingly – SSA can transform itself from a 
perpetual laggard to a promising leader for electric utility investment and reform. 
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Chapter 5: 
Governance, scale, and scope: reviewing six 
South African electricity generation 
infrastructure megaprojects 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Following a U-turn in government policy in 2005, The Republic of South Africa 
embarked on simultaneously building three electricity generation megaprojects: two-
4,800MW coal fired power stations, Medupi and Kusile, to generate base load electricity; 
and a hydro pump-storage facility, Ingula, a 1,332MW peaking power facility. All three 
projects have been problematic to build and have facilitated the bankrupting of the 
national electricity utility Eskom, whose survival is now in the hands of the South African 
government, its sole shareholder. This paper reviews six case studies to understand what 
happened, which includes three counterfactual projects. The fieldwork utilised a 
governance lens and involved original data collection via 32 interviews with experts 
deeply involved with at least one of the six projects. This included past and present senior 
Eskom management and other well-informed parties with alternative perspectives. The 
study found that aspects of governance, scale and scope were significant, to such projects 
success. 
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1. Introduction 
From an economic growth perspective, access to reliable and affordable electricity in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a major developmental obstacle [AfDB, 2018; Blimpo & 
Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; Briceño-Garmendia et al, 2008; Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a; 
Halff et al, 2014; Moyo, 2013] and a major challenge for a region whose population is 
projected by the UN to double by 2050 [UN News]. If SSA governments intend to 
persevere with a top down network ‘hub & spoke’ system33 or ‘standard model’, to 
expand access to electricity services - it is crucial for these governments (and other 
potential financiers of such expansionary infrastructure development) to appreciate any 
contextual challenges that may hinder the extension of this standard model, before 
attempting to expand their own systems further. Such knowledge is particularly pertinent 
if the private sector is to finance such infrastructure development, as the dominant 
multilateral development narrative is demanding [Collier, 2014; Eberhard 2015, Gregory 
& Sovacool, 2019b].  
Current evidence from South Africa (RSA), suggests that the most problematic 
component of this model to develop, is the electricity generation component: particularly 
when it involves sizable individual assets, which enter the scale and scope of a 
megaproject. Due to the urgency to expand electricity access across the African region to 
respond to expected population growth, this paper will analyse the development 
challenges for developing large-scale electricity generation assets, using case studies 
from the RSA – which is the only country in the SSA region to offer a depth of 
megaprojects, for this type of study.  
Six megaprojects were analysed, using data collected over a six-month period from 
thirty-two interviews with well-informed experts with varying perspectives. Three of the 
projects chosen, were problematic; and the remaining three were successful, to act as a 
counterfactual. Successful project delivery is defined in this paper, as the adherence to 
the anticipated project deliverables, as foreseen during the project’s planning process – 
was both the budget and schedule adhered to; and once completed, will it generate 
electricity for the planned cost and output? The interview questions asked were mostly 
deductive (see sec.3.4), to confirm the applicability of three principal governance 
 
33 The utilisation of a series of large-scale electricity generating assets, with supporting transmission and 
distribution structures. 
Page 100 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
narratives identified in the literature by Sanderson [2012] for explaining megaproject 
failure. However, and perhaps more importantly, the data was also able to deliver a very 
valuable understanding of the impact of scale and scope on megaproject development 
success as well. So despite the original ambition of this paper to just apply a governance 
analysis to explain such megaproject failure, it has instead expanded its analysis to now 
embrace how project governance, scale and scope has affected such infrastructure 
developments – using its original research fieldwork as a scaffold to permit such analysis. 
2. Literature review 
The academic project management literature is becoming rich with analysis and 
explanations surrounding megaproject failure (and success): Brady & Davies, 2014; 
Brookes & Locatelli, 2015; Davies et al, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2017, 2014, 2009, 2005; Kardes 
et al, 2013; Locatelli et al, 2017; Maylor et al, 2008; Sanderson, 2012; Van de Graaf & 
Sovacool, 2014; Williams & Samset, 2010 to name some of the more prominent papers. 
This literature however has a bias towards an OECD34 context; and concerning the RSA, 
it is very thin and arguably empirically inadequate35. Fortunately, this paper’s supporting 
fieldwork (discussed in sec. 4 & 5), suggests many of the factors and characteristics 
attributable to megaproject failure identifiable in the OECD orientated academic 
literature, still have relevance and validity to such projects in the RSA. This is particularly 
true for issues surrounding complexity: where more complexity results in more problems; 
and vice versa, less complexity delivers less problems. 
2.1 Defining a megaproject in South Africa 
Megaprojects can mean different things to different people, depending on the 
theoretical perspective one wishes to apply [Sovacool & Cooper, 2013]. Even if one just 
applies an economic definition, the dominant academic approach, there is still variance. 
Most scholars, such as Bent Flyvbjerg, define megaprojects by scale and cost – 
 “Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion 
dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and 
 
34 OECD – Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
35 Plausibly explained by the limited frequency of megaproject developments in the region, causing 
academic resources to focus elsewhere. 
Page 101 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people” 
[Flyvbjerg, 2017b:3].  
Others argue however, such as Allan Warrack [1993, citing Warrack, 1985], it is the 
nature of the stakeholder context and complexity that should be the defining feature – 
which would then include some projects significantly less than US$ 1 billion in value.  
As already noted in the introduction of this section, most of the project management 
academic literature has an OECD context bias. As this paper’s analysis is focusing on the 
developmental context of Africa, it chooses to be less value prescriptive and instead draws 
heavily on the development economist Albert Hirschman’s empirical work summarised 
in ‘Development Projects Observed’ [Hirschman, 1967]. His observations and analysis 
of the Nigerian Railway Corporation appears to still have validity to a South African 
context – as many of the themes he identified, are still consistent with the recent research 
findings summarised in section five of this paper. Hirschman suggests socio-political 
structures have a significant baring in Africa on what defines a megaproject36 
development, as well as access to the relevant capabilities [Ibid: 134]. This paper will 
therefore favour Hirschman and Warrack’s definition, where stakeholder complexity is 
the primary qualifying feature for defining a megaproject in South Africa.  
2.2 Conceptualising megaproject complexity 
Megaprojects are organisational systems of interacting stakeholders, components, and 
sub-systems, designed to deliver a common developmental purpose [Brady & Davies, 
2014; Maylor et al, 2008; Williams & Samset, 2010]. Complexity in the context of this 
paper, specifically applies to the interactions between these various stakeholders, 
components, and/or sub-systems. Further, this complex system has path dependency 
inbuilt, defined by its initial conditions [Maylor et al, 2008]. Any megaproject “takes 
place in a historical context, and its starting conditions (e.g. the state of existing 
relationships between stakeholders, the trust between project team members) cannot be 
calibrated precisely to be able to make reliable predictions [Maylor et al, 2008:s16]. This 
paper will return to these important facts on multiple occasions, whilst reviewing its case 
study’s research data. 
 
36 Megaprojects – Hirschman did not use the term ‘Megaprojects’, as it had not become an accepted 
term in 1967. 
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All megaprojects share characteristics due to their scale and their uniqueness: all of 
which create complexity, making megaprojects problematic to deliver. 
• Their ownership and agency arrangements are usually separated: as they are 
temporary activities with a requirement for unfamiliar project capabilities to the 
ultimate owner/sponsor, which makes it difficult for that owner/sponsor to 
manage and control both costs and progress.  
• They have long planning and construction horizons: which increases performance 
risk. 
• They require atypical design and technology usage: rendering standardisation and 
modulation difficult to achieve.  
• Their planning, organisation and execution are typically multi-actor processes 
with non-aligned agendas and insufficient commercial familiarity with each 
other: preventing reciprocal knowledge sharing and efficiency, as such 
interactions require trust and familiarity developed through a shared history.  
• They have many separate but related sub-routines with complex interfaces: many 
of which are tightly coupled.  This usually makes each module’s performance 
mutually dependent and subject to non-linear error growth (see sec.2.2.2). 
• Finally, all mega projects have legacy issues, and are economically and socially 
transformative – redistributing social, economic, and political power. This 
renders them fundamentally as political decision, even when they are in the 
domain of the private sector. 
[Synthesised from: Brookes & Locatelli, 2015; Brady & Davies, 2014; Brady et 
al, 2012; Davies et al, 2009; Flyvbjerg, 2017b; Kardes et al., 2013; Maylor et al, 
2008; Sanderson, 2012; Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2014; Williams & Samset, 
2010]. 
It is commonly the inability to manage the complexity of megaprojects, which is at 
the core of megaproject failure. However, complexity in the context of megaprojects is 
ambiguous, subjective, and often ill-defined [Brady & Davies, 2014 – citing William, 
1999 and Geraldi, 2008]. It is therefore necessary to quickly identify and describe the two 
principle broad types of complexity that can contribute to megaproject’s failures (as 
synthesised from the recent project management literature) – which will also then be 
referred to during the analysis of the case studies. Complexity is not the primary focus of 
this paper, so it will not drill down into this issue of complexity any further than is 
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necessary – this section is just providing a platform, to analyse the empirical case study 
data in sec.4.0. 
2.2.1 Structural complexity 
This primary catchall category consists of the types of complexity that arise from the 
projects initial design and organisation. This includes the arrangement and connectivity 
of components and sub-systems; the integration and engagement of both contractors and 
sub-contractors into the system; and the incorporation and application of technology. It 
also includes the governance arrangements between stakeholders, the project’s various 
agents, and the project’s remaining eco-system [Brady & Davies, 2014; Brady et al, 2012; 
Davies et al, 2009; Maylor et al, 2008; Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2014; Williams & 
Samset, 2010]. 
2.2.2 Dynamic complexity 
This alternative catchall category, consists of the types of complexity that arise from 
changes that occur after a project has commenced (and therefore not planned for), and are 
often described as issues of project ‘turbulence’ [Ibid] – incorporating all the inclusions 
listed in sec.2.2.1. The most troubling aspect of dynamic complexity is the impact of non-
linear error growth – where a change earlier in a project’s lifecycle, increases its impact 
disproportionately, as the project progresses: due to the interdependence of the sub-
routines and its complex interfaces. All structural complexity issues have the potential to 
morph into dynamic issues, often as un-intended consequences of other changes. Building 
from the issues described earlier surrounding path dependency, overlaid by non-linear 
error growth – issues of dynamic complexity have the greatest potential to be most 
damaging to a megaproject success. 
3. Methods 
This section outlines the conceptual approach used in this paper. It also explains the 
three categories of governance used for analysis and clarifies this paper’s empirical 
fieldwork. 
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3.1 Conceptual approach 
This paper applies three governance explanations identified by Sanderson [2012] to 
explain megaproject failure, to six electricity generation projects in the RSA. Sanderson 
originally identified these three explanations in the literature, through a form of snowball 
sampling37. In this paper, Sanderson’s three categories have been slightly re-positioned, 
to reflect more recent evidence (including this paper’s fieldwork) and re-titled. These are: 
a) Forecast inadequacies, where the planning process uses inaccurate and overly 
optimistic assumptions [Flyvbjerg, 2005, 2009, 2014, 2017b; Flyvbjerg et al, 2002, 2003; 
Sanderson, 2012; Wachs, 1989, 1990]. b) Deficient complexity management, to reduce 
the problems that arise out of aspects of project complexity [Brady & Davies, 2014; 
Kardes et al., 2013; Maylor et al, 2008; Miller & Lessard, 2002; Millar & Hobbs, 2009; 
Sanderson, 2012; Williams & Samset, 2010]. c) Rivalrous project goals, where different 
stakeholders and/or agents desire competing outcomes from the megaproject [Alderman 
et al., 2005; Atkinson et al, 2006; Locatelli et al, 2017; Rafey & Sovacool, 2011; 
Sanderson, 2012; Van de Graaf & Sovacool, 2014]. 
The six case studies used are Medupi, Kusile, Ingula, Sere, Avon and Dedisa. The 
first four are owned and managed by Eskom, the RSA’s national electricity utility, and 
the remaining two are independently owned peaking power stations: which sell their 
electricity to the Eskom owned electricity grid. As Medupi and Kusile, which are the two 
largest projects, are not yet complete, due to substantial delays: this paper’s analysis will 
only focus on cost and schedule performance, and not the post commissioning operating 
performance. 
3.2 Defining and categorising three types of megaproject governance 
A governance lens was applied, as governance embodies socially constructed 
behaviours and institutions that can be modified and supposedly improved [Booth, 2012; 
Florini & Sovacool, 2009; Gregory & Sovacool, 2019b; Levy, 2014] – in contrast to say 
capabilities, which are more difficult to transform quickly [Abramovitz, 1986; Bell & 
Pavitt, 1993]. This allows this paper to deliver an immediate actionable relevance to the 
international development community. Governance in the context of this paper 
encompasses how the interactions between the multiple actors responsible for 
 
37 Snowball sampling – Where the citations from one paper, determine ongoing targets for sampling. 
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undertaking the various project tasks within a megaprojects organisational structure are: 
identified, allocated, organised, and coordinated [Sanderson, 2012:432]. The three 
governance categories applied in this paper’s analysis are Forecast inadequacies; 
Deficient complexity management; Rivalrous project goals. 
3.2.1 Forecast inadequacies 
This category of governance encompasses projects where actors with an interest in 
such a project development proceeding, overestimate the benefits of the project, and 
underestimate the anticipated project costs and duration: resulting in a more compelling 
business case for the megaproject to proceed. Although potentially having sinister 
motivations, such a category usually has a more innocent explanation: the human 
propensity for optimism (optimism bias). Flyvbjerg [2017b] also outlines further less 
sinister motivations, in his four ‘sublimes’. These being: the technological sublime, where 
engineers aspire to work on the most noteworthy projects they can. The political sublime, 
where politicians want to be associated with ‘signature/statement projects’. The economic 
sublime, where actors (e.g. trade unions wanting to create employment for their members) 
seek a somewhat legitimate value capture. Finally, the aesthetic sublime, where the 
demand for ‘beauty’ is prioritised ahead of cost, by aesthetically motivated parties such 
as pressure groups. All four of these sublimes typically relate to a public financing 
narrative, as only a government financier of substance is likely to have the capacity to 
absorb such potential value changing influences. SSA governments are unlikely to have 
such funding flexibility. 
3.2.2 Deficient complexity management 
As was discussed in sec.2.2, complexity is an inbuilt reality of all megaprojects and 
needs to be both appreciated and planned for, as early as the project’s conception. In this 
paper, complexity is sub-divided into two categories: structural, complexity that is created 
during a project’s planning; and dynamic, complexity created by changes once a project 
has commenced. 
During planning “the consequences of decisions will be highest, while the information 
will be at its lowest” [Williams & Samset, 2010:39]. Importantly however, the cost 
implications of any changes required will also be at their lowest. Rushed pre-engineering 
and planning that leads to premature commencement of construction and therefore 
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revisions later, always prove costly – the more rushed, usually the more costly. Therefore, 
when say political decision-makers (or any primary decision-makers) are impatient for a 
project’s commencement (and pushing for it against their agent’s wishes) they are in 
effect condemning that project to underperformance [Brady & Davies, 2014; Maylor et 
al, 2008; Williams & Samset, 2010].  
“The World Bank gave a similar message in a study based on a review of 1,125 of 
its projects that were evaluated between 1991 and 1994. {It concluded} that 
projects with adequate or better identification, preparation and appraisal had an 
80% rate, against 25% for projects that were deficient in all these aspects; and that 
the quality of preparation and appraisal had significantly more influence on 
satisfactory performance than key country macro-economic variables, external 
factors, or government considerations [Williams & Samset, 2010:39 – citing the 
World Bank, 1996]. 
The challenges caused by changes once a project has commenced, are probably more 
significant (sec.2.2.2) and must be expected, as the scale of a megaproject will always 
cause unanticipated factors to arise. This category includes, not having processes in place 
to deal with the known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns, highlighted 
by Donald Rumsfeld on 12 February 2002 in Iraq.  
As the scale of projects increase: “challenges in some areas can only be solved by 
introducing failures in others. Thus, megaprojects will always have to confront some 
degree of failure despite attempts to synthesise a coherent megaproject management 
strategy. Therefore, planners can either plan for failure (make value decisions going into 
a project) or avoid the inevitability of failure by reducing the scale of projects, focussing 
instead on smaller, more scalable, more flexible energy investments” [Van de Graaf & 
Sovacool, 2014:26].  
3.2.3 Rivalrous project goals 
The core notion of this governance category is that to maximise the efficiency of a 
megaproject for successful delivery, all stakeholders and agents need to have shared goals 
or priorities. Governance failure occurs when a project’s actors start to have misaligned 
goals, if not opposed interests: which will lead to project turbulence. This usually occurs 
at a stakeholder-to-stakeholder level but can occur between stakeholders and their agents. 
With an electricity generation development: at a stakeholder level, this can manifest itself 
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as a clash between environmental and commercial requisites, and the need to appreciate 
and value economic externalities [Arrow, 1970; Pigou, 1932]. Between a principal and 
agent, this can reflect rent-seeking or value-capture, where agents seek to extract 
excessive and unreasonable value, from the project [Eisenhardt, 1989; Gregory & 
Sovacool, 2019b; Krueger, 1974]. 
3.3 Fieldwork research questions 
By applying the three governance explanations to the six case studies, this paper’s 
research sought to answer two questions. Firstly, if an infrastructure development has 
been un-successful, did one or more of the following cause this to happen? Forecast 
inadequacies, during the project planning; deficient complexity reducing governance 
arrangements; or rivalrous project goals, between stakeholders themselves or with their 
agents. Secondly, if an infrastructure development has been successful, were the 
following established: accurate forecasts, complexity reduction strategies, aligned 
objectives between each stakeholder and agents? Whilst evaluating the evidence received 
from the fieldwork, it became clear that the data collected could answer more than just 
governance issues. Consequentially, this paper analysis now focuses on issues of 
governance, scale, and scope.  
3.4 Fieldwork methods 
This paper’s fieldwork solicited data using two interview methods: originally ten 
inductive interviews were carried out (as part of a larger sample during an associated 
project), and later a further twenty-two semi-structured interviews. These were with 
relevant personnel who possessed intimate knowledge of at least one of the six case study 
projects in South Africa: Medupi, Kusile, Ingula, Sere, Avon and Dedisa. During the 
data collection, it became evident that certain potential witnesses had significant pressure 
exerted upon them to not confer with academics. This was probably because both Medupi 
and Kusile are subject to intense political scrutiny in the RSA – due to their significant 
cost overruns which have compromised Eskom’s balance sheet [Engineering News, 
31/07/2019; Eskom1; Mail & Guardian 9/01/2015; Africa Feeds, 13/02/2019; Mining 
MX, 1/09/207]. Fortunately for this paper’s data collection, much of the relevant historic 
institutional knowledge, no longer just resides within Eskom – Medupi and Kusile have 
been under development for over 15 years, and Eskom no longer employs many of the 
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most knowledgeable witnesses. Most interviewees have asked the author to guard their 
identities – therefore, for fear of compromising any of them; a summary only of the 
interviewee profiles appears below. Within the text of the paper, they are cited as ‘IW’ 
(interview witness) and given a number: e.g. IW12. 
Most fieldwork interviews were face to face, with one telephone interview, and 
one written set of answers. The shortest interview lasted about half an hour and the longest 
roughly two and a half hours. Most interviews were recorded (permission was sometimes 
withheld) and then transcribed. Twenty-two interviews were conducted in May/June 
2019. Ten occurred earlier, at the end and beginning 2018/19 as part of a separate project. 
The earlier interviews were inductive, and the interviews carried out later were deductive 
and surrounded six interview questions.  
1. What is your association with the project, and how did you come to be involved?  
2. Who was responsible for the project’s initiation: who sponsored it, and who were 
the principal stakeholders involved?  
3. How was the project planned - including its design, timetable, and budget; and 
were there any notable stakeholder agreements or disagreements?  
4. How was the construction of the project organised? – Who determined the 
structure, who was involved, and what issues (if any) arose?  
5. Who determined when the project was commissioned, and was it completed on 
time and at budget?  
6. Looking back at the project, what in your opinion most contributed to its 
problems and overruns / or if there were none – what factors led to the project’s 
success? 
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Table 3 (compiled by author) 
Interview Profiles 
Interviewee 
Code 
Structure 
of 
interview 
Class of Case 
 Study Project 
Position/ 
Expertise 
Institution 
Status 
when 
Interviewed 
IW1 F to F* All Eskom Director Eskom Current 
IW2 F to F All Eskom Director Eskom Current 
IW3 F to F Problematic Engineers Eskom Current 
IW4 F to F Problematic Manager Eskom Current 
IW5 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Current 
IW6 F to F Problematic Senior Management Contractor Current 
IW7 F to F Problematic Engineer Eskom Past 
IW8 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Current 
IW9 F to F All Eskom Senior Management Eskom Current 
IW10 F to F Successes Engineer Eskom Current 
IW11 F to F All Energy Journalist Publisher Current 
IW12 F to F Successes Senior Management Contractor Past 
IW13 F to F Problematic Engineer Eskom Past 
IW14 F to F Successes Senior Management Eskom Current 
IW15 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Current 
IW16 F to F Problematic Management Eskom Past 
IW17 F to F Problematic Management Supplier Current 
IW18 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Past 
IW19 F to F Problematic Senior Management Contractor Past 
IW20 F to F Successes Senior Management Shareholder Current 
IW21 F to F Successes Senior Management ADPP** Current 
IW22 F to F Problematic Management Eskom Past 
IW23 F to F Problematic Senior Manager Industry Current 
IW24 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Past 
IW25 F to F Successes Senior Management ADPP Current 
IW26 F to F Problematic Senior Manager NGO Current 
IW27 F to F All Senior Manager NGO Current 
IW28 F to F Problematic Senior Manager Eskom Past 
IW29 F to F Problematic Senior Management Industry Current 
IW30 F to F Problematic Senior Management Eskom Past 
IW31 Telephone Problematic Engineer Eskom Current 
IW32 Written Problematic Consultant Eskom Past 
*F to F = 
 Face to Face 
**ADPP = 
Avon and 
Dedisa Peaking 
Power 
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4. Case study context and selection 
This section will now explain the complex socio-technical environment that the six case-
study electricity generation projects were built within. Firstly, this involves a recent 
historical background surrounding Eskom, starting in the 1970s and ending in April 1994, 
when the ANC took over government. This is important as Eskom represented the entire 
RSA’s electricity supply industry during this period, and therefore any legacy issues that 
existed within Eskom when the ANC took power, need appreciating. Next, I will briefly 
analyse the three most influential socio-political undercurrents that impacted the case 
study context, after the ANC took power. This is then followed by a summary of why 
there has been both a lack of leadership and policy indifference surrounding electricity 
supply in the RSA, since the political transition. Next I describe Eskom’s current standing 
and condition; and finally, I will explain the case study selection. 
4.1 Eskom, an institution formed by history 
Eskom, as the national electricity utility of the RSA, is a vertically integrated, 100 
percent owned, corporate entity of the country’s central government. It itself, owns and 
manages the country’s electricity transmission grid and is responsible for generating most 
of the country’s electricity needs – what should be a clearly defined function, for this type 
of institution. However, over the past half century, the extent of the company’s 
responsibility and control have been markedly restricted in both reach and autonomy, 
which has left a legacy of frustrated managerial aspiration within the institution and path-
dependent trajectory of behaviour. This makes Eskom, like many significant institutions 
throughout the world, both a carrier of history and a hostage to it [David, 1994]. 
The modern Eskom had started to take shape in the 1970s, when it was still called 
ESCOM, (an anacronym for the Electricity Supply Commission). By this stage, ESCOM 
had automated and unified the country’s entire electricity generation fleet into a 
centralised national-grid, which it controlled using five operators from a hub in 
Simmerpan (completed in 1973) [Christie, 1984 – cited by Gentle, 2009].  As part of this 
centralisation, it also undertook an aggressive expansion program of building several very 
large pit-head, coal-fired power stations throughout the country’s coal regions [Gentle,  
2009; Eberhard, 2007]. It should be noted, it was during this time, that both the 
development locations for Medupi and Kusile, were originally identified [IW30]. It is 
also important to observe, that “ESCOM had also become a strategic arm of the then 
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apartheid regime’s geopolitical objectives” [Gentle, 2009:62], which permitted it to have 
considerable autonomy in how it strategically planned its own business, as its strategy  
was deemed synonymous with that of the state. This is when a culture of what is good for 
Eskom, is good for the state, started to dominate the organisation’s thinking [IW1, IW2]. 
This aggressive power generation building program however, demonstrated the fallacy 
of the organisation’s leadership and exhibited for the first time the institution’s ability to 
damage the entire country economically. The aggressive expansion of capacity, partly 
paid for by higher tariffs to the angst of its important customers, had created a significant 
excess in  generation capacity. “By the end of 1983, ESCOM had 22,260MW of generating 
capacity on order, double the capacity then being operated”: the outlay for which, the 
country and its industry could ill-afford [Eberhard, 2007:219 – citing Steyn, 2001:75]. 
This capacity expansion had been mainly financed by international bank lending, who 
as a community, were initially enthusiastic lenders when the program started, particularly 
as such lending received sovereign guarantees. As the decade progressed however, this 
willing sentiment turned against both the country’s apartheid regime and ESCOM. By 
1985, after anti-apartheid civil unrest had intensified and the gold price had collapsed (a 
major determinant of sentiment surrounding South Africa’s perceived solvency) the 
government was forced to declare a moratorium on debt repayment – a situation shaped 
by ESCOM’s spending [Gentle,  2009; Eberhard, 2007]. Notwithstanding, the apartheid 
government had already begun to question ESCOM’s autonomy.  
In 1983, the De Villiers commission had been established to examine both ESCOM’s 
strategic exuberance and electricity pricing throughout South Africa. The commission in 
its findings, heavily “criticised ESCOM’s governance, its management, its electricity 
forecasting methods, its investment decisions, and its accounting” [Eberhard, 2007:219]. 
Its conclusions included: that there should be a unified and commercial national 
electricity tariff, and ESCOM should cease being a public-interest parastatal (since its 
creation in 1922, ESCOM had to operate at cost and guarantee electricity supply, which 
meant it could recoup its development costs through its tariff). The new status was meant 
to require ESCOM to operate as a commercial company: making profits, paying taxes 
and dividends to its owner, the state [Gentle,  2009; Eberhard, 2007].  
In 1987, with the international backdrop of neo-liberal public management changes  
which started in the US and the UK (now known as New Public Management [Hood, 
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1991]), two new Acts were passed by the RSA government. The Eskom Act 1987 and the 
Electricity Act 1987. Amongst other things, ESCOM was renamed Eskom; and its 
supervision was reconfigured, to permit input from important customers – but this 
occurred with unintended consequences, as ESCOM’s lawyers were allowed important 
input into the legislation, which resulted in reduced regulatory oversight of tariffs 
[Eberhard, 2007:220]. The company also began its journey towards corporatisation and 
its modern status. Importantly, no new power stations were then ordered until 2005, the 
context of this paper’s fieldwork. 
Due to the changed status that the two acts had created, Eskom then entered the 1990s 
with the apartheid government exploring ways to privatise the company. This was not 
just driven by neo-liberal ideology, it was also an attempt to de-politicise the institution, 
whilst finding a sensible solution to remove the financial burden and legacy that Eskom’s 
expansion just discussed, had placed on the state’s balance sheet [Greenberg,2007]. The 
ANC however, due to the expectations that they had built amongst their supporters over 
their years of struggle, were openly hostile to such a notion, and openly threated to 
renationalise Eskom if privatisation was carried out. So, privatisation was shelved, and 
the company remained in public ownership as the ANC took over the leadership of the 
country and Mandela became president [Ibid]. 
4.2 The post-apartheid socio-political topography 
Since the political change in leadership in April 1994, there have been a number of 
supplementary but important socio-political themes that have influenced the topography 
of this paper’s analysis. The three most significant surround the topics of black equity, 
trade union influence and state capture. This sub-section will now briefly unpack these 
three themes and clarify how they have also influenced the empirical research context. 
4.2.1 The pressure for Black Equity 
There were many expectations demanded of the new ANC government, on their 
ascension to power, with one of the principal ones being a desire to rebalance the 
economic input from non-whites, in the country’s economy – or promoting ‘Black 
Equity’, as the policy is often described. Due to their public ownership, the nation’s 
parastatals were top of the list of institutions for redress and Eskom was certainly one 
organisation that was expected to change. Fortuitously for Eskom, the top management 
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had not waited for the formal political transition to occur before starting this process of 
redress, instead they had already commenced a policy of racial rebalancing within the 
institution much earlier, under the leadership of Dr Ian McRae in 1990 – when they 
actively started to recruit black engineers [IW1, IW3, IW4, IW5, IW7]. There was 
foresight in this move, as it enabled a training of a new black middle management in the 
necessary capabilities to run the company, much earlier than might otherwise have been 
possible – potentially enabling a less disruptive transition. In a wider context however, 
Black Equity was probably also responsible for many of the leadership issues surrounding 
Eskom, discussed in the coming section 4.3 – which has led to many of Eskom’s other 
problems. 
The policy of advancing Black Equity did not just impact the context of Eskom directly 
through its impact on its leadership, it also had an issue through another type of policy 
for racial-redress: the BBBEE (Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment) policy. The 
ambition of BBBEE is to distribute wealth across as broad a spectrum of the previously 
disadvantaged South African society as possible. This policy had direct relevance to the 
construction of the Eskom sponsored case studies, and the ownership of the independent 
ones. This is discussed in more detail in section 5.2.3 of this Chapter, where the policy’s 
influence, and other Black Equity measures, are explained. 
4.2.2 The influence of Trade Unions 
Before the political transition, the South African trade union movement under the 
leadership of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions), was arguably the 
most effective force for racial-political change in South Africa [Jerome, 1997]: as they 
were involved in numerous political activities that had more to do with promoting racial 
political change, than might normally be anticipated from a trade union movement.  
These included: “getting the government to free political prisoners; developing a 
mechanism to create a new constitution; drafting the new constitution; educating 
South Africans about government processes and voting procedures; conducting 
public debate about democratic institutions; aiding in plans for the 1994 election, 
assisting in the first all-race election, conducting the successful election of the ANC, 
forming the ‘New Government of National Unity’, persuading the USA and other 
countries to lift bans and sanctions, encouraging foreign investment, and 
encouraging domestic companies to invest in developing the new South Africa” 
[Ibid: 37]. 
Although never formally part of the ANC, COSATU’s influence over the ANC and its 
input of people into its senior ranks, even before it took over government, is clear to see. 
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Perhaps the greatest evidence of this is visible through COSATU’s pivotal role in the 
making of Cyril Ramaphosa politically, the current president of the RSA. Ramaphosa’s 
political reputation  was initially created as the leader of the NUM (National Union of 
Mineworkers) – a creation of COSATU. Ramaphosa followed this role by transferring to 
the ANC as its Secretary-General in 1991[Butler, 2007]. 
The relevance of this link for Eskom, lies primarily with the issue of coal. Eskom 
depends on coal as a fuel, from which to generate most of its electricity – and appears to 
be committed to this source of energy, as they are building two brand new 5GW power 
stations in the form of Medupi and Kusile. COSATU’s relevance to coal, is that they 
facilitated the creation of the NUM  under the leadership of Ramaphosa in 1982, when 
they were still CUSA (Council of Unions of South Africa). The NUM continues to 
represent most of the Coal miners in the country and are therefore keen to continue to 
support the coal industry’s raison d’etre. As will also be demonstrated in sec 5.2.3, the 
trade unions were very active in protecting their members interests, during the building 
of Medupi and Kusile. 
4.2.3 The effect of State Capture 
The term state capture describes a distinct category of administrative corruption (the 
misuse of public office for private gain [Booth, 2012; Godinho et al, 2018; Gregory & 
Sovacool, 2019b]), where the political corruption is systemic and utilises embedded 
networks of power and influence. This involves both public and private actors colluding, 
to co-opt the mechanisms of state for their own economic joint benefit – cheating the 
normal social contract and the wider societal interests [Godinho et al, 2018; Madonsela, 
2019]. Despite the applicability of the term, for describing the apartheid process of control 
of the pre-1994 South Africa – in the South African context, it is usually used to describe 
how President Jacob Zuma was able to use the power of the office of President, to 
appropriate value towards his own network of interests, which included the Gupta family 
and other non-state interests [Godinho et al, 2018, Madonsela, 2019]. Its relevance to this 
paper, is that as a process it was applied to Eskom and forms a legitimate contributing 
input for what may have gone wrong with the Medupi and Kusile case studies. 
As applied to Eskom, state capture was a political-economic project, that had several 
stages to it. Firstly, it was necessary to place sympathetic political officials in the 
ministries and trade unions that surround Eskom (see sec.4,3); next, the members of 
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Eskom’s board were replaced with new directors sympathetic to the network’s goals and 
who would be prepared to  appoint a senior management who were part of the network. 
Once these processes are completed, the network is then able to corrupt procurement 
processes of Eskom and any megaprojects that it is building – the larger the better – to 
appropriate value for the network [Godinho et al, 2018].  Evidence arising from the 
‘Zondo Commission of Enquiry into State Capture38 , suggests this is what happened 
[Ibid]. It should be noted that Zuma did not become president  until May 2009, after all 
the Eskom case studies had all been commissioned. There is also no suggestion of any 
impropriety before his accession to the presidency, or directly after it, within Eskom. 
4.3 Electricity supply: a leadership and policy vacuum  
Since the accession to power by the ANC in 1994 to the present day, there has been 
much confusion surrounding Eskom’s strategic leadership and direction. The political 
supervision of Eskom is the responsibility of the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE), 
whose minister frequently changes, leading to sub-optimal governance surrounding 
Eskom from the government – the current responsible minister is Pravin Gordhan, who 
has been in office since February 2018. As I explained in sec.4.2.3, it has also become 
customary for the President himself to take oversight, due to the significance of Eskom’s 
economic power.  
Further, as a corporation, it is also subject to the control of its own board and CEO, 
both of which have again been frequently changed. In the earlier days, as the policy of 
black empowerment took hold on Eskom, it led to conflicts between the CEO and the 
board and the board and its political masters (see sec.4.2.1) as the company transitioned 
from an apartheid legacy to an ANC one. More recently, it has led to conflict between the 
board and its political masters, as the costs and disruption of  load-shedding and Medupi 
and Kusile’s development have come home to roost. The current CEO is Andre de Ruyter, 
who has been in office since January 2020 and is the 11th CEO in ten years; the current 
chairman Malegapuru William Makgoba, is an interim appointment, made in January 
2020.  
As an energy utility, Eskom is also subject to the policy oversight of the department 
of Energy (DoE) and before that department’s creation, the department for Mining and 
 
38 https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/  
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Energy (DME). Again, the ministerial leadership of this body has also been subject to 
frequent change. This has created a policy vacuum surrounding electricity supply in the 
RSA. This has perhaps been best illustrated by the DME White Paper on the Energy 
Policy of the Republic of South Africa, [1998]. 
The Whitepaper was meant to deliver a road-map for the country’s future electricity 
supply policy and details a policy of restructuring and liberalisation of the electricity 
supply industry (ESI). To this end, it made several important transitional 
recommendations. 
1. The unbundling of Eskom Generation into a number of competing generation 
units. 
2. The diversification of ownership within the generation sector through local and 
international private sector participation. 
3. Exclusive private sector involvement in any new-build, to reach a target of 30% 
of generation capacity - prohibiting Eskom from building any new power 
stations. 
4. The separation of Eskom Transmission from Eskom Generation, to enable non-
discriminatory access to the transmission grid from new suppliers. 
5. The creation of a wholesale energy market in South and Southern Africa. 
6. The rationalisation of about 190 municipal and Eskom electricity distributors 
into a limited number of economically viable, wall-to-wall, regional electricity 
distributors. 
7. The introduction of competition into the industry, especially the generation 
sector, and giving customers the right to choose their electricity supplier. 
Whilst some movement did occur to implement the restructuring of the ESI, it became 
clear that most of the embedded interests within the socio-political establishment were 
against any such change, including the provincial and local government levels of 
government. Eskom and the municipalities had little appetite to appetite for change too. 
The result has been ongoing policy uncertainty, as without adequate political and 
executive leadership and direction, how can change occur? In 2020, twenty-two years on, 
the stated policy objectives of the 1998 whitepaper remain in place, and there is still 
heated discussion about what to do. 
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4.4 Eskom’s status and condition 
Traditionally, Eskom has generated most of its electricity from South African sourced 
coal, but its extensive coal fired generation fleet “are between 37 and 50 years old and 
many operate at sub-optimal levels due to their age” [Quote by Minister Gordhan, as 
reported in Biz News, 17/03/2019]. South African coal has a relatively high and variable 
non-combustible content, which includes quartz and alumino-silicates, which create 
highly abrasive fly ash39 [Moumakwa & Marcus, 2005; Falcon & Ham, 1988]. This is 
problematic to protect against and leads to excessive plant shutdowns – particularly if the 
quality of coal burned is of an inconsistent quality (which makes it difficult to engineer 
protection against). Evidence arising from the current ‘Zondo Commission of Enquiry 
into State Capture’ surrounding Matshela Koko (former acting Eskom CEO), has 
demonstrated through its hearings, that corruption in recent years had led to variance in 
coal quality [Times Live, 11/03/2019]. 
Eskom is often forced to lose a significant percentage of its current generation 
capacity, because of technology induced, unscheduled capacity shutdowns within their 
coal fired generation fleet [ENCA, 19/03/2019]. This then leads to load-shedding within 
the grid (controlled blackouts) throughout the country - its problems have been most acute 
during peak demand periods and have accelerated in frequency over the last year. The 
consistent load-shedding is perhaps the most significant economic issue facing South 
Africa currently 
4.5 Case study selection 
Eskom owns and operates four of the case studies used in this paper. Two of these are 
massive coal fired generation projects, Medupi and Kusile, each with an expected ‘plate’ 
generation capacity of 4,800MW once completed (amongst the largest in the world). 
Medupi (located in Limpopo province) was originally supposed to be finished in 2013/14 
and Kusile (located in Mpumalanga province) in 2014/15 [IW11; IW19; IW30], but 
neither is fully constructed yet. Medupi is anticipated for completion in 2020 and Kusile 
in 2023 [Business Day, 4/09/2019]. The initial budget was R79bln40, and there are no 
 
39 Fly ash – Small particle combustion residues, which are difficult to extract from the combustion 
exhaust, and therefore flow into through the boiler system. [Moumakwa & Marcus, 2005] 
40 R = Rand; bln = Billion 
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confirmed final costs, but a 200% plus cost overrun represents a realistic possibility. The 
third is Ingula, a 1,332MW pump storage facility: where an underground powerhouse 
complex, which contains four reverse flow pump turbines and four generator 
transformers, connects two reservoirs – this facility straddles the Free state and Kwazulu-
Natal border [Eskom 2]. The development cost was just under R30bln (US$2 billion), and 
understood to be 33% over budget, having suffered delays of over 4 years (+80%) 
[IW31]. All three projects are megaprojects, consistent with Flyvbjerg’s [2017] definition 
(see sec.2.1); and all three have been problematic in terms of budget and schedule. 
The fourth Eskom generation asset is the Sere wind farm, located in the Western Cape, 
which has a technical capacity 100MW: which some might argue should not qualify as a 
megaproject. The project cost approximately R2.7bln [IW10] – which was around 
US$375 million in 2011/12, when the project was commissioned. It is still included, as it 
exists within the complex socio-political structures that make up the South African 
electricity delivery landscape, and subject to its complexities: the primary qualifying 
feature for defining a megaproject in SSA in this paper (sec.2.1). Perhaps more 
importantly, it is an example of an Eskom successful project delivery, in contrast to the 
first three. It also utilises a technology that is unique within Eskom, and novel to the 
organisation. 
Figure 7. Location of case studies, within South Africa 
Avon
Sere
Dedisa
Medupi
Kusile
Ingula
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The last two case studies are two privately-owned, peaking power plants, which 
utilise two open cycle gas turbine power plants and together cost R10bln [Avon & 
Dedisa Peaking Power]. They are located on the Eastern coast of the country: Avon near 
Durban, and Dedisa near Port Elizabeth. Each plant was designed to supply electricity as 
peak demand facilities to augment the electricity grid when required. During the recent 
electricity outages in the RSA, these two plants have provided electricity outside this peak 
period, with no problems. Avon’s capacity output is 670MW, and Dedisa is 330MW.  
5. Results 
5.1 The organisation of data for analysis 
In this paper’s analysis: case studies 1, 2 & 3 are regarded as problematic, as they 
have gone over budget and beyond schedule; case studies 4, 5 & 6 are regarded as 
successful, as they were completed within projected timeframes and budget. Sere (case 
study 4) was late in its connectivity to the South African grid, but its generation 
component was completed on schedule: the delay was due to a complex negotiation with 
landowners over transmission land rights, which delayed the connectivity of the project 
to the grid [IW12]. In line with this paper’s research questions, this paper combines its 
case studies together into two separate groups: the problematic and the successful. It then 
applies each of the three governance perspectives explained in sec.3.2, to the two groups.  
5.2 Medupi, Kusile and Ingula: the problematic  
5.2.1 Forecast Inadequacies: governance explanation one 
This section analyses the applicability of Forecast Inadequacies as a suitable 
governance explanation for the development failures of the first three case studies. Here 
the evidence suggests a reluctance to build new generation capacity by government (as 
opposed to enthusiasm) and there is no evidence of optimistic projections (central to this 
type of governance failure). Once a decision to proceed with the development of new 
generation capacity however, the process was enthusiastically embraced and mishandled.  
Several interviewees suggested that Eskom pushed aggressively within government 
for at least a decade, for permission to start building further electricity generation capacity 
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[IW11; IW18; IW22; IW30]. Its requests to build were consistently rebuffed: first by the 
Mandela government (1994-1999) and then the Mbeki government (1999–2008), as these 
two democratic administrations both prioritised Eskom’s focus towards the connectivity 
of electricity-disenfranchised people, over building new generation capacity [Eskom 3]. 
There is a larger narrative that surrounds this reluctance to build, but the explanation and 
analysis of this is beyond the scope of this paper.  
• In December 1998, the South African Department of Minerals and Energy produced 
a White Paper on the Energy Policy of the Republic of South Africa where it stated: 
“Timely steps will have to be taken to ensure that demand does not exceed available 
supply capacity and that appropriate strategies, including those with long lead 
times, are implemented in time. The next decision on supply-side investments will 
probably have to be taken by the end of 1999 to ensure that the electricity needs of 
the next decade are met” [Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998:53] – But no 
change in government policy occurred following the white paper’s release, for over 
five years. 
 
• President Mbeki went on record to apologise in early December 2007, after load-
shedding had commenced “When Eskom said to the government, we think we must 
invest more in electricity generation ... we said not now, later. We were wrong, 
Eskom were right, we were wrong.” [Quote relayed by IOL, 12/12/2009] 
 
• Interview IW16 said a “decision was taken by government to proceed with Medupi 
in 2003, but it was quickly reversed after the Eskom board approved the return to 
service”: the recommissioning of three mothballed plants: Camden, Grootvlei and 
Komati [supported by IW11].  
 
The government only relented after Alec Erwin became the minister for DPE, in 2004. 
In late 2004, the minister was finally persuaded to reverse the government’s position with 
irrefutable evidence of impending electricity capacity shortfalls, when Eskom senior 
management were finally able to get a focussed meeting with him. “Once we persuaded 
him, Erwin then enthusiastically championed the three projects through cabinet in early 
2005” [IW30] – and beyond. 
The basis for Eskom’s own enthusiasm for construction to commence, was also rooted 
on solid ground – their own analysis since the 1990s had demonstrated that demand was 
going to exceed supply by late 2006, and serious load shedding had become reality to 
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South Africans, by the end of 2007. “Electricity demand was increasing, as tariffs were 
being kept low by NERSA {the regulator} to encourage industrial growth, and the 
government’s electrification program was increasing connectivity” [IW30], and 
therefore consumption of electricity. Despite the government’s reticence, “we embarked 
on a ‘desktop’ development {no pre-engineering} of 3 new coal generation projects: 
‘Alpha’ ‘Bravo’ and ‘Charlie’, using the Majuba schematics41 to deliver equipment factor 
estimates”. “We had also planned for several peaking power solutions, which we 
developed under the ‘Brownhook model’42: a pump storage project, which became 
Ingula, and two open cycle gas turbine plants, Ankerlig and Gourikwa”, both located in 
the Western Cape [IW30].  
Alpha, Bravo and Charlie are in fact significantly different to Medupi and Kusile – 
and therefore these projects anticipated budgets and construction timetables should not 
be applied as reference points for the project’s cost and timetable forecasts, even though 
they are often used as such. All three projects were desktop or concept only – initially 3 
x 600 MW (1800MW) generation plants, using sub-critical technology, with an 
anticipated budget of R35bln each. In late 2006 they became two 6 x 800MW 
(4,800MW), when the projects were expanded and had super critical technology 
applied43. Alpha and Charlie were merged to create Medupi, and Bravo was scaled up to 
become Kusile. Their initial proposed budget was finally set in 2007 at R79bln each. In 
2009, their budget was escalated by the board to R92bln for each project; increased again 
in 2010/11 to R105bln; and again, to R135bln in 2013. Three separate interviews have 
confirmed aspects of this reality [IW11; IW24; IW30]. 
 
41 Majuba was Eskom’s most recently constructed large coal-fired power station: commencing in 1983; 
suspended in 1985, for financial reasons; and after substantial delays, completed in the middle/late 1990s. 
42 Brownhook Model: a ‘ring fenced’ development/finance model, which delivered future ownership 
flexibility consistent with the then government policy [IW30]. 
43 Sub and Super critical technology – “Super-critical refers to a system operating at above 22.1MPa 
(3206 psi) and 3740C, called the critical point for water. Water at or above this pressure remains liquid, i.e. 
it does not boil into steam at any temperature. The net result is, as far as boiler design is concerned, that 
you are dealing with a liquid not a gas, hence heat transfer is improved. So, a boiler designed to operate in 
the super-critical regime can be slightly more thermally efficient, by several % points, depending also on 
several other factors. If your boiler is burning, say 3 million tons of coal a year, every % of improvement 
in efficiency is valuable, cost-wise, and especially since less coal for a certain electrical output equates to 
reduced CO2. Finally, since a super-critical boiler does not have to separate the steam and water, it does 
not need a (steam-separation) Drum and may thus be a bit easier and cheaper to build” [IW24]. 
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5.2.2 Deficient complexity management: governance explanation two 
As discussed in sec.2.2, it is the inability to manage the complexity of megaprojects, 
which is often at the core of megaproject failure (which is also an important project 
capability issue). It can be inferred from this that a failure to not only reduce complexity, 
but to increase it instead, must indicate an absence of appreciation of such a detail 
amongst the responsible decision makers behind the commencement of these three 
megaprojects. The previous time Eskom had been involved in constructing a major power 
generation project, from start to finish, was in the early 1980s (except Majuba – see earlier 
footnote) [IW11; IW13; IW19; IW22; IW24]. By 2005, the capabilities for constructing 
a megaproject, particularly the EPC skills, had long departed Eskom [Ibid]. It can be 
argued that should have dictated caution and a drive towards complexity reduction. 
Instead, Eskom commenced developing three megaprojects simultaneously; and making 
two of them, Medupi and Kusile, even more complex than they had to be. 
5.2.2.1 MAKING MEDUPI AND KUSILE MORE COMPLEX 
“Traditionally when Eskom had built its large power stations, it would have divided 
the construction process into 4, 5 or 6 work packages, surrounding: civil works; boiler 
works; turbine hall {turbines/alternators/air cooled condensers}; control & 
instrumentation; coal supply. Further, Eskom would not have proceeded with utilising 
‘prototype equipment’. With both Medupi and Kusile they broke these rules” [IW24, 
supported by IW11; IW22; IW30]:  
• “They built to a scale and complexity, that Eskom had never built to before” 
[IW24]. 
• “They used a technology that they and their contractor {Hitachi Power Africa} 
had never used before” [IW24] – super critical boilers. Flu gas desulphurisation, 
was also novel to Eskom; 
• “Medupi has at least 39 ‘key’ work packages, two of which were not managed 
by the project” [IW24, supported by IW22]. 
• “Kusile has over 50 ‘key’ work packages” [IW24]. 
If the number of work packages were limited, Eskom would transfer project risk to the 
contractor: as the responsibility for everything within the work package lies with them, 
including the performance of their sub-contractors. By disseminating the traditional work 
packages, into the number they did – Eskom did two negative things for themselves: they 
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made the development process far more complex and problematic; and they transferred 
the consequences of this complexity, from their contractors to themselves. 
Eskom then compounded this issue, by failing to benefit from the learning curve 
through ‘learning by doing’ [Scott-Kemmis & Bell, 2010]. When building something 
novel to your organisation, you can learn both ‘how to do it better’, and ‘what not to do 
again’. Rather than building Kusile after Medupi was finished, and applying the lessons 
learnt from Medupi to the Kusile project, before construction had started and a mistake 
ridden trajectory was ‘locked in’ (sec.3.2) – Eskom overlapped the building of both 
projects, with a delayed commencement of Kusile. 
Finally, there was a lack of appreciation of the global context, which should have also 
dictated caution surrounding scale and scope. At the point that Eskom embarked on 
building Medupi and Kusile, there was a global boom surrounding the construction of 
coal fired, electricity generation, power stations. “China was commissioning on average 
a new 2x600MW coal power project every month and to a lesser extent India” was also 
expanding this type of electricity delivery technology as well [IW24]. The outcome of 
this was that it was a seller’s market from a technology perspective: with only weaker 
technology providers available as suppliers to Eskom; and no availability for utilising 
turnkey contracts, to transfer construction and technology risk away from Eskom’s 
balance sheet – as traditional facilitators felt no pressure to accept such risk to secure 
business [IW11; IW24]. 
From a project capability and management skills perspective, this was also a problem: 
as the relevant skilled personnel who had been involved in building earlier Eskom large 
capacity power stations, had departed Eskom [IW3; IW11; IW16; IW19; IW22; IW24]. 
Eskom were unable to hire suitably skilled personnel locally or from overseas. Neither 
Parsons Brinckerhoff (PB Power Africa) or Black and Veitch, the respective ‘owner’s’ 
engineer for Medupi and Kusile, had knowledge of supercritical technology with South 
African low calorific coals for example [IW24], which require boilers to have a higher 
burn capacity to enable the required higher temperatures to be reached [Falcon & Ham, 
1988]. Hitachi Power Africa also lacked this knowledge, the boiler contractor for both 
power stations. Regarding civil construction skills, South Africa was also simultaneously 
building multiple large-scale stadia, for the 2010 soccer World Cup [IW8; IW22]. The 
lack of available staff with proficient welding skills was mentioned during many 
interviews. 
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5.2.2.2 RUSHED DESIGN AND FRONT-END ENGINEERING 
Medupi commenced construction in May 2007, Kusile in 2009 (delayed by the 2008 
Global Financial Crisis) [IW19; IW22], despite both projects only receiving cabinet 
approval in early 2005 – this again proved to be particularly problematic, in line with the 
issues described in sec.2.2.2. IW16, who since departing Eskom has been associated with 
many large-scale infrastructure projects throughout Africa, said: “projects of the size of 
both Medupi and Kusile require at least 10 years of front-end design and engineering 
before construction should have commenced”. Regardless of what the correct figure is, 
as the Eskom controlled electricity delivery system reached capacity in 2007 – the 
political expediency to commence construction from the DPE, for fear of impending 
power cuts, determined a quick commencement [IW16; IW19; IW22]. 
The problems caused by this rushed start are numerous and important but mostly 
outside the conceptual approach of this paper. The most significant issues that caused 
meaningful cost increases and schedule delays are covered here briefly: 
• Strain on local manufacturing capacity. As Eskom is government owned, it 
is subject to several government policy initiatives, the two principal ones being: 
Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) and local content 
procurement rules. The size of orders created off these three projects, 
overwhelmed the local supply industry: in both product and skilled personnel. 
Continuously changing design specifications then compounded this (see ‘Boiler 
issues’ below). The resulting procurement delays would then affect other work 
packages, as dynamic complexity issues were triggered [IW22]. 
Ingula was “forced to reject some of the contractor tenders, as they did not 
comply with BBBEE. This caused delays in the awarding of some contracts” 
(some contracts took three tenders before they qualified) [IW31]. As this 
delayed the commencement of certain structural components/sub-routines, it 
turned structural complexities into dynamic complexities, which grew in 
significance through non-linear error growth (see sec.3.2.2). 
 
• Geological problems and civil works. Rushed commencement caused 
geotechnical problems for both Medupi and Kusile [IW4; IW11]: 
o Medupi – Upfront work to understand geological conditions was 
incomplete, “which lead to ‘over blasting’ during bulk excavation. 
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This caused damage to the bedrock, which in turn increased cost 
and delayed the completion of the civils” [IW11]. 
“Roshcon, an Eskom subsidiary, was doing the blasting” [IW11].  
“The actual slope of the bedrock was also discovered to be worse 
than expected after the construction of the boiler and turbine bases 
had commenced”[IW11] – to partly resolve this, the order of 
construction of the individual six units was reversed: Unit 6 was 
constructed first [IW4; IW11]. 
o Kusile – “The slope of the Kusile bedrock was even worse than at 
Medupi”. This required unplanned extensive piling – which 
significantly increasing civil work costs and creating meaningful 
delays [IW11]. 
 
• Boiler construction: the novelty of supercritical technology. As already 
discussed, super-critical technology was new to Eskom and Hitachi Power 
Africa; and when combined with South African coal, new to the two-individual 
project’s ‘owner engineers’: Black & Veitch and PB Power Africa. The 
engineering for super critical boilers is dramatically different to traditional sub-
critical boilers [IW24]. It became very clear during construction that Hitachi 
Power Africa, were not suitably qualified to deliver the boilers [IW11; IW24]: 
o “There were several high-level interventions required between 
Hitachi and Eskom, to get the boilers to requirement” [IW11]; 
o “Welding was sub-standard and required redoing, which then 
required post-weld heat treatment to relieve stress in the 
surrounding metal” [IW11]. Super-critical boilers run at 
significantly higher pressures, than sub-critical boilers, 
requiring a very different configuration [IW24]. 
 
Ingula, unlike Medupi and Kusile, was relatively strait forward, and non-complex. 
After Erwin received cabinet approval in 2005, it commenced quickly as its 
development had occurred under the Brownhook model, which permitted 10 years of 
planning [IW30]. The principal issue causing project failure, which could have been 
planned for, was a deficient interpretation of the South African ‘Health and Safety’ 
(H&S) law. Eskom had anticipated that H&S issues were the responsibility of the 
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contractor. However, the Ingula Project was deemed to be a ‘mine’ for issues of H&S, 
and as such the South African law made this issue very clearly to be the responsibility 
of the owner – Eskom – so any costs associated with delays caused by H&S issues, 
were Eskom’s too [IW31]. There was then “an incident that led to the death of 6 
people underground, which caused a 14-month delay” [IW31]. 
5.2.3 Rivalrous project goals: governance explanation three 
Rivalrous type governance failure occurs when a project’s actors start to have 
misaligned goals, if not opposed interests. The natural assumption from anyone not 
familiar with megaproject governance might be to assume that the development goal of 
any infrastructure project is always straightforward: to create usable and cost competitive 
electricity for the RSA electricity service network, in the context of this paper. On closer 
analysis, particularly when a ‘public’ institution such as a government sponsors the 
megaproject, this is often not the case. Principal stakeholders can often have differing 
priorities for the project; and at an agency level, evidence often suggests that certain 
actors are more interested in maximising their own value extraction, rather than 
supporting the efficiency of the project development. This has occurred with the first three 
case studies, but in different ways.  
South Africa, dating back to the apartheid era, practices a ‘Developmental State’ 
agenda: where the government dictates that its state-owned institutions operate in a 
manner consistent with its industrial policy [Bond, 2008]. This agenda prioritises skill 
development, employment outcomes and national strategic values, alongside the 
businesses principal modus operandi. Further, certain senior members of the ANC, such 
as Alec Erwin, regarded megaprojects as effective ways to achieve policy goals of ‘Black 
Empowerment’ and employment growth [Ibid].  
At the political stakeholder level, interviews [IW1; IW7; IW9; IW16; IW22], said 
that there were in effect three primary policy agendas surrounding Medupi and Kusile – 
and to a lesser extent, with Ingula. These three agendas were: to hastily add sizeable new 
electricity generation capacity to the South African Grid; to skill and knowledge train the 
next generation of engineers and managers of Eskom, to reflect the country’s 
demographics; and to create a Keynesian type economic pump prime event, for two 
economically weak regions of the country - Limpopo and Mpumalanga provinces.  
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To support the developmental state agenda, Eskom created in 2010 the Supplier 
Development and Localisation (SDL) department, whose function was to ensure that the 
benefits of the Eskom infrastructure developments, were shared with the localities they 
were situated within [WI16; WI24].  
The SDL’s mandate was “to achieve maximum and sustainable local development 
impact through leveraging Eskom’s procurement spend in a manner that allows 
flexibility within the business in order to accommodate government local 
development initiatives and policies” [Eskom 4]. It’s six priorities were to enable 
and/or increase: a) Local content;  b) Local content-local to site; c) Procurement 
from large black suppliers (LBS); d) Procurement from black women owned (BWO) 
suppliers e) Procurement from small black enterprises (SBE);  f) Skills development” 
[Eskom 5]. 
The creation of the SDL to ensure that Eskom’s major developments were consistent 
with certain major policy initiatives of the South African Central Government. These 
being: ASGISA, BBBEE, NIPF, IPAP, CSDP, NIPP, NGP/NDP44. The suggested cost 
to Medupi alone, was suggested to be R6bln [IW24] – and the existence of the SDL, is 
likely to have contributed to the creation of so many key work packages.  
At the agency level, a high-profile example of unaligned interests was the Unions 
prioritising the longevity of work over productivity. “Industrial stoppages were 
numerous, violent, and some substantial in length – one Kusile stoppage lasted eighteen-
month and the site offices have been burnt to the ground several times” [IW19]. A 
noteworthy problem identified, was that the unions did not differentiate between 
contactors, when it came to employment. When a termination for non-performance of a 
contactor occurred – and therefore the contactor’s employees lost their jobs – this became 
a project wide problem industrially, making it very difficult to manage poor performance 
of contractors (see sec.6.6). Contractors were equally happy to be paid for ‘standing time’, 
whilst waiting for other contractors to catch up with the official project schedule (due to 
any delays). Standing time and other value issues associated with third party delays were 
chargeable - increasing the value of their contract [IW19].  
 
44ASGISA = Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa; BBBEE = Broad Based Black 
Economic Empowerment; NIPF = National Industrial Policy Framework; IPAP = Industrial Policy Action 
Plan; CSDP = Competitive Supplier Development Programme; NIPP = The National Industrial 
Participation Programme; NGP/NDP = New Growth Path/ National Development Plan 
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With Ingula, industrial issues do not appear particularly problematic; instead, a 
capability asymmetry appears to have been the most significant factor. This permitted 
principal contractor’s claims, to be aggressive and expensive to the project.  
• “The principle contractor employed a full-time specialist agent, to press such 
claims” [IW31].  
• “The Eskom claims team were not as ‘experienced’ as the contractor’s; and the 
contracts were legally weak”, against Eskom [IW31]. 
5.3 Sere, Avon and Dedisa: the successful 
All three of the counterfactual projects were of a different scale (much smaller) and 
utilised different technologies to the problematic first group. The technologies used, were 
ones that delivered active competition between suppliers; had an ability to standardise 
and modularise equipment and processes, which reduced risk and complexity surrounding 
each project; and all were less challenging in terms of project capability requirements. 
All three projects had a principle contractor (as did Ingula) and all three projects were 
able to utilise a turnkey risk mitigation pricing strategy: that transferred risk from the 
client to the agent (contractor) [Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a:150].  
In response to the fieldwork’s second research question, the following were 
established. Accurate forecasts were used (within a planned margin of error); successful 
complexity reduction strategies were applied; and stakeholders and their agents had 
aligned objectives [IW10; IW12; IW14; IW20; IW21; IW25]. 
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6. Big is fragile 
“Theories of ‘big’ have advocated the proposition that ‘bigger is better’ since the 
mid-nineteenth century, drawing especially on notions of economies of scale and 
scope, natural monopoly, or pre-emptive capacity building [Ansar et al, 2017: 60 
– citing: Stigler, 1958; Silberston, 1972; Chandler, 1990; Mill, 1848; Mosca, 2008; 
Porter 1980].  
Recognising the above perception, before concluding this study, the literature is reviewed 
again to contrast the notions of  ‘big is better’ [Ansar & Flyvbjerg, 2016], against ‘big is 
fragile’ [Ansar et al., 2017]: for the pertinence of the latter over the former in the context 
of the RSA and SSA, where the pursuit of policy robustness is usually an observable 
policy desire. From this review, eight factors were identified that favour greater size 
causing fragility over robustness in this research context. Broad and deep complexity; a 
lack in depth of suitable capabilities; socio-political legacy’s impact on skills; neo-
patrimonialism through state capture; a lack of modularisation; substandard contractor 
lock-in; systemic asset fragility; difficulty for financing. 
6.1 Broad and deep complexity 
In Section 2.1, which defines a megaproject in SSA, it did not deal with sub-categories 
of megaprojects. This will now be briefly examined further, focusing on complexity in 
both depth and in breadth [Wang & von Tunzelmann, 2000].  
The perspective here asserts that a road megaproject is very different to a ‘super-
critical’ coal-fired electricity generation megaproject, even though both types of 
megaproject can have stakeholder complexity and substantial scale and value surrounding 
their development. This is because of what Wang & von Tunzelmann [2000] describe as 
complexity in breadth and depth: where breadth concerns “the degree of heterogeneity 
and depth with the level of sophistication” [Ibid: 806]. An electricity generation asset can 
be thought of as a large capital good: which is both a complex product and system 
[Hobday et al., 2000]. The construction of large capital goods involves complexity in their 
application of technology as well its number of integrated and dependent sub-systems. 
Hobday et al. [2000], describe these as complex products and systems (CoPS). 
CoPS projects are particularly vulnerable to non-linear error growth described in 
Section 2.2.2 and require broad engineering and project management capabilities for 
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successful delivery. Scale and scope are consequentially significant to successful 
execution of this type of megaproject: but the appropriate capabilities in the sub-Saharan 
region are not plentiful, as will now be discussed in Section 6.2. 
6.2 Lack in depth of suitable capabilities 
Project capabilities encapsulate contextually appropriate organisational factors that 
deliver project efficiency (reducing costs or adding value to project outcomes), whilst 
delivering that value to the project’s sponsor [Nightingale et al., 2015:223]. When 
overlaying the impact of complexity that arises from an increase in scale and scope 
(discussed throughout), it is implicit that as the scale of a project increases, successful 
delivery requires more project capability capacity. Further, it can also be deduced that 
due to the temporary nature of megaprojects, such capacity will deteriorate (or depart the 
country) if unused for any length of time.  
Due to the temporary nature of megaprojects and their sporadic use in the RSA and 
SSA generally; the use of scale to deliver infrastructure should be very cautiously 
embarked upon due to a specific lack of relevant capabilities [IW16; IW27]. An NPC45 
commissioner [IW27] mentioned this as a principle reason the NPC “does not recommend 
the use of megaprojects in the RSA” (to be fair, the creation of the NPC occurred after the 
commencement of Medupi and Kusile). 
6.3 Socio-political legacy’s impact on skills 
Building on Hirschman’s African observations discussed in Section 2.1 [Hirschman, 
1967], there is an unexplored issue thus far hindering skill transference in the RSA (and 
SSA generally). It is accepted that when the colonial powers divided Africa up in the 19th 
century, creating the 50 countries that now form the SSA region, they gave little thought 
to the socio-political structures that existed on the continent beforehand. Hirschman 
suggests that these socio-political structures still have significance in Africa when 
developing projects, as he identified that the socio-political dynamic could be very 
problematic to such development – and many of the fieldwork interviewees have 
concurred [IW1; IW3; IW4; IW7; IW11; IW16; IW18; IW19; IW22; IW23]. 
 
45 NPC – National Planning Commission, established in the RSA in 2010 
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This socio-political dynamic hinders skills transference on a couple of levels. Firstly, 
it makes sharing skills, through training, more difficult to attain, as training is best 
achieved within a tribal identity: which consequentially limits training capacity, 
particularly over rushed timeframes. Secondly, it makes it more difficult to transfer 
skilled personnel from ‘out-of-area’ tribal groups, to fill a capacity need elsewhere.  
As Medupi and Kusile are in two different tribal contexts: both skill development and 
skill transfer were always going to be difficult; and this is a problem that could and should 
have been anticipated [IW1; IW3; IW4; IW7; IW11; IW16; IW18; IW19; IW22; IW23]. 
Further, the larger a project becomes, the more difficult it becomes to find enough skilled 
personnel from the relevant tribal grouping: making the project more fragile, as the option 
of transferring people from elsewhere in the country or further locations, is not a effortless 
alternative.  
6.4 Neo-patrimonialism through state capture 
Neo-patrimonialism [Erdmann & Engel, 2006] through ‘state capture’ describes a 
category of financial appropriation, that can be observed throughout sub-Saharan Africa, 
and has recently had a high profile in the RSA (described in Section 4.2.3) [Godinho & 
Hermanus, 2018]. It depicts a political misuse that is systemic and utilises embedded 
networks of power and influence: where both public and private actors collude to co-opt 
the mechanisms of state for their own economic joint benefit [Godinho & Hermanus, 
2018; Madonsela, 2019]. This defrauds the normal social contract and the wider societal 
interests [Ibid]. The value appropriated is used to reward political supporters, to maintain 
control of the political authority that has been captured [Erdmann & Engel, 2006]. 
The vast procurement process surrounding megaprojects represent a useful setting to 
appropriate such value [Godinho & Hermanus, 2018]. As megaprojects involve 
considerable value and are atypical in the RSA and SSA, it should not be a surprise that 
they are vulnerable to pressures of neo-patrimonial behaviour, when they occur. The 
bigger the project,  the greater the value that can be misused, which is discussed in section 
5.2.3 of this chapter. 
6.5 Lack of modularisation 
According to Ansar & Flyvbjerg, [2016:36] “big is not scalable .... but modular is”. 
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Many of the interviewees suggested that the notion of ‘big is better’ described at the 
beginning of this section, was ensconced in both the upper echelons of Eskom and the 
RSA government during planning [IW3; IW13; IW16; IW18; IW23; IW24; IW29]. It is 
accepted that scale can give some types of economies to projects: such as through civil 
works construction, where volume discounts on orders can reduce unit prices (e.g. 
concrete); or replicating a proven design and processes in multiple locations 
(modulation), utilising the tacit knowledge created on the first project by reapplying it. 
However, the theory behind economies of scale was not meant to be applied to novel 
megaprojects or projects only built in tandem. It is true that with firms, increasing scale 
can be economical [Chandler, 1990], but a unique megaproject, does not have the features 
that Chandler is attributing this phenomena to.  
An ‘economy of scale’ exists where “producing two or more of something can be 
done at a lower cost than producing them separately {…} This principle is then 
applied to high fixed cost production, spreading the large cost over many units, 
delivering a low individual unit cost [Nightingale et al., 2015: 217 & 219].  
This value saving through volume concept, usually requires standardisation and 
repetition; as well as a high fixed cost proportionate to variable costs. As discussed in 
Section 5.2.2.1, Medupi and Kusile are of an atypical design and built in tandem, 
rendering standardisation and modulation difficult to achieve. It was believed by Eskom, 
that the separation of each plant into six separate generation units, would deliver 
modulation economies [IW24] – but the reality, as can be seen from the research data, 
has disappointed. However, modularisation was successfully used with the three smaller, 
counter-factual projects [IW21, IW25]. 
6.6 Substandard contractor ‘lock-in’ 
During the data collection, a question kept arising that demanded an answer: if Hitachi 
Power Africa (HPA) did not demonstrate the required capabilities to deliver supercritical 
boilers, why were they not removed as a supplier when that reality became evident? 
Interviewee IW24 offered the following in explanation for why not, which I paraphrase.  
The Eskom Board discussed with various General Managers whether to terminate 
Hitachi from the projects, when their lack of competency became evident, but 
decided against it. There were two principal reasons why IW24 believed the Board 
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persevered. It would be too expensive to remove them due to contractual 
termination costs; and secondly, the further costs of time required to get another 
contractor up to speed to then complete both Medupi and Kusile. IW24 understood 
that instead, Mitsubishi-Hitachi Power SA (as HPA later became) received 
incentive payments in March/April 2018 for the acceleration of deliverables, which 
were already very late. The logic behind the incentives was that all available 
penalties and LDs46 had already been imposed: so, Mitsubishi-Hitachi Power SA 
were in a serious cash-constrained position and pulling bonds/guarantees could 
have tipped them into total insolvency and liquidation. Rewarding bad behaviour 
was cheaper than penalising it. 
Even though the circumstances described are anecdotal, it does demonstrate a very clear 
problem for megaprojects that exist within a challenging development environment: such 
as the one just described, when there may be limited interest from commercial EPC47 
firms delivering large value complex project. A failing contractor may not be easy to 
replace, and greater damage and cost may be incurred, by doing so. This was also touched 
upon in Section 5.2.3 when the impact of labour issues reached beyond the removal of a 
failed contractor.  In less challenging environments, this may be managed by getting a 
turnkey contract, where the contractor manages the uncertainties and underwrites the risk; 
in SSA, these are less obtainable as the scale of a project increases, due to the perception 
of increased regional systemic risks (see Section 5.2.2.1) [Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a]. 
6.7 Systemic asset fragility 
Due to co-dependencies, a mistake or error within a complex system, will impact the 
entire system. Consequentially, such systems can only be as robust as their weakest parts: 
making them systemically vulnerable [Ansar & Flyvbjerg, 2016]. When compounding 
this reality with non-linear error growth, which is equally applicable after an asset is built 
as it is during construction: a single event  can destroy the viability of the entire asset, as 
witnessed by the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters. The larger the value of an asset that 
comes with scale, both the greater the potential loss from a single issue; and the greater 
 
46 LDs – Liquidation damages 
47 Engineering Procurement Construction 
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the difficulty to ensure a minimal level of quality throughout the entire asset, as an 
increase scale increases the number of potential catastrophic vulnerabilities.  
6.8 Difficulty for financing 
Dixit & Pindyck [1994], suggest that an investment can be defined as the act of 
incurring an immediate cost (the cost of the investment) in the expectation of future 
rewards (the investment return).  By unpacking this definition: an investment can be seen 
to contain two related but separate parts; and that investors will require a certainty of 
outcome for both an asset’s construction and performance once commissioned, before a 
commitment to finance can proceed  - investment evaluation is a fragile process [Gregory 
& Sovacool, 2019b:346]. 
Applying this investment perspective to a CoPS megaproject development in the RSA, 
suggests that such projects must be challenging to finance. Their long planning and 
construction horizons, their project specific complexity and problematic nature – acts as 
a repellent for investors, as this creates significant uncertainty to both parts of the 
investment process described above, which require certainty. Further, a CoPS 
megaproject’s proclivity for non-linear error growth when trying to correct any mistakes, 
just compounds investment paranoia. Implicitly, an increase in the scale and the scope-
novelty of electricity generation infrastructure will always disproportionally increase the 
level risk surrounding development cost and timelines in the mind of investors: 
destabilising the investment case [Gregory & Sovacool, 2019a]. 
7. Conclusion 
From the performance outcomes of the various electricity generation projects, derived 
from the evidence supplied by the fieldwork, it appears that the more substantial and 
unique that an electricity generation asset’s design embraces, the more problematic it will 
be to produce in a SSA context. Further, in the absence of appropriate engineering and 
project management capabilities, which is customary in the sub-Saharan region, cost 
overruns and completion delays are inevitable; in the case of megaprojects, financial 
collapse is likely to follow. Therefore, when developing electricity generation 
infrastructure in the SSA region, a measured approach to scale is a necessity, proven 
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designs are essential; if scale is desired, it must be achievable using modular and familiar 
technologies.  
Being specific to the three problematic case studies and the lessons they can teach 
policymakers.  The central problem for both Medupi and Kusile has been a poor 
appreciation of the issues of both complexity management and novelty; and how to avoid 
building it into a project’s execution process. It appears Eskom, and probably the RSA 
government as well, were overly confident in their abilities to deliver the scale and scope 
of the assets that they had proposed to construct. It can also be argued that they had no 
comprehension of how important it was, to reduce the complexity of the project and the 
novelty of technology issues when designing and organising the construction process of 
both projects. Some criticism probably should also fall on the World Bank here too, as it 
could have insisted on a standardised design, on a smaller scale, before agreeing to 
finance the construction of Medupi. Ingula appears less problematic, as the major 
construction was in effect underground civil works, the capabilities for which were widely 
available due to the country’s existing, experienced underground mining industry. 
As a final point of emphasis, when constructing a large complex project with multiple 
sub-systems (such as an electricity generation asset), it is necessary to focus on how to 
deliver this asset as specified, as simply and inexpensively as possible. The construction 
of such a class of asset is not an effective way of increasing the depth of capabilities in a 
country. Even if some capabilities are initially created or enhanced, unless those skills are 
continually employed by building more projects of a similar type, those skills will either 
leave the country or waste away.  
Policy ‘takeaways’ 
Projects are temporary organisational structures with an aspiration and purpose, which 
involve processes that take ideas and transform them into outcomes, whilst influencing 
the surrounding eco-system that they are positioned within [Nightingale et al., 2015:229]. 
Moving beyond the theory, however, for sub-Saharan Africa: projects are also expected 
to be key drivers for the successful delivery of economic development and a conduit for 
the diffusion of innovation within the region, as infrastructure development is essentially 
a diffusion of technology through projects. Although megaprojects are not yet common 
in SSA, this is likely to change sooner rather than later, due to the UNs projected 
population growth for the region. Therefore, the contextual knowledge of cause and effect 
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surrounding megaproject failure needs to be understood by all policymakers throughout 
the larger sub-Saharan territory. 
Applying this reality to SSA electricity network expansion, it follows that successful 
development depends on an understanding of how to execute such expansion as robustly 
as possible. To this end, the study makes the following recommendations to SSA 
policymakers and planners. First, be considered when specifying the level of scale for 
electricity generation project development, as big is fragile in any context and arguably 
more so in SSA.  Second, do not rush a project’s planning and pre-engineering, as it is a 
false economy. Rushed planning most likely will lead to disproportionate delays later 
(greater than the original time saved) and will result in considerably inflated project costs. 
Third, develop the depth of the country’s relevant project capabilities before embarking 
with complex projects, as such depth of knowledge and skill is necessary to help ensure 
successful project delivery. Finally, while recognising the dangers of homogenisation 
when discussing pan-regional solutions for SSA (as each of the region’s countries has its 
own unique socio-political contexts), it is reasonable to build understanding of common 
difficulties encountered in project and megaproject developments. 
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Chapter 6: 
Discussion & Conclusions 
As I touched on in my introduction to this thesis, there has been a major multilateral 
policy failure for over two decades, for resolving electricity poverty in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It has been my ambition behind this PhD’s research, to understand why this 
is occurring and to make a meaningful contribution towards its resolution.  
With this ambition in mind, this chapter will now explain why I believe the 
multilateral development community should persist with this development policy, 
despite its ongoing failure. I will then revisit and apply the structural problems that 
we identified in the sub-Saharan region from my second co-authored paper (chapter 
four), that make it difficult to attract private financing of electricity infrastructure in 
my research region. This will then be followed by my key findings that explain why 
the private sector themselves are not willing to invest, including clarifications about 
these findings and a short review of an analogy. Next, I carry out a policy discussion 
with recommendations. Finally, I will finish my thesis with some concluding 
remarks about why I have treated SSA as a homogenised entity in much of this 
thesis; and why I have not sourced any of my data regarding my research problem, 
from the investors themselves. 
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1. Why the multilateral development community needs 
to persevere with its policy for resolving electricity 
poverty in SSA 
Before explaining why this policy failure requires perseverance, rather than abandoning, 
I will first discuss in Section 1.1 why access to affordable and reliable electricity services 
is crucial for a country’s economic development. Although I touched on this in the 
introduction of my thesis (Chapter 1, Sections 1.2 & 1.3), that explanation was very 
narrow, and would benefit from some further theoretical support. Next, in Section 1.2, I 
then briefly analyse the problematic nature of the strongest alternative source of financing 
to private investors: The Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In Section 1.3, I briefly 
summarise the failures of another multilateral development policy that has relevance to 
electricity access in SSA, Official Development Assistance (ODA), which has lacked 
success over an even longer period of time. Only then, in Section 1.4, do I then summarise 
the two principle reasons to persevere. 
1.1 Why access to affordable and reliable electricity services is so 
important for economic convergence or catch-up for Africa. 
Access to affordable and reliable electricity is arguably the most important factor 
preventing meaningful economic growth in SSA. This is not to suggest that there are no 
other important factors that are holding back growth in the region, such as the existence 
of ‘functional states’ run by competent politicians and bureaucrats [Fukuyama, 2011]; or 
‘the supremacy of the rule of law’, which treats everyone as equal rather than favouring 
those that control the instruments of state [Ibid]; or the existence of ‘mechanisms of 
accountability’, which ensures that power is applied in the interest of society rather than 
specific interests [Ibid]; or that a nation’s institutions need to be inclusive and serve the 
interests of the majority of citizens, rather than exclusive, where they only represent the 
interests of the ruling elite [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012]. It is just  that even if these 
conditions are in place, there is still at least one further strong argument to suggest that 
the sub-Saharan region will not be able to fulfill its economic potential, until it has access 
to affordable and reliable electricity services. 
In the introduction of this thesis, I focussed on the importance of electricity as a 
General-Purpose Technology: when I briefly described how electricity is an important 
enabling variable for economic growth. Without discounting the relevance of that 
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theoretical explanation, I will now build on this attribute of electricity services, by 
focusing on how electricity access also has a legitimate and vital contribution for 
facilitating economic convergence, by explaining how it acts as a further social capability 
to the five identified by Moses Abramovitz [1986].  
Convergence theory suggests that over time the knowledge of what is economically 
successful, will both diffuse to all lesser industrialised countries, in a manner that permits 
those countries to utilise that knowledge to improve their own economic performance; 
and that the process of technology diffusion will be faster than the industrial leaders new 
technology creation [Fagerberg & Srholec, 2008]. The less industrialised country will 
achieve this by either: imitating, adopting (licencing), or receiving ‘best-practice’ 
technologies through foreign direct investment (FDI) [Ibid]. However, as convergence 
theory can regularly be observed as not occurring in practice, there must be other factors 
that are required, other than just knowledge [Ibid]. Moses Abramovitz [1986] identified 
five enabling social capabilities as the required factors [Ibid] – I am now advocating that 
access to affordable and accessible electricity, should also be added to this list of social 
capabilities (maybe just in SSA). 
Abramovitz’s original list of Social Capabilities [1986; 1994a; 1994b] included the 
following five factors. 1) Technical competence, the ability to use and understand 
technology: enabled through education of a country’s workforce. 2) Experience in the 
organisation and management of large-scale enterprises: which would include projects as 
well as institutions and corporations. 3) Honesty and trust must be a societal default: to 
avoid powerful interests monopolising the interest of the greater society, which would 
include a proficient legal system. 4) Access to financial institutions: for mobilising the 
necessary capital and investment, to pay for the necessary application of technology. 5) 
A stable and effective government: to create and uphold a supportive governance 
framework. To this list, I am advocating that there is a need to include access to affordable 
and reliable electricity services as a further factor required to enable economic 
convergence. I suspect that electricity services did not make Abramovitz’s original list, 
as he was focussing on different geographic areas that had greater levels of electricity  
access than SSA when he wrote on the subject. 
 Kim [1997] observes, using evidence from South Korea’s successful convergence, 
that the catch-up process for less industrialised countries is a reversal of the normal 
innovation process. Usually with a new technology, it progresses through a three staged 
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development trajectory: firstly the technology emerges, where the market engages with it 
and starts to integrate it; secondly, the technology then consolidates (which can require 
complimentary assets [Teece, 1986]), where the market experiments with the technology 
to appreciate how useful it is, and it diffuses throughout an economy as actors embrace 
it; thirdly, it then matures, as it settles into the economic landscape and becomes a 
standard, familiar and an assimilated technology [Ibid]. When a country is catching-up 
however, and adopting existing technologies from industrialised contexts, there is already 
a proven path dependent trajectory for that technologies adoption: as the technology is 
already understood and appreciated in its original industrialised context. Consequentially, 
as industrialised economies are ecosystems where access to affordable and reliable 
electricity is an accepted reality – their technologies can also be assumed to require an 
access to electricity too for their efficient diffusion. For a country to successfully 
assimilate any types of innovation, that country will therefore require access to affordable 
and reliable electricity.  
1.2 Financing  from the PRC 
Financing from the PRC can be regarded as fulfilling a similar function to that of  other 
forms of private financing of infrastructure. It is an enabling variable for building 
infrastructure which occurs because the sponsor of the investment is expecting a future 
reward in return for their financial input (see Chapter 2) [Cheung et al., 2018; Donou-
Adonsou & Lim, 2018]. Where it differs from other forms of overseas sourced private 
investment, is that it utilises a different type business model. A business model that 
monetises some of the externality benefits that are available from such types of 
investment, which are not perceived to be valuable to a typical overseas private investor.  
‘Greater China’ acts as the sponsor (which can be viewed as a combined investment 
system), who is prepared to monetise the strategic externality values that investment in 
Africa offers as a whole (such as access to commodities and geo-political influence). 
Further, the country also coordinates their lending as part of a larger EPC package, which 
focuses on capturing the engineering, procurement and construction value for China (both 
technology and labour) that arises from any investment [Donou-Adonsou & Lim, 2018; 
French, 2024]. The country is creating economic output for themselves, by recycling their 
excess capital, which currently would create little return if it were invested in a traditional 
manner such as US bonds [Donou-Adonsou & Lim, 2018; French, 2024]. 
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The commencement of the recent trend of Chinese investment in Africa, can arguably 
be traced back to the visit of the Chinese president  Jiang Zemin in 1996 [Alden, 2005; 
Donou-Adonsou & Lim, 2018], which can be seen as a very early act of China’s ‘Step-
out Policy’, which became formalised in 2000. His visit came just two years after China 
had created two policy banks, The China Exim Bank and The Chinese Development 
Bank, whose creation was designed to act as a vector for advancing Chinese overseas 
investment and development [Gu & Carey, 2019]. Both banks report directly to the State 
Council (the effective cabinet of the PRC), and are financed by ad-hoc capital injections 
from the national budget: which provides policy flexibility [Ibid]. Their principle function 
is to act as lenders of first resort for infrastructure and other development, in regions of 
strategic interest to China. The Chinese strategic goal is to provide integrated investment 
packages in coordination with the country’s construction industry, designed to cut time 
frames and work with deficient management capabilities of recipients (types of risk 
reduction measures as discussed in Chapter 3) [Ibid]. 
China’s engagement with Africa has been further reinforced 2013, by President Xi 
Jinping’s new Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The vision behind the BRI, is to use the 
growing Chinese economic muscle, substantial surplus capital, proven engineering and 
project management capacities: to become a transformative actor and secure strategic 
benefit and influence [French, 2015; Gu & Carey, 2019] – a formalising of the earlier 
described approach. China had surpassed Japan in the second quarter of 2010, to become 
the second largest global economy [Bloomberg 2]; and was starting to project the 
influence and the status that comes with such economic significance. 
According to Howard French’s book ‘China’s Second Continent’ [2014] however, this 
engagement is becoming problematic for its recipients. Firstly, its strategy has utilised 
substantial Chinese migration into the region (over a million Chinese nationals now live 
in SSA), the assimilation and engagement of which is causing many problems, as most 
of these migrants appear uninterested in the local African cultures. Secondly, the 
African’s believe that the Chinese do not employ the local African people; and if their 
businesses do, they pay significantly less than they would to Chinese expatriates. Thirdly, 
there is a feeling of déjà vu amongst the recipient populations, as both resources and 
profits do not remain in the region but are expatriated back to China for the benefit of that 
country’s economy. Fourthly, corruption and backroom deals with ruling elites, only 
permits a minimal trickle-down effect to the country’s disadvantaged populations.  
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Even allowing for a level of contestability in French’s described perspective, and 
proportionally discounting his narrative, it still suggests an exploitive policy, where an 
inclusive one would be a preferable form of engagement. 
1.3 Financing through ODA 
As I alluded to in my introduction to my first co-published paper in chapter 3, Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) has existed since at least the early 1970s: when it was 
devised and named in 1969, and then finalised in 197248 [oecd.org]. ODA has also failed 
as a policy to resolve African electricity poverty and represents a public sector policy 
narrative that has been in existence for almost 50 years. Accepting that it is a general 
global development policy for all developing economies, I draw attention to it, hoping 
that its longer duration as an unsuccessful public sector approach, will make my defence 
of a privately sourced one a little easier ‘in the eyes of’ those less ideologically supportive 
of such narratives.  
1.4 The two principal reasons for persevering with the current policy 
Firstly, I believe that the policy of promoting the private financing of electricity 
infrastructure development in SSA needs persevering with, as there is no realistic 
alternative for resolving my research problem in that region. I have already explained that 
a public sector approach, in the form of ODA, has failed despite a far longer history. More 
significantly however, is that for the level of funding required for the adequate 
electrification in SSA, only the private sector can deliver that level of resource – 
referencing again, the following evidence from the IEA: 
“The amount of investment needed for the provision of electricity in sub-
Saharan Africa is substantial and well above the level of the current flows of 
capital into the region’s power sector. Reaching full access by 2030 and 
maintaining it to 2040 would require multiplying current investment levels by 
five. The cumulative investment in this case would reach more than $2 trillion 
between 2019 and 2040” [IEA, 2019:141]. 
So, policy agents need to consider where else might $2 trillion be sourced from, in a 
politically acceptable way for all the DAC country’s electorates? This is a legitimate 
notion, as there has been a failure of the DAC members to contribute .7% of their 
 
48 By the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD 
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GDP as ODA: an agreed strategy for ODA dating back to when the policy was 
designed – with the USA being the most notable transgressor [oecd.org].  
Secondly, any policy consensus required between many stakeholders who have different 
‘masters’ (which is what the multilateral development community represents), are always 
the most complex to reach a consensus between [Howlett et al, 2009]. It will either be 
very difficult to achieve an agreement over what the replacement policy should be; or an 
attempted reform of the policy to deliver a different outcome, will be vulnerable to the 
inefficiencies caused by either layering or drift [Ibid:204]. Layering being where a new 
policy priority is overlaid on the previous one(s), rather than removing and replacing the 
original policy aims; drift is where a policy’s aim(s) is redefined with no redefining of 
the tools to achieve them. 
As will be observed later in this chapter, I will instead be discussing forms of policy 
conversion: where I examine possible reforms of the tools and inputs of the policy 
process, but not the policy goals [Ibid] 
2. Structural factors, working against the policy 
In my second co-published paper’s discussion section (chapter 4, sec.6), we synthesized 
15 structural factors that require appreciation by policy actors as currently preventing 
private investment in SSA electricity infrastructure – the key thrust of the multilateral 
policy I am now defending. Before moving onto my key findings of my thesis in my next 
section therefore, which will focus on the perspective of private investors, I will revisit 
and explain how these structural factors have relevance to my key findings and policy 
recommendations. 
1. Insufficient local banking capabilities. In most SSA countries, the domestic banking 
systems are unable to finance any significant value of electricity infrastructure 
projects, even at a household level.  
The stressing of this structural factor represents an implied call for the policy 
community to embrace international private investment, as a legitimate part of a 
solution to resolving SSA electricity poverty (as I believe many are reluctant to do). 
Foreign (out of region) investor involvement shouldn’t just be criticised as being 
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exploitive; instead, it should be recognised as a legitimate and necessary part of a 
solution, that requires careful management to ensure maximum positive impact. 
2. Exchange rate convertibility: the inability to repatriate the principal investment and 
the investment's returns, into the foreign investor's original currency – usually 
attributable to either exchange controls or insufficient African currency liquidity. 
This structural factor is analysed in detail in my key finding VII, in the next section.  
3. Uncommercial tariff regulation: electricity tariffs are not permitted to be 
commercially reflective of their cost of the investment. 
Private financing can potentially only occur using project financing, which relies on 
the creation of bankable cashflows (findings IV). This is only possible to create, if a 
predetermined tariff that is commercially reflective. A continuance of setting 
uncommercial reflective tariffs, will assure further policy difficulties. 
4. Inadequate law and order structures. In many SSA countries, the institutions of legal 
enforcement do not prevent theft of various forms of value from an investment, as 
there is no effective recourse, or they represent the actual perpetrators. 
Anything that removes any anticipated value of an investment, is troublesome to the 
ability to attract it in the first place. This is reflective of the ‘hold-up problem, which 
is explained in my finding V, as market failure two. 
5. Uncertain security of the physical asset. When there is a notable probability that the 
value of the investment will be diminished or destroyed by an independent third 
party’s action, such as theft, vandalism, or terrorism. 
Ditto – structural factor 4.  
6. Uncertain revenue security of the asset. When there is a notable probability that an 
unrelated third party will unexpectedly misappropriate the anticipated revenues (or a 
percentage of them) from the investment. 
Ditto – structural factors 4 & 5.  
7. Unearned equity dilution. When there is a requirement to allocate significant 
percentage of ownership (equity) of an investment, in return for nothing other than a 
permission to proceed.  
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This structural factor does not remove value unexpectedly, but it does make the maths 
behind an investment, less compelling – adding to investment inertia described in my 
key finding I.  
8. Rent-seeking: the attempt to appropriate excess value or ‘rent’ from an investment 
where such rent value does not exist, by non-related beneficiaries of the investment. 
Ditto – structural factors 4, 5 & 6. 
9. Corruption by officials: the abuse of a power asymmetry, in return for non-obligatory 
financial gain. 
Ditto – Structural factors 4, 5, 6 & 8 
10. Patrimonialism: the transference of value to an unrelated party (an insider) to 
support a political patronage system. 
This is a very similar point to my structural factor 7, as are its impacts. 
11. Reallocation of the ownership of a project: a project's ownership can unexpectedly 
be removed and reallocated to an unrelated party (usually between the planning and 
construction phases). This means an instant loss on all preparation costs up to that 
point by an investor. 
Like structural factor four, this is again a form of hold-up problem, which is explained 
in my finding V, as market failure two. 
12. Path dependency and regime resistance: the government or the monopolist utility are 
locked into a technology paradigm, which makes them hostile to change. 
This concerns my key finding VI. If the electricity service delivery system is not 
operating efficiently, it is likely to suffer from diseconomies of scale: as it will likely 
be charging less for its electricity sold, than it costs to produce and deliver it. 
13. Insufficient working capital: there is insufficient working capital available within the 
utility, to support, operate and maintain the technological system at efficient levels. 
Ditto – structural factor 12. 
14. A lack of complementary assets: the supplementary assets or capabilities that are 
required to allow the primary asset to operate optimally are not available. 
Ditto – structural factors 12 & 13. 
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15. Deficient technological tacit knowledge and skills. The successful diffusion of 
different electricity technologies are impeded by a shortfall of institutional and 
individual’s technology-orientated capabilities. 
This primarily influences three of my key findings: findings III, IV and VI – but I 
could equally argue that this structural factor is much broader and touches all my 
findings to some degree. 
3. My key findings 
Reflecting my list of fifteen structural factors and other conclusions that can be 
drawn from my research, the following are my eight principle findings that explain 
what is deterring private investors from financing large-scale electricity network 
infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa.  
3.1 Results: 
I. There is no singular reason for explaining a lack of enthusiasm by private 
investors: instead, the reasons are multiplicitous and mirror some of the 
principles of inertia. (Chapter three, sec.4.&.5) 
There is no single explanation for why private investors are not investing in SSA 
electricity infrastructure, other than all the identifiable variables are forms of 
investment risk. These risks are difficult to quantify, mitigate or manage in my 
research context: and they display cumulative characteristics that lead to a type of 
inertia. The more the risks accumulate, the more investment inertia builds to 
undermine the likelihood of investment success: until it reaches a tipping-point, 
where all investment interest disappears.  
II. The ability to finance privately the development of electricity infrastructure in 
SSA is a dependent variable. (Chapter one, sec.2.4 - chapter three, sec.4.&.5) 
I believe I have confirmed my hypothesis: that the ability to finance electricity 
infrastructure development privately in SSA is a dependent variable, which is 
influenced by many independent variables or risks. However, these risks surround 
two different facets to my original hypothesis: firstly, they control how much the 
infrastructure will cost to build, which is difficult to predict and expensive when 
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it goes wrong. Secondly, they determine how reliably an investor can receive their 
investment rewards and the return of their initial cost: their reasons for investing.  
III. It is difficult to predetermine the full cost of constructing electricity 
infrastructure, within an acceptable value range – particularly when the scale 
and scope of an infrastructure project increases substantially.  
The ability to know the full cost of an investment is crucial to determining whether to 
proceed with that investment (as a private investor). Referring back to my conceptual 
framework explained in chapter two, section 4 (and reiterated in chapter four, sec.2.2) 
– a decision to invest has two parts: an initial cost is incurred; and a level of reward for 
investing is expected, in response to that initial cost (which must increase if the cost 
increases). Therefore, understanding exactly how much it will cost to construct an 
asset, so that it properly functions to enable it to make the returns anticipated by an 
investor, is an absolutely priority for the investor. 
In SSA, much of this cost uncertainty is due to issues surrounding capabilities and 
policy decisions: which makes it difficult to quantify the full cost of planning a project, 
and then constructing it on budget (chapter three & four). This uncertainty is then likely 
to dramatically increase as the scale of the proposed infrastructure is increased: as a 
linear increase in scale and scope, exponentially increases the development complexity 
– and is therefore likely to increase any costs in an accelerating manner (Chapter five, 
Section 2.2 & 6). 
IV. It is very difficult to create pre-determined, reliable, and long-durational 
cashflows, which can match the duration of the infrastructure investment. 
(Chapter 1, sec.6 & Chapter 4, sec.4&5) 
The standard method the private sector uses to finance infrastructure, is termed project 
financing – where a project's cash flows are pre-determined and then protected or 
guaranteed in some way: allowing the cashflow to be attributed a net present value or 
NPV. Finance is advanceable against this NPV figure. The longer the duration, the 
greater the value created. Such a cashflow in this context is derived from an electricity 
offtake agreement49: known as a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). 
 
49 Electricity Offtake Agreements: an agreement to purchase a set amount of electricity for a pre-agreed price and 
length of time. This permits a definable value of cashflow to be created (an NPV), which can be invested against (it 
represents a form of risk management, through risk transference). 
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Actions of the inefficient and dysfunctional utility and/or associated government 
institutions within SSA, such as regulators or relevant government ministries, usually 
impede the formation of the acceptable cashflows required to create bankable PPAs. 
The market-breakdowns 
The balance of my findings now consists of what I am identifying as several types of 
market-breakdowns. I am using this idiom to describe two types of problem: firstly, 
circumstances where the natural stabilisers prescribed to market forces, do not appear to 
function; secondly, techniques that are available in a OECD context are for various 
reasons not available in SSA. I am not using the more traditional term of market-failures, 
as some of these factors are outside the tight academic use of this term by economists. 
V. Traditional financing risk mitigation techniques are problematical in SSA: due 
to several different types of market-breakdowns. (Chapter 2, sec.1) 
I have initially grouped some of my identified market-breakdowns, as my first four 
describe how some of the standard risk management techniques that can be applied 
within an OECD context, are difficult to use in SSA – which in turn prevent investment 
opportunities from qualifying as bankable, eliminating investor interest. 
▪ Market-breakdown one. The adverse selection problem: the existence of 
knowledge asymmetries between investors and possible investment recipients. 
(Chapter 2, sec.1; Chapter 6, sec.3) 
Adverse selection problems occur, as the recipient of the value of an investment (or 
insider) is better informed about the risk dynamics surrounding the investment than the 
potential investor (or outsider) – their perceptions of value and risks surrounding the 
opportunity are different [Deb et al, 2011]. This asymmetry undermines an investor’s 
ability evaluate an investment’s risk and causes potential investors to be overcautious 
in their risk assessment (their risk weighting valuation, discounts too much value): this 
is The Lemons Problem [Akerlof, 1970]. This problem makes it harder to attribute 
greater value to what are the better projects ex-ante, which discourages their creation, 
thereby reducing the perceived quality of all of that class of project. 
Page 149 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Traditionally, the entity seeking investment might offer warranties: but these need to 
be believable and enforceable. In an OECD context, reliable and independent credit 
ratings agencies supply knowledge surrounding ‘reputation and creditworthiness’ to 
manage The Adverse Selection Problem (see sec.2.3 of this chapter). However, the 
three recognised credit ratings agencies (Standard & Poor’s Investor Services, 
Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch Ratings) do not offer this kind of knowledge 
analysis surrounding SSA infrastructure. They are private organisations, whose 
business models are decided by commercial imperatives [Deb et al, 2011]: and this 
represents a profile of opportunity that is disinteresting to them currently50.  
▪ Market-breakdown two. Hold-up problems: a consequence of the permanence 
and illiquidity of infrastructure. (Chapter 2, sec.4.2) 
Infrastructure investment represents a sunken cost once it commences; or to use a 
different positional explanation: it is irreversible once it has occurred. Due to this 
dynamic, private investors are vulnerable to ex-post exploitation or interference, 
making investors hesitant to commence with such types of investment until they can 
be sure that the asset will perform as expected (cost and revenue), and this hesitancy is 
compounded further by the long investment timeframes that the maths behind 
infrastructure investment demands. This is a type of Hold-up problem, as described in 
‘Game Theory’: and represents a form of market-breakdown [Ellingsen & 
Johannesson, 2004]. 
▪ Market-breakdown three. An inability to mitigate the risk of initial value loss, 
through the conduit of surety. (see Chapter 2 sec.4.3) 
The traditional methods investors normally use to protect the value of their initial 
investment, which involves a concept of surety51, are not easily useable in SSA. These 
traditional value protection techniques are as follows: 
➢ Asset backed lending: where the value of an alternative asset is offered as surety. 
This is not available, as there are too few assets representing an acceptable 
transferable value in the region, to act as surety. 
 
50 Discussion with an employee of Standard and Poor’s at a conference 
51 Surety: in this context, is where something valuable that is not money, is offered by an investment 
recipient (the insider) to an investor (the outsider), to help assure the value of the initial investment is 
secure and returnable. 
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➢ Balance sheet lending: where another entity guarantees the value or acts as surety. 
This is not available as there too few entities with acceptable balance sheets in the 
region, including governments, which are acceptable to act as surety. 
➢ Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs): this is where a necessary surety value is 
created through an NPV calculation applied to the proposed investment’s offtake 
(electricity sold). There are too few credit-worthy electricity offtake agreements 
available, to permit successful project financing (see footnote 49). 
▪ Market-breakdown four. Insufficient contextual capabilities are available for 
the efficient development of new electricity infrastructure. (Chapter 4, sec.5) 
Capabilities in this context describes, having the ability, knowledge, skill, or the 
qualities that are necessary to build electricity infrastructure: both organisationally and 
technically; and possessed both by individuals and institutions. 
 
Traditionally, such institutional and individual capabilities are developed within firms 
[Bell & Pavitt, 1993; Scott-Kemmis & Bell, 2010], but throughout SSA there is not a 
sufficiently well-established industrial base, to develop a ‘local’ depth of capability that 
is required in the region to efficiently develop infrastructure of any form. Further, 
companies do not have the resource to finance the development of such skills, or the 
required frequency of work to perfect them to suitable levels – to turn codified 
knowledge into tacit knowledge. (See Chapter 5). Finally, these skills (which once 
created, are usually possessed by individuals) are then vulnerable to disappear with the 
person, as such a skilled employee in the region will be in significant demand.  
VI. Dis-economies of scale: as electricity output capacity increases, so do the 
inefficiencies of operation and losses. (Chapter 4, sec.5) 
The dysfunctionality of most of the region’s electricity delivery systems (the utilities 
and surrounding government institutions), triggered by the complexity associated with 
such systems, results in them operating at a loss. Under these circumstances, despite 
having the highest tariffs in the world for electricity (adjusting for subsidies) [Blimpo 
& Cosgrove-Davies, 2019], expanding electricity access increases the losses of the 
electricity delivery system – and would force a utility into bankruptcy if not subsidised. 
  
The domestic politics of the countries concerned make it difficult to differentiate 
aspects of regulation within the nation’s system, such as tariffs; or improve its 
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efficiency of operation, due to alternative political agendas. This represents a type of 
market-breakdown. 
VII. It is very difficult to appropriate investment returns into an investor’s original 
currency. (Chapter 4, sec.3.5) 
In SSA, all currencies are termed ‘soft’ (excluding SA), meaning they are illiquid and 
not easily exchangeable in large value transactions. This creates a significant inability 
to repatriate the immediate cost of an investment and any investment return, back into 
the original currency of an overseas investor. The inability to repatriate funds by an 
investor is the ultimate barrier to investment: as this removes both the ‘future rewards’ 
of an investment as well as destroying the ‘initial value’ – the whole raison d’etre 
behind an investment. This is particularly problematic with long-duration investments 
typical of infrastructure, as this maximises the risks surrounding policy uncertainty and 
any changes in global investment sentiment. 
Currency markets do not function systematically but are instead social constructs, 
which are market based and order driven. They require large numbers of both buyers 
and sellers to meet and trade, to permit them to function efficiently [Froot & Stein, 
1991]. Systems to help create further efficiencies are employable – but without 
sufficient originating orders in the form of the buyers and sellers, they cannot function 
as required by investors. 
As most SSA countries have semi-industrial or agrarian based economies, they have 
not integrated sufficiently with international trade. Therefore, there is insufficient 
liquidity to create efficient exchange-rate markets. This represents a type of market-
breakdown. 
VIII. It is very difficult for a private investor to monetise the value of the externality 
spillover benefits associated with electricity infrastructure, valuable as they are 
– and this includes receiving subvention support. (Chapter 2, sec.4.6) 
I covered in some detail in my introduction, many of the externality spillover benefits 
deliverable by access to affordable and reliable electricity services – these being the 
greater benefits to a society and economy, outside the normal linear economic 
relationship of generating and selling electricity for a profit. Such benefits present a 
substantial value to both the recipient country and the greater world society.  
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These spillover benefits, substantial as they are, are also very difficult to appropriate, 
or internalise (as economists describe it). Externalities as both costs and benefits are 
shared ‘by many’, but usually produced by ‘the few’. It is therefore difficult in my 
research context, to compensate a private sector entity for the value of the benefit of 
the externality, as it is difficult to quantify and legitimise such a form of compensation 
to those who ultimately transfer the value – in my research context, this is likely to be 
taxpayers in the form of aid. This represents a type of market-breakdown and a policy-
breakdown. 
3.2 Clarifications surrounding my results 
On their own, none of my key findings is likely to preclude private sector investment, 
particularly for investors who regard themselves as having African contextual knowledge 
and expertise. Nevertheless, in combination, they represent cumulative factors that then 
create investment inertia, making an investment proposition ultimately non-bankable. I 
also recognise that none of my individual findings is unique in their character, as they are 
all recognisable in other contexts (often with a descriptive label). What I believe is novel 
however, is how I have collated them as representing a more suitable explanation for the 
existence of electricity poverty in SSA; and identifying them as being cumulative and 
displaying the characteristics of inertia, which create a tipping-point in my research 
setting – that when reached, terminates investor interest.  
Despite using a governance lens for my analysis, not all my findings are 
necessarily governance related, notwithstanding having identified them all just using 
such a lens. My findings related to capabilities, may also be too narrow. I suspect 
however, that if I had had the capacity to apply capabilities as a supplementary lens, 
through asking further research questions with a capability focus in my data 
collection, I would have further clarified my structural factors that have fed into my 
key findings, rather than increase the number of key findings in themselves.  Most 
of my capability findings arose out of my data analysis for my third paper, which 
made up my Chapter 5 of this dissertation. I will revisit capabilities, in my policy 
discussion in section four. 
Different types of knowledge deficiency is a continual theme throughout my findings 
(and my thesis generally). Moreover, this knowledge deficiency is not just apparent in 
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any particular governance stakeholder group (as identified in chapter 4), but it is 
multiplicitous. Every stakeholder group within the governance system embraced in my 
second paper, has important knowledge deficiencies that are leading to my research’s 
identified policy failure. Moreover, each of the stakeholder groups have a different basis 
for their deficiency – and most importantly, do not appear to prioritise any corrective 
responses. It also appears to represent a collective action problem [Booth, 2012], another 
market-breakdown, as individual interests attempt to benefit through the knowledge 
asymmetry to the detriment of the greater system’s mutual interest of cooperation. 
Finally, the second half of my findings surround several market-breakdowns: 
many of which exist because of the semi-industrial (or agrarian focused) structure of most 
of SSA economies, discussed in my working assumptions at the beginning of my second 
chapter. This economic reality prevents the natural stabilisers of market forces, from 
functioning. This does have a benefit however, as I can make better informed policy 
recommendations derived from other contexts, where these types of market-breakdowns 
have already been found to exist. Because such parallels exist with my research context, 
this has led me in the next section to examine one historical similarity in particular – 
surrounding the history of Credit Ratings Agencies (CRA). Regarding other precedents, 
I will analyse these in my policy discussion (sec.4). 
3.3 The history of the Credit Rating Agencies: can we learn anything? 
As I discussed in both my introduction to this thesis, and within my fifth key finding, 
the existence of the CRAs have an ongoing relevance to my thesis subject and research 
problem. I will now argue, by summarising their history and their function, that their 
reason for being also shares several parallels to my research topic and problem. 
The ratings agencies came into existence to resolve a very similar problem to one of 
my research findings: the existence and resolution of asymmetric knowledge. The CRAs 
arose to assist dispersed investors in monitoring the risks behind a class of assets (in their 
case, debt instruments). They evolved to help reduce information asymmetries between 
investors and borrowers, by removing (or at least reducing) the adverse selection problem 
that exists between debt issuers and possible investors [Deb et al, 2011].   Over time, the 
CRAs function has broadened, to assume a form of certification role over the credit 
quality of the entities they rate.  
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What a credit certification represents 
A credit rating is an ordinal ranking, of an entity’s credit quality, ascribed by a CRA 
based on informed and fundamental analysis. It represents a pooling or amalgamation of 
knowledge and cost – to allow a diffusion of knowledge, where it would not commercially 
occur otherwise: by creating economies of scale. A CRA’s ratings, are also forward 
looking and subjective, reflecting a range of qualitative and quantitative indicators. 
Ratings are also typically set over the business cycle, where data is statistically averaged. 
Finally, they are independent, neutral, and objective assessments: without bias towards 
any stakeholder, which it represents value to [Ibid: 4]. 
What benefits are derived from such certification 
Certification removes, or at least reduces knowledge asymmetries and improves the 
agency of both investor and the receiving entity. Furthermore, they encourage investors 
to participate, where their lack of knowledge would normally deter them from doing so. 
They do this by creating more efficient investment markets: from an investor’s 
perspective, risk is more easily assessed, priced, and charged; alternatively, from the 
recipient’s perspective, the better the investment proposal formulation, the cheaper will 
be its funding.  
Most importantly, CRAs are neutral. This reduces any participant-induced frictions, 
encouraging better behaviour. It encourages issuers to be more forthcoming, so their 
proposals stand out within the greater investment landscape and are therefore more likely 
to succeed. The credit rating signalling (the positive or negative outlooks) also encourage 
better behaviour from issuers, for fear of penalties and reduced funding in the future. In 
conclusion, certification overall improves the depth of capabilities, creates acceptable 
transparent standards. It also expands investment and creates investment momentum 
[Ibid]. 
4. Policy discussion  
My policy discussion is now going to focus on responding to the last six of my key 
findings, as my first two were only observations of descriptive features, surrounding my 
research problem – rather than consequential findings, which are modifiable by a change 
in the policy framework.   
Page 155 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
4.1 Reducing Scale and scope  
As I explained in Chapter 5, Section 6: contrary to the normalised belief that ‘big is better’ 
when developing electricity generation infrastructure in SSA; instead, an increase in both 
the scale and scope increases the fragility of such a class of development in at least eight 
ways.  
1. Broad and deep complexity. Large electricity generation development projects are 
multi-dimensional in their complexity, as they are both complex products and 
systems. If you increase either their scale or scope, they become more complex in 
both dimensions: therefore, exponentially more problematic to build on time and 
budget.  
2. A lack of capabilities. When either scale and/or scope is increased in an environment 
that lacks the relevant skills and knowledge (capabilities), it increases the likelihood 
that the workforce building it will not be suitably skilled to deliver the project. It will 
also be more difficult to hire in the extra capability required, to handle the complexity, 
after the project has commenced and the need to avoid delays might be urgent.  
3. Socio-political legacies. The skill and knowledge deficit just described, is 
compounded in SAA by socio-political legacies. Members of one tribal group are 
often reluctant to work effectively with members of other tribes, which compounds 
the difficulty of either hiring capable staff or training them.   
4. Neo-patrimonialism though state capture. An increase in both scale and scope 
intensify both the desire to capture value to support neo-patrimonial tendencies from 
the political elites that wish to stay in power. This is problematic in two ways: firstly, 
it increases the negative consequences if such appropriation occurs: as resources will 
be diverted away from the reasons they were allocated to the project in the first place, 
creating problems. Secondly, non-linear error growth will create ever more problems 
when trying to compensate for the original mis-appropriation. Those mis-
appropriating funds have either no concept of the problems that they create, or do not 
care. 
5. Modularisation helps to manage the complexity that comes with both scale and 
scope; and should be sought as a design priority.  
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6. Substandard lock-in. As was clearly demonstrated in Chapter 5, the more complex 
a project becomes, the more costly it becomes to replace a sub-standard contractor. 
In SSA, projects scale and scope should be restricted to a level that permit contractors 
to underwrite the value of their work through a commitment to ‘turn-key’ contracts.  
As an undiscussed consequence, that is perhaps worthy of further research, scale and 
scope increases the need to employ overseas contractors and personnel -  which perhaps 
would be in contradiction of the political priorities of the citizens of the country. 
7. Systemic asset fragility. Due to co-dependencies in complex projects, assets once 
built are only as robust as their weakest point. Increasing the scale and scope, 
increases the likelihood of catastrophic failure, as they both create more potential 
points of weakness within the system. 
8. Difficulty for financing. Any asset that is designed to be more problematic, by 
increasing its scale and scope, will also be more difficult to finance. 
As robustness is usually a policy priority amongst policy makers in the region: scale and 
scope need to be reduced when formulating policy surrounding infrastructure projects. 
Further, technologies that are granular and repeatable: whose scale can be increased 
predictably and with transparency, should be encouraged. Wind and solar renewable 
technologies represent such suitable types of technologies.  
4.2 Support the creation of long durational cashflows 
This is the reason I embarked on this PhD: I was aware how difficult it is to create 
long dated cashflows in SSA, which can be repatriated into an original currency of an 
overseas investor. This is further complicated, as the cash-flow must be a suitable duration 
for permitting the mechanism of project financing to work (usually more than 20 years). 
Therefore, my key finding IV supports my previously held intuition. 
I need to add to this however, building on my key finding VII. When unpacking this 
problem into its constituent elements, it becomes possible to appreciate that this is not 
just a hindrance associated directly to a utility’s (or their relevant government’s) credit 
worthiness or functionality. Instead, it is relatable to the systemic semi-industrial 
character of most sub-Saharan country’s economies, where their lack of integration with 
the global-trading system and its markets, prevents a liquid and functioning exchange-
rate system from developing. 
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Currently, the only kind of industry in SSA (outside the RSA) that can rely on a 
reliable hard currency cash-flows, are those industries exporting primary commodities, 
which deliver a revenue stream in US$: oil from Angola or Nigeria; diamonds from 
Botswana; cocoa from Ghana would be good illustrations. For international investors: 
electricity for domestic consumption that receives its revenues in an African based 
currency, are problematic as an investment proposition. 
It may be possible to create new business models, which utilise agriculture to deliver 
hard currency cash flows. However, agriculture relies on land to farm, which could leave 
current subsistence farmers dispossessed of their livelihoods. Any solution that was to 
utilise agriculture to create cash flows, must also be able to compensate the population 
that would lose out from any land dispossession. I will revisit this issue in my section 5, 
as it represents a motivation for my new policy perspective for Africa. 
4.3 Create and expand risk management tools 
As I mentioned in my discussion surrounding my key findings (sec.3.2), the advantage 
of recognising previously identified market-breakdowns from other contexts in my 
research setting, is that I can potentially transfer their solutions from those contexts too. 
Such solutions are now the basis for the following discussions. Before embarking on 
outlining policy recommendations however, I will first revisit the project management 
literature to communicate their five standard ways to manage risks: as I believe this will 
act as a useful point of reference for such discussions.  
4.3.1 Five ways to manage risk 
The first method to manage risk is to accept it, if its likelihood of happening and/or 
its impact if they do occur, are not significant. The second method, if the nature of the 
risk is identifiable, is to avoid it if possible: this might involve a re-design of the process 
of engagement to involve greater certainty or (as often with an investment), reject an 
opportunity and move on after little evaluation. This can mean missing good opportunities 
– and in my research context, it would mean avoiding investments of any sort in Africa. 
Thirdly, risks can be reduced through the accumulation of knowledge: by again avoiding 
the risk when the acquired knowledge demands rejection; or planning how to manage the 
risk in advance, through the application of contextual capabilities. Alternatively, the 
nature of the risk might permit the building of contingencies/redundancies into your 
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planning or deciding on pre-planned responses (you accept and plan for the risks). 
Fourthly, risks can be transferred to another entity, if there is one that is prepared to 
accept the risk. Finally, the fifth method is to reduce the level of risk by diluting it through 
diversification: this only works with project specific risks, not systemic risks (and many 
make the mistake, of not appreciating the difference) [Hillson, 2004]. These risk 
management responses, will now be applied to my market-breakdowns. 
4.3.2 Proposed solutions 
➢ Resolve knowledge asymmetries between the ‘outsiders and the insiders’.  
To resolve knowledge asymmetries, I am advocating the creation of a new 
institution: to reduce/remove asymmetric knowledge between investors and the 
recipients of investment value: both external and internal (risk-management method 
three). Such an institution would partly function in a similar way to a CRA: in that it 
would be responsible for collating, amalgamating, analysing, and disseminating 
information for use by all the interested participants of the SSA infrastructure investment 
ecosystem – however, it would also be responsible for much more.  
For the wider African technical infrastructure ecosystem, this institution would remove 
knowledge asymmetries, by acting as a repository of sector relevant news and other 
essential contextual knowledge; it would also rate the reliability and credit worthiness of 
the regions countries, utilities, industry suppliers, contractors, and any other actors – but 
through its process of delivering this, ensure there exists a roadmap of best practice’ for 
such actors to aspire to and imitate. Unlike a traditional CRA however, it would also seek 
to create common organisational standards, processes and documentation and skills; it 
would also be responsible for training and disseminating the dynamic technical 
capabilities that Teece et al [1997] (see Chapter 4, sec.5) described as essential for the 
efficient functionality of such a technical innovation system – which it would deliver to 
any sub-Saharan country that required such a strengthening of knowledge and skill.  
For potential investors: it would function in a similar way to a CRA. It would be 
responsible for building a repository of knowledge of qualitative and quantitative 
indicators surrounding all likely and relevant risks involved in building any type of 
infrastructure within the sub-Saharan region. This would involve creating and publishing 
risk assessments and ratings for individual countries, their relevant institutions, and 
private enterprises. This knowledge would be of an open access nature and freely 
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available at no cost. Its dissemination process will prioritise creating transparency and 
removing knowledge asymmetries.  
The existence of such an institution would help resolve a number of the market-
breakdowns identified in my key finding five. These would include hold-up problems, 
adverse selection problems, and certain policy related technical, financial and project 
management capability deficiencies. 
How to prevent institutional capture.  
I am sure the need for such an organisation has occurred to others (maybe not with 
both functions combined), which would support the notion that creating such an 
institution is likely to be challenging. Certainly, the dominant CRAs  following the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2008/9, have indicated that there is an ample scope for contestations 
surrounding such organisations: as their decisions can have significant value altering 
outcomes. With this knowledge, I will therefore apply a political economy lens, to 
understand the most likely dynamics that would potentially negatively impact my 
proposal.  
The fundamental instability surrounding this sort of organisation, concerns the 
substantial value altering nature of their decisions; and therefore, how neutrally and 
objectively they can act in their function as a credit referee when making such decisions: 
such as when a third party with an agenda is helping to pay the bills? Or to reposition this 
approach slightly: can their raison d’etre be captured and corrupted by interested parties? 
To answer this problem holistically, I will consequentially unpack the dynamics of 
influence – who benefits most if credit decisions are changed? And assume that this is 
most likely to comprise any recipient of the types of value, that can be derived from an 
investment. 
The evidence from the risk challenges that impact the objectivity of the current 
dominant US based CRAs, concerns how these sort of institution are and have been 
financed – their business models. If they only charge ‘ratings fees from the recipient of 
their analysis, this might  cause the CRA to expend a disproportionate resource on 
‘chasing new business’ rather than accurately keeping their ‘published rating’ analysis 
accurate  and relevant. There is also likely to be a bias to be generous in the published 
conclusions of any such analysis towards those that are paying for it [Deb et al, 2011] – 
which will overtime undermine the organisations reputation and credibility.  
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A recipient pays model is also problematic in other ways, particularly in the 
development context of SSA. Firstly, the landscape of investment is already a financially 
challenged  one, as discussed throughout this thesis, so it is unlikely that many of the 
profiled potential recipients will be able to afford to pay for such a rating – which 
undermines this proposal’s raison d’etre. We also know from my second paper, Chapter 
4, that misappropriation is a problem in the region - and as such an institution will be 
recruiting its human cognitive capital, from the region – so my proposed institution will 
also be at risk from known cultural factors that will be normalised within its employees. 
In a user pays model, the investor that relies on the rating pays for it, which is equally 
problematic in this region. Initially (and currently) the need for such ratings is not a 
commercial proposition – there is just too small a financial demand to deliver a revenue, 
that can create a meaningful and useful institutional capacity (Chapter 2. Sec.1). Further, 
the role described for this institution is not meant to be purely a commercial one, it is also 
about delivering a public good for the region – creating a knowledge capacity, to enable 
future economic growth that would otherwise be unlikely to occur.  
Due to the problems summarised, my proposed institution therefore needs to be 
independently funded, probably through ODA from multilateral sources in a similar way 
as the multilateral banks are. I am also opposed to this organisation being located within 
an existing institution either: as such, a function is different to the current multilateral 
functions of a development bank. Just as a CRA operates independently from the other 
investment industry functions, so would this institution need to do. I do not want this 
institution’s functions, to be captured by any kind of bank or existing organisation. 
➢ Expand the availability of political risk transfer and credit 
enhancement tools:  
Expand or replicate the capacity of MIGA (risk-management method four). Currently 
private investors have two ways of managing political risk, and both utilise the existing 
DFIs (development finance institutions), and their inferred political influence.  
Firstly, they can use the MIGA (Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency) facility of 
the World Bank: which is in effect an insurance scheme offering political risk insurance 
and credit enhancement guarantees. It currently offers five classes of insurance product: 
Currency Inconvertibility and Transfer Restriction coverage; Expropriation coverage; 
War, Terrorism, and Civil Disturbance coverage; Breach of Contract coverage; Non-
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Honouring of Financial Obligations coverage [miga.org]. This scheme appears to be 
working well, but it is a global scheme that is limited in its capacity to cover SSA. 
Therefore, it needs a replication of similar insurance capacity either by other well-
resourced institutions or by expansion of its current capacity.  
Even though these tools are useful, and in keeping with some of my findings, they are not 
yet comprehensive and have a (potentially prohibitive) cost in what is a normal margin 
business (chapter 2, sec.4.2) and so cannot be described as a silver bullet. According to 
the MIGA annual report, SSA only received US$18.4 billion of guarantees [Ibid], this is 
nowhere the financial capacity required (US$2 trillion) to nullify electricity poverty in 
the region described at the beginning of this chapter. 
The second method that DFIs offer to help control political risk and enhance credit is by 
crowding-in [ICA, 2017; IEA, 2019]. In my research context, this involves the following: 
one or more DFIs will become early ‘cornerstone’ investors in a project and because of 
their expertise and implied power as a representative of the DAC community, act as 
protectors of all the corresponding investors. They are in effect sharing their position and 
knowledge as a DFI as an externality benefit of protection, which is used by the remaining 
investors in the project. This is a cheaper form of cover, as there is no direct cost. As a 
form of protection, for some it will be too weak as it is implied and less comprehensive 
as a risk mitigation tool. It is also limited to the projects that the DFIs choose or can 
support. That said, it is helpful and useful and needs its expanding as a tool. 
➢ Improve the level of capabilities for infrastructure project delivery (risk 
management method three). 
There is a limitation in the level of skills and capabilities available for delivering 
infrastructure projects efficiently in the sub-Saharan region. These skill shortages affect 
all stages of projects:  from initiation; through design, construction, and commissioning; 
to operation and maintenance. They are responsible for the region’s relatively high project 
development costs, low project quality and weak operating performance. These are 
particularly associated with my key finding V, market-breakdown four. 
Such project skills and capabilities are usually developed in two broad ways. They are 
either created as individuals undertake education and training in universities, technical 
colleges, and similar organisations (codified knowledge); or they are enhanced by 
learning by doing. This involves programmes of training, apprenticeship, and mentoring: 
Page 162 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
usually within firms. This second part of the skill transfer process involves the acquisition 
of tacit knowledge and is an essential element of innovation [Bell & Pavitt, 1993]. The 
usefulness of codified knowledge is dramatically improved when it is enhanced by 
learning by doing [Scott-Kemmis & Bell, 2010]. 
As I mentioned in my key finding V, market-breakdown four, firms within SSA are 
not currently developing these skills, and it should be a policy priority to discover how to 
remedy this. 
4.4 Prioritise the improvement of the functionality of utilities 
As emphasised in my conclusion of my second co-authored paper: if a centralised 
electricity, delivery system is to be persevered with for delivering electricity services 
within SSA – experienced, knowledgeable, and skilled managers must manage it. Without 
the improvement of the efficiency of utilities and the surrounding government-controlled 
structures, electricity poverty within SSA will remain a stubborn policy problem. This is 
essentially an issue of capabilities, the resolution of which I have already covered. 
Recognising that this may be difficult to achieve, because of factors of domestic 
politics in the countries concerned (key finding VI), it may be necessary for policy 
makers to consider alternative choices. Options that can succeed, despite the failings of a 
centralised electricity delivery system (if that is possible); or explore possible ways to 
replace the existing system, with a decentralised one. This represents a motivation behind 
my new perspective for policy that I will feature in section five.  
4.5 Internalising externality spillover benefits 
As I explained in my key finding VIII and in in chapter 2 (sec.4.8), the value of the 
externality spillover benefits that would be created by delivering universal, reliable, and 
affordable electricity access to SSA, are substantial. However, this value is very difficult 
for the private sector to monetise through internalisation, permitting their legitimate 
appropriation. It is this policy truth, which is probably the most compelling reason for 
promoting a public sector narrative over a private sector one, when seeking a solution to 
African electricity poverty: as the state does have the ability to appropriate such value 
through its ability to raise taxes. Conversely, the creation of this externality value, also 
represents a compelling reason for promoting the policy of private sector sourced 
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financing – as through that policy’s success, there will be a substantial value transferred 
to a recipient economy, with no recompense to those who have created the value and 
transferred it: the ‘private’ actor.  
This is definitely a policy conundrum: and reminds me of the philosophical debate 
between the consequentialists (Jeremy Bentham & John Stuart Mill) and the admirers of 
the categorical imperative (Immanuel Kant). As the positive externalities of electricity 
access are substantial and diffused, I would argue from a development policy perspective: 
the achievement of universal electrification in SSA is more important than how it is 
attained.  
As discussed specifically in Chapter 2 sec.4, and throughout this thesis, a traditional 
private investor is seeking a minimal level of return to justify their engagement as an 
investor – but this is difficult to attain in SSA. This is partly due to the inability to 
appropriate the spillover benefits associated with the delivering a general-purpose 
technology (Introduction, sec.1.2) to an economy that doesn’t have affordable and reliable 
access to it – but it is also because so much economic value is lost through the risks 
described in Chapter 4 of this thesis. If the loss of value through risk can be minimised, 
it may be realistic to believe the value that cannot be appropriated from the spillover, may 
actually not be required to make such investment attractive enough to private actors. 
If externality spillover value is still required to make the investment maths attractive, 
the only spillover value that I have been able to identify through my research, that has the 
potential to be internalised, is the strategic value to the international community that a 
functioning state using climate friendly technologies represents. This type of value could 
also bypass my key finding VII concerning the exchange of currency.  
The obvious way to internalise this, is through a form of subsidy. However, with the 
current frictions surrounding ODA from the electorates of many OECD countries – such 
subsidies are probably too politically awkward to administer to a private entity in my 
research context.  It would therefore be necessary to be more creative in designing such 
solutions. I note that this has been tried with failure in the past, when the Clean 
Development Mechanism had promised such value through the creation of Carbon-
Credits, but then had a minimal impact on SSA (causing substantial angst within African 
Policy circles). There is currently such potential through article 2.1c of the Paris 
Agreement, which could be a subject for further research.  There may also be the potential 
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to overcome this, through a radical new approach to repositioning how households are 
defined within the electricity delivery regime – which I discuss in section 5.2. 
4.6 Areas for future research that arise out of this thesis 
4.6.1 Marginalised rural stakeholders of electricity services 
I have identified a research need to explore whether it is possible to redefine how poor 
African rural households function as a stakeholder group, within their country’s 
electricity delivery systems. Currently, such electricity delivery systems, have a 
disposition towards the urban populations of the country, in their organisation, 
governance and their electricity value propositions. Consequentially, rural households 
find themselves excluded as stakeholders from the electricity delivery system, as they are 
not sufficiently wealthy for the system to desire them as customers. Inevitably, if their 
electricity system ignores such households as stakeholders, then they in return will not 
see any arrangements surrounding that system as legitimate and will consequentially not 
support the integrity of the system in return. Such an actuality encourages both the theft 
of electricity, and theft/vandalism of the physical infrastructure; and leaves the entire 
network vulnerable to political opportunism. 
I am advocating that there should be research to see if the current energy technology 
transition, from fossil fuels to renewables, can also be used to redefine what the rural poor 
of Africa can represent as stakeholders within their country’s electricity delivery systems. 
It appears possible to use the distributive and modular traits of how renewable 
technologies function, to possibly transform poor rural households from being 
stakeholders that cannot afford to consume electricity (and are marginalised), to 
becoming stakeholders at the heart of their electricity system.  
It should be possible to reorganise rural communities to become effective electricity 
generators, where they can consume and generate an electricity surplus simultaneously, 
just as fishermen and farmers can feed their families whilst simultaneously securing a 
living to support their families. This would transform them from signifying stakeholders 
who currently see no value in supporting the current electricity service system, as it 
marginalises them and represents zero value to them and their community – to 
stakeholders who can rely on the electricity system to supply their livelihoods: meriting 
support and improved legitimacy, compared to  the current status-quo.  
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4.6.2 Classifying the risks surrounding the development of nuclear power 
for electricity generation, in sub-Saharan Africa? 
One gap in my research, concerns the development of nuclear power technology, for 
electricity generation. As I touch on in my concluding remarks in the next section, my 
topography of study for this thesis has been pan-African, to which I have taken a top 
down approach – looking at both the governance and the financing of electricity systems 
for the region of SSA. This has then particularly examined the problematic nature of  large 
scale and novel technology projects. It seems a natural fit therefore, for my technology 
evaluation to be extended to include nuclear fission technologies.  
During my numerous visits to South Africa, carrying out research for my thesis (which 
included attending pan-African conferences), I have been able to identify both an interest 
from governments in the region to develop nuclear power generation capacity, and 
vendors of such technology (particularly Russian) to concentrate their promotional 
efforts, on this region too. Whilst I do not anticipate that such technology development 
would be privately financed, I do anticipate an increased likelihood that state actors will 
increase their pressure for such development in the region, which will include its 
financing. Following my Section 1.2 in this Chapter, I believe the most realistic actor to 
be China. With this focus in mind, I think it is necessary for thorough and authoritative 
research to be conducted, that appreciates the difficulties and legacy issues that could 
arise out of such a technology development. I also think my research on Medupi and 
Kusile would lead into such research, quite nicely. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Back in 2015, when I decided that I wanted to author a PhD but was not yet familiar with 
what it would entail – I was very solutions focused and approached my subject as if the 
region was a single entity. This approach was very quickly amended, as I started to engage 
with the various academic institutions that I had identified, when all counselled me that 
that the scope of my research was unrealistic in its scale of investigation that a pan African 
approach would entail. I was also anticipating that much of my research, would require 
interviewing investors about what aspects discouraged their investment appetite in SSA. 
I am therefore aware of two potential criticisms of this thesis, that I wish to close down 
before concluding it:  
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• Why I am treating SSA in my thesis as a single entity, as each country is unique 
and have their own problems and needs: which I completely recognise and concur 
with incidentally. 
• Why I have not sought investor’s opinions directly, for why they are not investing 
in SSA? 
I recognise that these both appear to be legitimate and important observational questions  
– hence my desire to explain why I have not applied either of them in my analytical 
approach and data collection, for my research subject.  
Investment decisions to proceed are homogenous 
One of the early lessons I learnt once I proceeded with my research, was the 
importance of perspectives: how I chose to analyse my research problem. Initially I acted 
on the advice I had received about cutting back my area of scrutiny and chose a 
manageable sample of three countries: Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique, for my first 
published paper. As my research expanded and I started to unpack my research problem 
however, it soon became apparent that I needed to re-appraise my perspective. My 
research problem was one for investors, not the recipients of their funding – and investors 
have uniformity in how they approach investment: as I explained in my conceptual 
approach in chapter 2, section 4.  
Investors all have three questions when they decide where and how to invest, which 
as I said in section 4.5, acts as my risk filter:  
(i) Is it realistic to expect a reimbursement of the value of the investment (the initial 
cost) in the future? 
(ii) Is it realistic to expect to receive the anticipated returns (the rewards) when 
they are expected?  
(iii) How does this investment opportunity, compare with every other investment 
opportunity that is available?  
Due to this reappraisal of perspective, I therefore argue that it is reasonable for me to take 
a pan sub-Saharan approach, rather than just focus on a small sample of countries. 
These same three questions are also the reason that I never relied on investor sourced 
data for this thesis. After commencing with my research, I did interview some investors. 
Some of the South African investment banks and Aldwych International (who were the 
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developer of the Lake Turkana wind farm, in Kenya) were the most significant, but I soon 
realised that this had predominantly been the approach of others past research: particular 
grey or practitioner research. I also conjectured that this had not delivered a workable 
understanding of my research problem, as if it had the policy failure of private financing, 
would probably not be an ongoing policy failure. Within my first year of analysis, I 
therefore decided to just focus on approaching my problem from a theoretical approach, 
utilising finance academic theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Page 168 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
References 
Abramovitz M; (1986); Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind; (the journal 
of economic history); Vol6, No2, The tasks of economic history; Cambridge 
University Press (on behalf of the Economic History Association); pp385-406 
Abramovitz M; (1994a). The Origins of the Post-war Catch-Up and Convergence 
Boom;  in Fagerberg, J., Verspagen, B., von Tunzelman, N. (Eds.), The Dynamics of 
Technology, Trade and Growth. Edward Elgar, Aldershot; pp21-52.  
Abramovitz M; (1994b); Catch-up and Convergence in the Postwar Growth Boom and 
After; in Baumol, W. J., Nelson, R. R., Wolf, E. N. (Eds.), Convergence of 
Productivity – Cross-national studies and historical evidence. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press; pp86-125.  
Acemoglu D, Robinson J A; (2012); Why Nations Fail, the origins of power and 
prosperity and poverty; Random House, New York 
Ackermann T, Andersson G, Sodar L; (2001); Distributed generation: a definition; 
Electric Power Systems Research 57 (2001) 195-204; Elsevier Science 
Adebayo E, Sovacool B.K, Imperiale S; (2013); It’s about dam time: improving 
microhydro electrification in Tanzania; Energy for Sustainable Development; Vol 17 
(4); August 2013, pp378-385 
AFDB; (2010); Vision Statement by Dr. Akinwumi Adesina, candidate for President of 
the African Development Bank (now current President); Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-
Documents/Akinwumi_A._ADESINA_Vision_Statement.pdf 
AFDB; (2018); African Economic Outlook, 2018; African Development Bank, 
Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire 
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/African_Economic
_Outlook_2018_-_EN.pdf 
Africa Feeds: 13/02/2019:  
https://africafeeds.com/2019/02/13/eskom-declared-technically-bankrupt/ 
Africa Progress Panel; (2017); Lights, Power, Action: Electrifying Africa; (2017); 
Geneva, Switzerland.  
Page 169 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/APP_Lights_Power_Action_Web_PDF.pdf 
Africa 50; https://www.africa50.com/ 
Akerlof G; (1970); The markets for lemons: quality, uncertainty and market 
mechanisms; Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol 84 (3), pp488-500 
Alden C; (2005); China in Africa; Survival; 47 (3), pp147-164 
Alderman N, Ivory C, McLoughlin L, Vaughan R; (2005); Sense making as a process 
within complex service-led projects; International Journal of Project Management 23 
(5) pp380-385 
Amars L, Fridahl M, Hagemann M, Roser F, Linner B; (2017); The transformational 
potential of nationally appropriate mitigation actions in Tanzania: assessing the 
concept’s cultural legitimacy among stakeholders in the solar energy sector; Local 
Environment, 22:1; pp86-105; Routledge 
Ansar A, Caldicott B, Tilbury J; (2013); Stranded Assets and the Fossil Fuel 
Divestment Campaign: What does divestment mean for fossil fuel assets? Smith 
School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, UK 
Ansar A, Flyvbjerg B, Budzier A, Lunn D; (2017); "Big Is Fragile: An Attempt at 
Theorizing Scale"; The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press), Chapter 4, pp. 60-95; URL for final print: 
http://bit.ly/2bctWZt  
Ansar A, Flyvbjerg B; (2016); Big is Fragile: Why the UK Government Should Not 
Approve The Hinkley Point C Nuclear Power Station; Petroleum Review, vol. 70 
(834), pp.37-40, 
Arezki R, Bolton P, Peters S, Samama F, Stiglitz J; (2016). From global saving glut 
to financing infrastructure: the advent of investment platforms; IMF Working 
Paper; International Monetary Fund, 2016. 
Arrow K; (1970); Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and 
Externalities; Book Chapter: The Analysis of Public Output; Published by National 
Bureau of Economic Research; pp1-30; Volume ISBN: 0-87014-220-8 
Page 170 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Atkinson R, Crawford L, Ward S; (2006); Fundamental uncertainties in projects and 
the scope of project management; International Journal of Project Management 24 
(8), pp687-698 
Avon and Dedisa Peaking Power; http://www.peakers.com/  accessed 20/08/2019 
Ayanwale A.B; (2007); FDI and Economic Growth: Evidence from Nigeria; AERC 
Research Paper 165 African Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi April 2007 
Baker L, Sovacool B. K; (2017); The political economy of technological capabilities 
and global production networks in South Africa’s wind and solar photovoltaic (PV) 
industry; Political Geography; Vol 60; September 2017, pp1-12, Elsevier 
Becker B. Milbourn T; (2011); How did increased competition affect credit ratings? 
Journal of Financial Economics 101(2011) pp413-514, Elsevier 
Bekker B, Eberhard A, Gaunt T, Marquard A; (2008); South Africa’s Rapid 
Electrification Program: Policy, Institutional Planning, Financing and Technical 
Innovations; Energy Policy 36 (2008) pp3125-3137, Elsevier 
Bell M, Pavitt K; (1993); Technology accumulation and industrial growth: Contrasts 
between developed and developing countries; Oxford University Press 1993 
Bessis J; (2015); Risk Management in Banking; John Wiley & Sons, East Sussex, UK 
Biz News; 17/03/2019; https://www.biznews.com/briefs/2019/03/17/pravin-gordhan-
eskom-loadshedding 
Blimpo M.P. & Cosgrove-Davies M; (2019); Electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa: 
uptake, reliability, and complimentary factors for economic impact; The World 
Bank, Washington DC 
BLOOMBERG 1; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-
05/mozambique-sets-foreign-exchange-limits-standard-bank-says 
BLOOMBERG 2; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-08-16/china-
economy-passes-japan-s-in-second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise  
Bohlmann J.A, Inglesi-Lotz R; (2018); Analysing the South Africa residential sector’s 
energy profile; Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews; Vol 96; November 2018; 
pp240-252 
Page 171 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Bond P; (2008); South Africa’s Developmental State Distraction, Mediations: Journal 
of the Marxist Literary Group; 2008 Vol 24 (1) Dossier: South Africa; pp9-26  
Booth D; (2012); Development as a collective action problem: Addressing the real 
challenges of African Governance; Overseas Development Institute, Africa Power 
and Politics, 2012; ISBN:978-1-907288-94-4. 
Brady T, Davies A; (2014); Managing structural and dynamic complexity: a tale of 
two projects; Project Management Journal, Vol. 45 (4) pp21-38 
Brady T, Davies A, Nightingale P; (2012); Dealing with Uncertainty in complex 
projects: revisiting Klein and Meckling; International Journal of Managing Projects 
in Business; Vol 5 (4) (2012), pp718-736 
Bresnahan T.F, Trajtenberg M; (1995); General Purpose Technologies: engines for 
growth; Journal of Econometrics 65 (1995) 83-108; Elsevier Science SA 
Bratton M, Van de Walle N; (1994); Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political 
Transitions in Africa; World Politics, Vol 46, No. 4, (1994), pp453-489 
Briceño-Garmendia C, Smits K, Foster V; (2009); Financing public infrastructure in 
sub-Saharan Africa: patterns and emerging issues; January 2009; World Bank 
Group, Washington DC, USA 
Brix Pedersen M, (2016), Deconstructing the concept of renewable energy‐based mini‐
grids for rural electrification in East Africa; March 2016; Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Energy and Environment; https://doi.org/10.1002/wene.205 
Brookes N.J, & Locatelli G; (2015); Power plants as megaprojects: using empirics to 
shape policy, planning and construction management; Utilities Policy 36 (2015), 
pp57-66 
Business Day; (4/09/2019);  
https://protect-eu.mimecast.com/s/_xi9CN05NTRoGjumpSu7?domain=businesslive.co.za 
Butler A; (2008); “Cyril Ramaphosa”; Jacana Media; ISBN: 1770093702 (ISBN13: 
9781770093706) 
Byigero A.D, Clancy J, Skutsch M; (2010); CDM in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
prospects of the Nairobi Framework Initiative; Climate Policy, Vol 10, issue2, 
pp181-189 
Page 172 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Byrne J, Mun Y-M; (2003); Rethinking Reform in the Electricity Sector: Power 
Liberalisation or Energy Transformation? Chapter in: “Electricity Reform: Social 
and Environmental Challenges”; Wamukonya N; United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP); Risoe Centre, Roskilde 
Castalia Strategic Partners; (2014); Barriers to Infrastructure Service Delivery in sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia; Literature review for ‘Evidence on Demand’. 
CEPA 1; (2015): Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd; Mobilising Finance for 
Infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia: a literature review; prepared 
for UK Department for International Development; March 2015 
CEPA 2; (2015): Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd; (2015); Mozambique 
Country Case Study; prepared for UK Department for International Development; 
August 2015 
CEPA 3; (2015): Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd; (2015); Kenya Country 
Case Study; prepared for UK Department for International Development; August 2015 
CEPA 4; (2015): Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd; Mobilising Finance for 
Infrastructure: final report; prepared for UK Department for International 
Development; August 2015. 
Chandler A.D; (1990); Scale and Scope: the dynamics of industrial capitalism; The 
Balknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, USA 
Chapman C, Ward S; (2011); How to Manage Project Opportunity and Risk; John 
Wiley and Sons. UK 
Cheung Y.W, De Haan J, Qian X, Yu S; (2012); China’s outward direct investment 
in Africa; Review of International Economics; 20 (2); pp201-220 
Chirambo D; (2016); Addressing the renewable energy-financing gap in Africa to 
promote universal energy access: Integrated renewable energy financing in Malawi; 
Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews; Vol 62; September 2016; pp793-803 
Christensen J, Gulde A.M, Pattillo C; (2006); Bankable Assets: Africa faces many 
obstacles in developing financial systems; Private Sector Development; Findings 
Reports 276, July 2006, World Bank, Washington 
Page 173 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Christie R; (1984); Electricity, Industry, and class in South Africa; Albany, NY, 
University of New York Press 
Collier P; (2014); Attracting international private finance for African infrastructure; 
Journal of African Trade 1 (2014); pp37-44. 
Commission of Enquiry into State Capture; https://www.sastatecapture.org.za/ 
Compagnon D; (2011); A predictable tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the collapse of 
Zimbabwe; University of Pennsylvania Press; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA 
Cook P; (2011); “Infrastructure, Rural Electrification and Development”; Energy 
for Sustainable Development 15 (2011) pp304-313, Elsevier 
Darley W; (2012); Increasing sub-Saharan Africa’s share of Foreign Direct 
Investment: public policy challenges, strategies and implications; Journal of African 
Business, 13:1, 62-69 (2012). 
David P; (1994); Why are institutions the ‘carriers of history’?: Path dependence and 
the evolution of conventions, organizations, and institutions; Structural Change and 
Economic Dynamics; Vol 5, Issue 2, Dec 1994, 205-220; Elsevier 
Davies A, Gann D, Douglas T; (2009); Innovation in megaprojects: system integration 
at London Heathrow Terminal Five; California Management Review, Vol. 51 (2), 
pp101-125 
Deb P, Manning M, Murphy G, Penalver A, Toth A; (2011); Whither the Credit 
Ratings Industry? Bank of England: 
file:///C:/Users/jg459/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d
8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/whither-the-credit-ratings-industry.pdf 
De Jager D, Rathmann M; (2008); Policy instrument design to reduce financing costs 
in renewable energy technology projects; Ecofys International BV P.O. Box 8408 
NL-3503 RK Utrecht Kanaalweg 16-G NL-3526 KL Utrecht The Netherlands; By 
order of the: IEA Implementing Agreement on Renewable Energy Technology 
Deployment (RETD) 
De Soysa I; (2003); Foreign Direct Investment, Democracy, and Development: 
Assessing Contours, Correlates, and Concomitants of Globalization; Routledge; 
Department of Minerals and Energy; (1998); White Paper on the Energy Policy of the 
Republic of South Africa; 1998, RSA Department of Minerals and Energy  
Page 174 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
ISBN: 0-9584235-8-X 
Dilnot A, Helm D; (1987); Energy Policy, Merit Goods and Social Security; Fiscal 
Studies; https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5890.1987.tb00298.x 
Dixit A, Pindyck R,S; (1994); Investment under uncertainty; Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Donou-Adonsou F, Lim S; (2018); On the importance of Chinese Investment in 
Africa; Review of Development Finance; 8, pp63-73 
Doorsamy W, Cronje W.A; (2015); Sustainability of decentralised renewable energy 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa; Conference Paper; 4th International Conference on 
Renewable Energy Research and Applications; Palermo, Italy. 
Eberhard A; (2007); The political economy of power sector reform in South Africa; 
Book chapter 6: The political economy of power sector reform: the experiences of five 
major developing countries;  Edited by David G. Victor, Stanford University, 
California , Thomas C. Heller, Stanford University, California; Cambridge University 
Press. 
Eberhard A; (2015); Powering Africa: Facing the financing and reform challenges; 
Revue of Economic Development, (Vol. 23); 2015/HS, pp39-48 
Eberhard A, Gratwick K, Morella E, Antmann P; (2017); Independent Power 
Projects in sub-Saharan Africa: Investment Trends and Policy Lessons; Nature 
Energy 2; Article number: 17005 (2017); A Nature Research Journal 
Eberhard A, Gratwick K, Morella E, Antmann P; (2016); Independent Power 
Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Five Key Countries; The World Bank, 
Washington DC, 2016. 
Eberhard A, Shkaratan M; (2012); Powering Africa: meeting the financing and 
reform challenges; Energy Policy 42, (2012) pp9-18; Elsevier 
Egan A, Wafer A (2004); The Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee: Globalisation, 
marginalisation, and new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa - A joint 
project between the Centre for Civil Society and the School of Development Studies, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
Page 175 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Eisenhardt K.M; (1989); Agency theory: An assessment and review; Academy of 
Management; 14(1): pp57-74, Elsevier 
Ekholm T, Ghoddusi H, Krey V, Riahi K; (2013); The effect of financial constraints 
on energy-climate scenarios; Energy Policy; Vol 59, August 2013; pp562-572 
Ekouevi K, Elizondo-Azuela G; (2013); Financing Energy Access. In: Renewable 
Energy for Unleashing Sustainable Development. Springer International Publishing. 
 https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-00284-2_9.  
Ellingsen T. Johannesson M; (2004);  Is There a Hold‐up Problem? The Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics 106 (3), pp475-494; Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, Uk 
Engineering News: 31/07/2019; https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/south-
african-yields-climb-as-bond-sale-amounts-raised-for-eskom-2019-07-
31/rep_id:4136 
Erdmann G, Engel U; (2006); Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All 
Concept; GIGA-WP-16/2006; German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, 
Germany 
Eskom 1; Annual Financial Statement, 31 March 2019; 
http://www.eskom.co.za/IR2019/Documents/Eskom_2019_AFS_singles.pdf 
Eskom 2: 
http://www.eskom.co.za/Whatweredoing/ElectricityGeneration/PowerStations/Peaki
ng/Pages/Ingula.aspx 
Eskom 3: http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heritage/Pages/1990.aspx ; 
http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/heritage/Pages/2000.aspx  
Eskom 4: http://capechamber.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Supplier-
Development-and-Localisation-W-Cape-Final-3.pdf  
Eskom 5: http://www.eskom.co.za/sites/idm/documents/sd_l_criteria_framework.pdf  
Fagerberg J, Srholec M; (2008); National innovation systems, capabilities, and 
economic development; Research Policy, vol. 37,  
Falcon R. Ham A.J; (1988); The characteristics of Southern African Coals; Journal of 
South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy; Vol 88 (5) May 1988, pp145-161 
Page 176 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Florini A, Sovacool B.K; (2009); Who governs energy? The challenges facing global 
energy governance. Energy Policy, 37(12), pp5239-5248. 
Flyvbjerg B; (2005); Design by deception: the politics of megaproject approval; 
Harvard Design Magazine, June 2005, pp50-59 
Flyvbjerg B; (2009); Survival of the unfittest: why the worst infrastructure gets built – 
and what we can do about it; Oxford Review of Policy Reform, Vol. 25 (3), 2009, 
pp344-367 
Flyvbjerg B; (2014); What you should know about megaprojects, and why: an 
overview; Project Management Journal, vol. 45, no. 2, April-May, pp6-19 
Flyvbjerg B; (2017a); Did megaproject research pioneer behavioural economics? The 
case of Albert O. Hirschman; In: The Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford; ch8, pp155-193 
Flyvbjerg B; (2017b); Introduction: the iron law of megaproject management; In: The 
Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Flyvbjerg B, Skramis Holm M.K, Buhl S.L; (2002); Understanding costs in public 
works projects: error or lie; Journal of American Planning Association 68 (3), pp279-
295 
Flyvbjerg B Bruzelius N, Rothengatter W; (2003); Megaprojects and risk: an anatomy 
of ambition; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Freeman C; (1995); The ‘National System of Innovation’ in historical perspective; 
Cambridge Journal of Economics; Volume 19, Issue 1, February 1995, pp5–24, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.cje.a035309 
Freeman R.E; (2004); Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Revisited; 
Organisation Science, Vol 15, No. 3, May-June 2004, pp364-369 
French H; (2014); China’s second continent; Alfred A Knopf; New York, USA 
Friebe C.A, von Flotow P, Taube F.A. (2014); Exploring technology diffusion in 
emerging markets: the role of public policy for wind energy; Energy Policy 70 
(2014), pp 217-226 
Page 177 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Froot K.A, Stein J.C; (1991); Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: An 
Imperfect Capital Markets Approach; The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Volume 106 (4), November 1991, pp 1191–1217, 
Fukuyama F; (2011); The origins of political order; Farrar, Straus and Giroux; New 
York 
G20; 2017; Compact with Africa; G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
Meeting (March 2017); 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Featured/G20/g20-
communique.pdf;jsessionid=F6D1532148EF6BACFD8E46C984D62C7B?__blob=publicationFile&v=3 
Gallagher T.J, Andrew J.D; (2000); Financial management: principles and practice; 
Prentice Hall 
Garcia F.J.P; (2017); The WACC; Chapter 17, Financial Risk Management: 
identification, measurement, and management; pp 345-351; Palgrave Macmillan 
Geels F. W; (2004). From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: 
Insights about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory; 
Research Policy, Vol 33, (6-7); September 2007; pp897-920 
Gentle L; (2009); Escom to Eskom: from racial Keynesian capitalism to neo-liberalism 
(1910-1994); Book Chapter 2; Electric capitalism: recolonising Africa on the power 
grid; HSRC Press, RSA 
Gentzoglanis A; (2013). Regulation of the electricity industry in Africa: in search of 
an optimal model – where and when the next model? African Journal of Economic 
and Management Studies, Vol 4, issue 1, pp 34-57 
Geraldi J.G; (2008). The balance between order and chaos in multi-project firms; a 
conceptual model; International Journal of Project Management 26 (4), pp348-356 
Godinho C, Hermanus L; (2018); (Re)conceptualising State Capture – with a case 
study of South African power company Eskom; conference paper prepared for the 
Public Affairs Institutes conference on: ‘State Capture and its aftermath, building 
responsiveness through state reform’; 22-24 October 2018, Johannesburg. 
Gollwitzer L, Ockwell D, Muok B, Ely A, Ahlborg H; (2017). Rethinking the 
sustainability and institutional governance of electricity access and mini-grids: 
Electricity as a common pool resource; Energy Research and Social Science; Vol 39; 
May 2018; pp152-161 
Page 178 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Greenberg S; (2009); Market liberalisation and continental expansion: the 
repositioning of Eskom in a post-apartheid South Africa; Book Chapter 3; Electric 
capitalism: recolonising Africa on the power grid; HSRC Press, RSA 
Greentech Media (2019). Living under the Grid: 110 Million of Africa’s unconnected 
customers represent a massive opportunity; 
 https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/living-under-the-grid-110-million-of-
africas-unconnected-customers-represen 
Gregory J.A, Sovacool B.K; (2019a). The financial risks and barriers to electricity 
infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique: A critical and systematic 
review of the academic literature; Energy Policy 125 (2019), pp145-153, Elsevier 
Gregory J.A, Sovacool B.K; (2019b). Rethinking the governance of energy poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa: reviewing three academic perspectives on electricity 
infrastructure investment; Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 111 (2019) 
pp344-354 
Gu J, Carey R; (2019); China’s development finance and African infrastructure 
development; Book Chapter 8: China-Africa and the Economic Transformation; 
Oxford University Press 
Gujba H, Thorne S, Mulugetta Y, Kavita R, Sokona Y; (2012). Financing low carbon 
energy access in Africa; Energy Policy; Vol 47 (1); June 2012; pp71-78 
Gumbe L; (2016). Electrifying Kenya through conventional and renewable sources; 
conference paper; 2016 ASABE international meeting (American society of 
agricultural and biological engineers). 
Halff A, Sovacool B.K, Rozhon J; (2014). Energy Poverty: Global Challenges and 
Local Solutions; Oxford University Press; Oxford, UK 
Hillson D.A; (2004). Effective opportunity management for projects: Exploiting 
positive risk; Boca Raton, US: Taylor & Francis; ISBN 0-8247-4808-5, pp 38-40, 167-
174 
Hirschman A.O; (1967). Development Projects Observed; accessed through E Book: 
Brookings Institution Press (2015); first published 1967 
Hobday, M; (1995). Innovation in East Asia: The Challenge to Japan . London: Edward 
Elgar. 
Page 179 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Hobday M, Rush H, Tidd J; (2000); Innovation in complex products and system; 
Research Policy 29, pp.793-804 
Hofmeister J, Krebs S, Schickhuber G, Scharfenberg G; (2015). Design and 
development of a Pico hydro turbine system for the use in developing countries; 
Conference paper; 2015 Proceedings of the 5th International Youth Conference on 
Energy (IYCE). 
Holstenkamp L, (2019). What do we know about cooperative sustainable electrification 
in the global South? A synthesis of the literature and refined social-ecological 
systems framework; Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews; Volume 109, July 
2019, pp307-320 
Hood C; (1991); A Public Management for all Seasons? Public Administration; 69 (1); 
pp3–19.  
Howlett M. Ramesh M. Perl A; (2009); Studying Public Policy: policy cycles & policy 
sub-systems; Oxford University Press 
Hufty M; (2011). Investigating Policy Processes: The Governance Analytical 
Framework (GAF); Research for sustainable development: foundations, experiences, 
and perspectives; In: Wiesmann U, Hurni H (editors); Geographica Bernensia, 2011 
pp403-424, 
 Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2019005  
Hull J.C; (2018). Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives, 10th Edition; Pearson; 
 https://www.vitalsource.com/referral?term=9780134631493 
ICA: The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa; (2017); Infrastructure financing trends 
in Africa; The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa Secretariat c/o African 
Development Bank 01 BP 1387, Abidjan 01, Côte d'Ivoire; WWW.ICAfrica.org 
Institute for Economic Affairs; (2015). Situational Analysis of Energy Industry, Policy 
and Strategy for Kenya; 5th Floor ACK Garden House 1st Ngong Avenue P.O. Box 
53989-00200 Nairobi, Kenya  
file:///C:/Users/julia/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8
bbwe/TempState/Downloads/Situational-Analysis-of-Energy-Industry-Policy-and--
Strategy-for-Kenya%20(1).pdf 
International Energy Agency, United Nations Development Program, United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation; (2010). Energy Poverty: how to 
make modern energy access universal? OECD, Paris, France 
Page 180 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
IEA: International Energy Agency; (2017). WEO- Special Report: Energy Access 
Outlook; OECD, Paris, France.  
Available at: https://webstore.iea.org/weo-2017-special-report-energyaccess-outlook. 
IEA: International Energy Agency; (2018). Energy Access Database. OECD, Paris 
Available at: https://www.iea.org/energyaccess/database/  
IEA: International Energy Agency; (2019). Africa Energy Outlook 2019; OECD, Paris 
Available at: https://www.iea.org/africa2019/ 
IFC: International Finance Corporation; (2016). Transforming African Development: 
Partnerships and Risk Mitigation to Mobilize Private Investment on a New Scale; 
IFC, Washington DC, USA 
IOL, 12/12/2007; https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mbeki-apologises-for-sa-power-
cuts-382421 
Jerome B; (1996); Trade Unions in South Africa: dramatic change after apartheid 
ends; Monthly Labour Review, Washington, Vol 119 (5)’ pp37-41 
Jovanovic B, Rousseau P,L; (2005). General Purpose Technologies; National Bureau 
of Economic Research; 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138; January 
2005 
J.P. Morgan Asset Management; (2017). Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions, 
21st Annual Edition. https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320744868579.pdf 
Isaacman A.F, Isaacman B.S; (2015). Extending South Africa's Tentacles of Empire: 
The De-territorialisation of Cahora Bassa Dam; Journal of Southern African Studies; 
Vol 41(3), 2015 
Kagimu V, Ustun T.S; (2016). Novel Business Models and Policy Directions based on 
SE4ALL Global Framework for Minigrids; 2016 IEEE International Conference on 
Emerging Technologies and Innovative Business practices for the transformation of 
societies (Emergitech).  
Kardes I, Ozturk A, Cavusgil T, Cavusgil E; (2013). Managing global megaprojects: 
complexity and risk management; International Business review 22 (2013) pp905-
917 
Page 181 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Kim L; (1997); Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological 
Learning; Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Kinda T; (2013). Beyond natural resources: horizontal and vertical FDI diversification 
in Sub-Saharan Africa; Applied Economics; Vol 45 (25), 2013, pp3587-3598 
Kihwele S, Hur K, Kyaruzi A; (2012). Visions, Scenarios and Action Plans Towards 
Next Generation Tanzania Power Systems; Energies; 2012,  
ISSN 1996-1073 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies 
Kojima M, Trimble C; (2016). Making power affordable for Africa and viable for its 
utilities”; World Bank, Washington DC; 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/25091/108555.pdf?se
quence=10&isAllowed=y 
Kreibich N, Hermwille L, Warnecke C,  Arens C; (2017). An update on the CDM in 
Africa in Times of Market Crisis; Climate and Development; 9 (2017), 2, 178-190 
DOI: 10.1080/17565529.2016.1145102  
Kowalska-Pyzalska A; (2018). What makes consumers adopt to innovative energy 
services in the energy market? A review of incentives and barriers; Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews; Vol 82 (3); February 2018 pp3570-3581 
Krueger A; (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society; The American 
Economic Review; American Economic Association; Vol64, NO.3, (1974), pp291-
303 
Labordena M, Patt A, Brazilian M, Howells M, Lilliestam J; (2017). Impact of 
Political and economic barriers for concentrating solar power in sub-Saharan 
Africa; Energy Policy 102 (2017) pp52-72, Elsevier 
Lammers I, & Diestelmeier L; (2017). Experimenting with law and governance for 
decentralized electricity systems: Adjusting regulation to reality? Sustainability. Vol 
9, issue 2, 2017 
Levy B; (2014). Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in 
Development Strategies; Oxford University Press, UK 
Page 182 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Locatelli G, Mariani G, Sainati T, Greco M; (2017). Corruption in public projects and 
megaprojects: there is an elephant in the room; International Journal of Project 
Management 35 (2017) pp252-268 
Longstaff F.A; (2001). Optimal Portfolio Choice and the Valuation of Illiquid 
Securities; The Review of Financial Studies, Summer 2001, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 407-
431; The Society for Financial Studies 
Lundvall B. A: (1985) Product innovation and user-producer interaction, industrial 
development; Research Series 31, Aalborg: Aalborg University Press. 
Lundvall B. A: (1992); National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning; London, Pinter. 
Mail & Guardian: 9/01/2015; https://mg.co.za/article/2015-01-08-21-days-and-eskoms-
broke/ 
Madonsela S; (2019); Critical reflections on state capture in South Africa; Insight on 
Africa; Sage Journals, Dec 2018 
Markusen J.R, Venables A.J; (1999). Foreign direct investment as a catalyst for 
industrial development; European Economic Review, Vol43 (2), pp335-356; Elsevier 
Maylor H, Vidgen R, Carver S; (2008). Managerial complexity in project-based 
operations: a grounded model and its implications for practice; Project Management 
Journal, Vol. 39, ppS15-S26 (supplement) 
Miga.org  https://www.miga.org/what-we-do accessed 10/10/2020 
Mill, J. S. (1848). The Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their 
Applications to Social Philosophy. London: John W. Parker.  
Miller R. Hobbs B, (2009). The complexity of decision making in large projects with 
multiple partners: be prepared to change; In: Making essential choices with scant 
information: front end decision making in major projects; Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, pp375-389 
Miller R. Lessard D.R, (2000). Public goods and private strategies: making sense of 
project performance; In: The strategic management of large engineering projects: 
shaping institutions and risks; MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp19-49 
Page 183 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Mining MX: 01/09/2017; https://www.miningmx.com/special-reports/mining-
yearbook/mining-yearbook-2017/30368-power-drain-eskom-sliding-towards-
bankruptcy/ 
Monyei C.G, Jenkins K.E.H, Serestina V, Adewumi A.O; (2018a). Examining energy 
sufficiency and energy mobility in the global south through the energy justice 
framework; Energy Policy, Vol 119, August 2018, pp68-76 
Monyei C.G, Adewumi A.O, Jenkins K.E.H; (2018b). Energy (in)justice in off-grid 
rural electrification policy: South Africa in focus; Energy Research and Social 
Science, Vol 44, October 2018, pp152-171 
Moumakwa D.O. Marcus K; (2005). Tribology in coal-fired power plants; Tribology 
International 38 (2005), pp805-811 
Mosca, M. (2008); On the Origins of the Concept of Natural Monopoly: Economies of 
Scale and Competition. The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 
15(2), pp317–353.  
Moyo B; (2013). Power infrastructure quality and manufacturing productivity in 
Africa: A firm level analysis; Energy Policy, Vol 61, October 2013, pp1063-1070 
Myers S; (2013). The Economic Challenge of Rural Electrification: Community 
Solutions Initiative in Africa; IEEE 2013 Global Humanitarian Technology 
Conference. 
Nelson R & Winter S; (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Nightingale P. Baden-Fuller C. Hopkins N.H; (2011). Projects, Project Capabilities 
and Project Organisations; Project-Based Organizing and Strategic Management, Vol 
28, pp215-234 
Ockwell D, Byrne R; (2016). Sustainable energy for all: Innovation, technology and 
pro-poor green transformations; Routledge, London 
OECD.org: http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-
development/development-finance-
standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm 
Ogando Noah, Pretorius L; (2015). Managing Project Risk in the Electricity Industry 
in Africa; Conference Paper; International Association for Management of 
Technology, IAMOT 2015, conference proceedings 
Page 184 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Onyeji-Nwogu; (2017). Chapter 3 - Harnessing and Integrating Africa's Renewable 
Energy Resources; Renewable Energy Integration; Practical Management of 
Variability, Uncertainty, and Flexibility in Power Grids; 2017, pp27-38 
Parshall L, Pillai D, Mohan S, Sanoh A, Nodi V; (2009). National electricity planning 
in settings with low pre-existing grid coverage: Development of a spatial model and 
case study of Kenya; Energy Policy; Vol 37, (6); June 2009; pp2395-2410 
Pigou A; (1932). The Economics of Welfare, 4th edition; Macmillan and Company, 
London  
Pindyck R, S; (1986). “Irreversible investment, capacity choice, and the value of the 
firm”; Working Paper; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts 
Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 July 1986 
Pollitt C, Bouckaert G; (2004). Public management reform: A comparative analysis, 
2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive strategy: techniques for analysing industries and 
competitors. New York: Free Press. 
Rafey W, Sovacool B. K; (2011); Competing discourses of energy development: the 
implications of the Medupi coal fired power plant in South Africa; Global 
Environmental Change 21 (2011) pp1141-1151 
Robbins G, Perkins D; (2012). Mining, FDI, and infrastructure development on 
Africa's east coast: examining the recent experience of Tanzania and Mozambique; 
Journal of International Development; John Wiley and Sons; 
https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.2817 
Rodrik D; (2002). After Neoliberalism, What? Remarks at the BNDES Seminar on 
“New Paths of Development”, Rio de Janeiro, September 12-13 2002. 
Rogers E.M; (2010). Diffusion of Innovations; Free Press, New York 
Sanderson J; (2012). Risk, uncertainty and governance in megaprojects: a critical 
discussion of alternative explanations; International Journal of Project Management 
30 (2012), pp432-443 
Sayed T & Bruce D; (1998). Inside and Outside the Boundaries of Police Corruption; 
African Security Review, Vol 7: No2, 1998, pp 3-21, 
Page 185 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Scott-Kemmis, D, Bell, M. (2010). The mythology of learning-by-doing in World War 
II airframe and ship production, Int. J. Technological Learning, Innovation and 
Development, Vol. 3 (1), pp.1–35 
Sen A; (1999). Development as Freedom; Oxford: Oxford University Press. UK 
Silberston, A. (1972). Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice; The Economic 
Journal, 82(325), 369–391. http://doi.org/10.2307/2229943 
Sovacool B.K; (2012). The political economy of energy poverty: A review of key 
challenges; Energy for Sustainable Development; Vol 16 (3) September 2012; pp272-
282 
Sovacool B.K; (2014a). Defining, measuring, tackling Energy Poverty; Energy 
Poverty: Global challenges and local solutions; Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK; 
Book chapter pp21-52 
Sovacool B.K, Axsen J, Sorrell S; (2018). Promoting novelty, rigor, and style in energy 
social science: Towards codes of practice for appropriate methods and research 
design; Energy Research and Social Science; Vol 45, November 2018, pp12-42 
Sovacool B.K, (2014b). What are we doing here? Analysing fifteen years of energy 
scholarship and proposing a social science research agenda; Energy Research and 
Social Science; Vol 1, March 2014, pp1-29 
Sovacool B.K, & Cooper C.J; (2013); The Governance of Energy Megaprojects: 
Politics, Hubris and Energy Security; Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, The 
Lypiatts, 15 Lansdown Road’ Cheltenham; Glos GL50 2JA; UK 
Steyn G; (2001); Governance, Finance and Investment: decision making and risk in 
the power sector; DPhil, SPRU, University of Sussex. 
Stigler, G. J. (1958). The Economies of Scale. Journal of Law & Economics, 1, 54.  
Teece D; (1986); Profiting from technical innovation: Implications for integration, 
collaboration licensing and public policy; School of Business Administration, 
University of California, Berkley, USA 
Teece D. J, Pisano G, Shuen A; (1997). Dynamic and Strategic Management;  
Strategic Management Journal. 18 (7): pp.509–533. 
Page 186 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Times Live: 11/03/2019; https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-03-11-state-capture-
koko-ordered-eskom-to-accept-dodgy-coal-from-gupta-mine/ 
Tinoco M, Montoya F, Frem B, Oduor J, Calderon E.A, Madrigal M; (2012). 
Planning of interconnections in central America and East Africa, considering 
uncertainties; January 2012; Cigre, 21 rue d′Artois, F-75008 Paris.  
Tyler T.R; (1990). Justice, self-interest, and the legitimacy of legal and political 
authority; In J. J. Mansbridge (Ed.), Beyond self-interest pp171-179. Chicago, IL, US: 
University of Chicago Press. 
UNCTAD; (2017). Transformational Energy Access, the Least Developed Countries 
Report; UNCTAD/LDC/2017; ISBN 978-92-1-112914-4 
Van de Graaf T, Sovacool B.K; (2014). Thinking Big; politics, progress, and security 
in the management of Asian and European energy megaprojects; Energy Policy 74 
(2014) pp16-27 
van Noordwijk M; (2019). Integrated natural resource management as pathway to 
poverty reduction: Innovating practices, institutions and policies; Agricultural 
Systems; Volume 172, June 2019, pp 60-71 
Wang Q, von Tunzelmann N; (2000); Complexity and the functions of the firm: 
breadth and depth; Research Policy 29; pp.805-818 
Warrack A.A; (1985). Resource megaproject analysis and decision making;  Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, Western Resources Program, Victoria, BC 
Warrack A.A; (1993); Megaproject decision-making: lessons and strategies; Western 
Centre for Economic Research, Faculty of Business, University of Alberta, Edmonton. 
1993. 
Wenzel J; (2016). Amandla! Awethu! Energy, infrastructure, rights, services, 
Interventions; International Journal of Postcolonial Studies Volume 18, 2016 - Issue 
6: South Africa  
Williams N.J, Jaramillo P, Taneja J, Ustun T.S; (2015). Enabling private sector 
investment in microgrid-based rural electrification in developing countries: a 
review; Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 52 (2015) pp1268-1281 
Page 187 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
Williams N.J, Jarmillo P, Taneja J; (2016). PV-array sizing in hybrid 
diesel/PV/battery microgrids under uncertainty; conference paper – 2016 IEEE PES; 
Power Africa Conference.  
Williams T. & Samset K, (2010). Issues in Front end decision making on projects; 
Project Management Journal, vol. 41 (2), pp38-49 
William T.M; (1999). The need for new paradigms of complex projects; International 
Journal of Project Management 17 (5), pp269-273 
Williamson J; (1990). Latin American Adjustment: How much has happened? Institute 
for International Economics (now: Peterson Institute for International Economics); 
Washington DC, USA 
Williamson J; (2004A). The Washington Consensus as a Policy Prescription for 
Development; A lecture in the series "Practitioners of Development" delivered at the 
World Bank on January 13, 2004. 
Williamson J; (2004B). A short history of the Washington Consensus; Paper 
commissioned by Fundación CIDOB for a conference “From the Washington 
Consensus towards a new Global Governance,” Barcelona, September 24–25, 2004. 
World Bank 1; (2017). Linking Up: Public-private partnerships in power transmission 
in Africa; World Bank Group, Washington, D.C. (2017); 
 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26842 
World Bank 2 (2017). Tackling Africa’s Skills Gap to Build More Robust and 
Diversified Economies; Africa Pulse; (Oct 2017); Africa's Pulse, World Bank Group, 
Washington, D.C.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/572941507636665377/Africas-Pulse. 
World Bank 3 (2017). Why We Need to Close the Infrastructure Gap in Sub-Saharan 
Africa; (April 2017); Africa’s Pulse, World Bank Group, Washington D.C. 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348741492463112162/Africas-pulse 
World Bank; (2010). World Bank Annual Report 2010: Year in Review; World Bank 
Group, Washington, D.C  
D.C.http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2010/Resources/WorldBank-
AnnualReport2010.pdf 
Page 188 
 
Governance of private investment surrounding African electricity infrastructure  
 
World Bank (2011). Africa’s power infrastructure: investment, integration, efficiency; 
World Bank Group, Washington, D.C. (2011); http://hdl.handle.net/10986/2290 
World Bank 2 (2010). Addressing the Electricity Access Gap; (June 2010); World 
Bank Group, Washington, D.C; 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTESC/Resources/Addressing_the_Electricity_
Access_Gap.pdf 
World Bank; (1996). Evaluation results 1994; The International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development, Washington. 
World Economic Forum; https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/how-can-africa-
develop-its-electricity-infrastructure/ 
Yadav P, Malakar Y, Davies P.J; (2019). Multi-scalar energy transitions in rural 
households: Distributed photovoltaics as a circuit breaker to the energy poverty cycle 
in India; Energy Research & Social Science, Volume 48, February 2019; pp1-12 
Yescombe E.R; (2002). Principles of Project Financing; Academic Press, San Diego, 
California, USA; www.academicpress.com  
Zamana R & Brudermann T; (2017). Energy governance in resource-poor settings: 
The case of Bangladesh; Energy Procedia, Volume 142, December 2017, pp2384-
2390 
 
